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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AT THE
MILLENNIUM: A HISTORICAL REVIEW AND
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
STEPHEN F. BEFORT*
Abstract: This Article uses a historical perspective as a basis to analyze
the current state of labor and employment law in the United States.
The Article first chronicles the decline in collective governance and the
corresponding rise in the governmental regulation of the individual
employment relation during the past 50 years, and attempts to ascertain
the socio-economic forces contributing to this evolution. The Article
then critiques the current state of workplace legal rules and finds a
number of deficiencies in terms of both efficiency and equity. The
Article pays particular attention to the impact of globalization and the
resulting exacerbation in the imbalance of power between labor and
capital. The Article concludes by making four recommendations for
systemic law reform with an eye toward the development of new
international norms in the areas of job security, collective bargaining,
employee participation programs, and the legal status of the contingent
workforce.
INTRODUCTION
The passage into the new millennium has unleashed a passion
for reflection and assessment. It is as if this monumental turning of
the calendar necessitates a meaningful appraisal of our world today as
a prerequisite for a better tomorrow. This Article joins in this trend by
reflecting on the status of American labor and employment law at the
millennium. This particular assessment, however, is undertaken with a
historical focus on tracking the changing nature of labor and em-
ployment law over the past fifty years. Grounded in the notion that
"what's past is prologue," 1 this longitudinal perspective provides a
unique viewpoint from which to appraise the present and to develop
recommendations for a better tomorrow.
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. The author thanks Kimberly
Pullman, Monica Grubbs, Sarah Link, Jessica Clay, and Adam Gillette for research assis-
tance and Anne Johnson for editorial assistance.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 2, Sc. i, line 281.
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Assessing the current status of American labor and employment
law is the easiest part of this task. Simply put, it's a mess. In 1950, the
American workplace was structured by two overarching legal regimes:
the presumption of at-will employment and the alternative of labor-
management co-determination. Since then, both of these regimes
have crumbled. In their stead today is a patchwork of governmental
regulation that lacks both doctrinal coherence and administrative
efficiency.
A closer look, however, reveals a more complicated and troubling
story, as the legal structures of employment have failed to keep pace
with dramatic changes in working life. As examples of such changes,
the demographic composition of the workforce and thè output of
workers both have changed markedly. Even more significant is the
transformation in the how and why of work. Global trade and tech-
nology have crafted a workplace unknown in 1950.
Workplace change, of course, has influenced the evolving legal
landscape. Innovations in trade and technology, however, have set
askew the balance of power in the workplace. With capital mobility
enhanced, the previous equilibrium between management and labor
has been destroyed. As a result, the current regulatory regime simply
does not play fair with workers.
Pressure emanates from global economic competition, creating a
disastrous "race to the bottom." The watchword of "flexibility" de-
mands ever-increasing workplace deregulation throughout the world.
The fact that the United States already leads the industrialized world
in the lack of workplace regulation does little to stem that tide within
our borders.
What is needed is not massive deregulation, but a new interna-
tional consensus on labor norms. This is not the first time that tech-
nological change has tipped the balance of power in favor of capital.
In previous eras of sweeping innovation and workplace change, legal
regulation eventually stepped in to create a new equilibrium that re-
balanced considerations of efficiency and fairness. This must happen
again.
This Article attempts to contribute to the building of the consen-
sus that will be necessary to achieve a new equilibrium. In particular,
it offers four recommendations for systemic reform in American labor
and employment law to guide it toward such a consensus.
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Part I of this article describes the law of the American workplace
as it existed in 1950. 2 Part II tracks the changes that have occurred
during the past 50 years and summarizes the current legal frame-
work. 3 This part also discusses workplace changes that have contrib-
uted to the evolution of legal rules.4 Assisted by this historical per-
spective, Part III goes on to provide a policy-oriented critique of the
present scheme of American labor and employment law. 5 Part IV then
concludes by making four recommendations for reformulating
American labor and employment law. 6
I. LEGAL REGULATION OF THE WORKPLACE- 1950
A. Introduction
The typical American employee in the 1950s was a white male
with an education that did not exceed that of a high school degree?
Women comprised only one out of three members of the civilian la-
bor force at this time.8 Minorities made up only ten percent of the
workforce. 9
Most employees at the mid-point of the twentieth century worked
in blue-collar jobs. Typical occupations included manufacturing, min-
ing, construction, and unskilled labor positions.th Employees working
in the service sector accounted for only twelve percent of the total
2 See infra notes 7-61 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 62-175 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 176-296 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 297-460 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 461-716 and accompanying text.
7 In 1955, 69.76% of the total labor force was male. See U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, By-
REM/ OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO
1970, at 131 (1975). In addition, in 1955, 85.4% of the civilian labor force as a percentage
of the civilian non-institutional population consisted of white males. See id. at 133. In 1950,
the mean years of school completed by white males was 9.3, and in 1960 it had risen to
10.6. See id. at 381.
8 See HANDBOOK OF U.S. LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS, PRICES, PRO-
DUCTIVITY, AND OTHER LABOR DATA 52 tbl.1-7 (Eva E. Jacobs ed., 3rd ed. 1999) (showing
33.9% of working age females participating in the civilian labor force in 1950).
9 See U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, 1999 REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE 141 tbl.8
(1999). The U.S. Department of Labor did not maintain data concerning minorities in the
workforce until 1954. At that time, approximately six million out of a total workforce of
sixty million workers were nonwhite. See id.
i° See id. at 146 tb1.12. In 1950, approximately forty-five million employees were on
nonfarm pylons. Of these employees, 15.2 million worked in manufacturing jobs, 0.9
million in tni ll i ll g jobs, 2.4 million in construction jobs, and 13.4 million in other unskilled
labor positions. See id.
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workforce." Professional employees made up another eighteen per-
cent of the workforce. 12
The American workplace of 1950 was subject to very little gov-
ernment regulation. Absent union representation, employers were
free to hire and fire employees at their sole discretion. Employers
were free to set terms and conditions of employment subject only to
the minimum standards imposed by the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). 15 The FLSA, enacted in 1938, required (and still requires)
employers to pay covered employees the equivalent of the mandated
minimum hourly wage plus overtime compensation at one and one-
half times the regular rate of pay for time worked in excess of forty
hours per week. In 1950, the minimum wage was pegged at seventy-
five cents per hour. 14
This lack of legal regulation is vividly illustrated by one of the
most significant workforce transitions in recent history: the return of
the armed forces following the conclusion of the Second World War.
During the war, the Armed Forces increased from 800,000 men in
December 1940 to nine million in June 1943 and 12.3 million in June
1945. 15 The increased draw on the male workforce created a shortage
in the civilian workforce which was to a great extent alleviated by an
influx of women into the workforce. 16 This change proved to be only
temporary as United States' employers replaced female employees
11 See id. (showing approximately 5.3 million American workers employed in the serv-
ice sector in 1950).
35 See id. (indicating that, in 1950, the finance, insurance, real estate, services, and gov-
ernment sectors employed 7.9 million American workers).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
" See U.S. Dep't of Labor, History of Federal Minimum Wage Rater Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 1938-1996, at http://www.dol.gov/dol/esa/public/minwage/charchtild
(last visited March 15, 2002).
35 See U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, AMERICAN WORKERS' FACT BOOK 34 (1960).
16 See Phyllis T. Bookspan, A Delicate Imbalance—Family and Work, 5 TEx. J. WOMEN & L.
37, 45 n.45 (1995). Prior to Pearl Harbor, women comprised only 27.6% of the American
workforce. See id. During the war the percentage of women working in factories increased
to 46% and by the end of the war 37% of the workforce was made up of women. See id.; see
also Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: Historical and Legal Perspectives
of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. Soc. Potty & L. 581, 590 (1997). During the years sur-
rounding World War II, 20.6 million women entered the nation's workforce. See Bookspan,
supra, at 45 n.95. In fact, in 1940, women filling positions previously held by men who had
been drafted made up nearly 25% of the labor force. See id. This increased demand for
labor manifested itself differently within the African-American community. See Nancy E.
Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 Ann. L. REV. 431, 435 (1990). Typi-
cally, African-American women were denied factory, office, and sales jobs that were held by
most white women, and instead found work in domestic employment. See id.
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with returning male G.I.s after the war." Some of these replacements
were voluntary;" some, however, were not."'
Employer preference for male workers in 1950 was perfectly law-
ful. Civil Rights statutes prohibiting the discriminatory treatment of
women and minorities in employment did riot yet exist." The relative
skills and abilities of the displaced workers were legally irrelevant.
Simply put, the existence or nonexistence of the employment rela-
tionship was almost entirely a matter of employer discretion, not gov-
ernment regulation.
The principal exception to this laissez-faire approach was in the
arena of labor-management relations. The National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), adopted in 1935, obligated employers to negotiate with
the freely-selected union representatives of their employees. 21
Thus, in 1950, the workforce and the relatively barren landscape
of employment regulation could be divided into two main sectors.
The largest was the at-will sector in which employers possessed the
legal authority to determine unilaterally the existence and terms of
the employment relationship. Smaller, yet still quite significant, was
the unionized sector in which employers and unions bilaterally set
terms and conditions of employment.
B. The At-Will Sector
In 1950, "employment law" did not exist as an area of legal prac-
tice or study. The controlling law of the workplace at that time was
either labor law or the at-will regime, which was no law at all. More
12 See Marion 0. Crab, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gender Structure of Wage Labor,
89 Mien. L. REV. 1155,1167 (1991).
12 See id. Ruth Millkman has argued that this reversion to postwar patterns is a result of
two factors: (1) the traditional sexual division of labor was so ingrained in society and in-
dustry that it compelled the reversion; and (2) that while it was profitable for industries to
utilize women in the workforce during the war, they could get more "bang for their buck"
by employing men when they were available. See id.
12 The federal government played a large role in pushing worsen out of the workforce
when it granted veterans the right to displace wartime workers and it terminated child care
funding that had been established during the wan See Bridge, supra note 16, at 590. In
addition, many industries restructured their workforce through outright layoffs. See Dowd,
supra note 16, at 436. As a result of these reallocations of employment opportunities, by
1947 only sixteen minion women, 30% of the working age females, remained in the labor
force. See Bridge, supra note 16, at 590. Those women who did remain in the workforce
returned to jobs more traditionally allocated to females that were lower paying and typi-
cally in the clerical field. See id.
2° See infra notes 276-278 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of Title
VII, the first federal antidiscrimination statute, in 1964).
21 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
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than two-thirds of American employees in 1950 fell into the latter,
regulation-free category.
The at-will rule, which provides the theoretical foundation for
this sector, is generally traced to treatise writer Horace Gray Wood,
who wrote the following in 1877:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hir-
ing is prima fade a hiring-at-will, and if the servant seeks to
make out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish
it by proof.... t is an indefinite hiring and is determin-
able at the will of either party. 23
Although the accuracy of Wood's description of the law is ques-
tionable,24 "Wood's rule" quickly became the law throughout the
United States. 25 Only a few years later, for example, the Tennessee
Supreme Court articulated its classic formulation of the rule: "All may
dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause,
for no cause or even for a cause morally wrong, without being thereby
guilty of legal wrong."26
The employment-at-will doctrine is premised on a theoretical
equality of rights where both employer and employee have the right
to terminate the employment relationship at any time and for any
reason. This theoretical equality was consistent with prevailing late
nineteenth century notions of freedom of contract and unfettered
entrepreneurship. 27 As a doctrine grounded in market rather than
22 For a good description of the development and historical antecedents of the em-
ployment-at-will rule, see Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20
Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
"14.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
24 .See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Meting Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Ariz. 1985) CM
commentators and courts later would point out, none of the four cases cited by Wood
actually supported the rule."); Note, Implied Contract Rights to fob Security, 26 STAN. L. REV.
335, 341-42 (1974). Apparently, some American courts continued to follow the one-year
presumption as to duration, which had been borrowed from the English common law. See
Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in
Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1825 n.51 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Protecting At Will
Employees] (citing CHARLES MANLEY SMITH, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SER-
VANT 53-57 (1852)).
25 See Feininan, supra note 22, at 121.
2 Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds by
Hutton v. Waters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915).
21 See Note, Protecting At Will Employees, supra note 24, 1824-26 (1980) ("By increasing
the employer's freedom in the employment relationship and restricting her liability, the at-
will contract rule was meant to further economic growth and entrepreneurship."); see also
Richard J. Pratt, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further Encroachments on the
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legal forces, the at-will rule has been defended on the grounds that it
promotes overall economic efficiency with a minimum of administra-
tive costs.28
Thus, two significant attributes characterized the legal framework
governing the at-will sector in 1950. First, employers possessed virtu-
ally unfettered discretion over both the existence and terms of the
employment relationship. Second, beyond the basic at-will principle
itself, this sector was essentially free of any governmental regulation.
C. The Unionized Sector
Union members accounted for 31.5% of the Atnerican nonagri-
cultural workforce in 19502" Although this figure is far lower than in
many European countries, it is not far below the all-time U.S. high of
35% recorded in 1954." Indeed, the union movement was so strong
during this period that Congress, by adopting the Taft-Hartley Act in
1947, significantly amended the NLRA in order to curb what was per-
ceived to be excessive union power."
The vast majority of unionized employees" are subject to two
sources of legal regulation. One source, in the form of a federal stat-
ute, is the NLRA. The other is in the form of contractual rules flowing
from privately-negotiated collective bargaining agreements.
Broadly speaking, the NLRA protects three types of employee
conduct. First, the NLRA, at least in the private sector," protects the
Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 201 ("Mhe at-will doctrine contributed
to the entrepreneurship and economic growth of an era.").
ss See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947
(1984); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic
Efficiency, 38 EMORY LJ. 1097 (1989).
" U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 1980b, at 412 tb1.165, in MI-
CHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10 tbl.1
(1987). Approximately fifteen million American workers belonged to unions in 1950. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, BICENTENNIAL EDITION D 927-39 (1975). Of these, approximately eight
and one-half million were members of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), four
million belonged to the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), and the remaining
two and one-half million were members of independent or unaffiliated organizations. See
id.
'° See GOLDFIELD, supra note 29, at 10 161.1.
31 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
32 The exact size of the unionized sector is somewhat imprecise in that not all union
members are covered by collective barga. g agreements and not all of the employees
who are so covered are union members.
" The NLRA does not apply in the public sector. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994). Most
states, however, have enacted labor relations acts applicable to public employees. Many of
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right of employees to engage in organizational activities." The NLRA
specifically prohibits an employer from interfering with an employee's
right to join a union or to engage in activities that urge fellow em-
ployees to join a union." Accordingly, an employer commits an un-
lawful labor practice by such acts as discharging an employee organ-
izer36 or making threats of reprisal for union support. 37
A second right conferred by the NLRA is the right of employees
to bargain collectively through their selected union representative."
Mandatory subjects of bargaining include "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment,"" but not matters that go to the
core of an employer's entrepreneurial control," such as plant clos-
ings41 and product advertising." The NLRA obligates both parties to
negotiate in "good faith" 43 with a present intention to find a basis for
agreement,'" although "such obligation does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession:43
Finally, the NLRA protects the right of employees to engage in
"concerted activity ... for mutual aid or protection." 46 This includes a
these statutes provide rights and obligations similar to the NLRA, with the notable excep-
ti011 Of the right to strike. See DONALD ET AL, BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 9-11
(4th ed. 1993) (describing the typical provisions of the public sector labor relations stat-
utes adopted in 36 states). Only thirteen of these state statutes recognize a right of public
employees to engage in strikes, and even in these states, the right is "limited and condi-
tional." See id. at 10.
m 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). The NLRA also protects an employee's tight not to join a
union and to refrain from engaging ill organizational activities. Id.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994).
36 See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
37 SeeNLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
" 29 U.S.C. § 157.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994); see NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S.
342 (1958).
413 See Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (stating that the NLRA does not require bargaining with regard to managerial
decisions 'which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control").
41 See, e.g., First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (ruling that an em-
ployer is not required to bargain with respect to a decision to close part of its business
operation).
42 See, e.g., NLRB v. Detroit Resilient Floor Decorators Local Union No. 2265, 317 F.2d
269 (6th Cir. 1963) (ruling that an employer is not required to bargain with respect to
deciding whether to contribute to an industry promotion fund).
29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
44 See NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 683-84 (9th Cir. 1943).
4s 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
42 29 U.S.C. § 157; see also 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1994) ("Nothing in this Act, except as
specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede
or diminish in any way the right to strike.").
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ban on an employer's ability to discharger or otherwise retaliate
against an employee who participates in a lawful strike. In reality, most
collective bargaining agreements waive the union's right to strike dur-
ing the contract term in favor of a grievance arbitration mechanism
for dispute resolution 49
Collective rights arising under the NLRA are enforced through
administrative procedures. The NLRA prohibits various "unfair labor
practices" committed either by employers 50 or labor unions." The
NLRA established as its administrative enforcement mechanism a Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) with two distinct functions. One
branch of the NLRB, under the direction of the NLRB's General
Counsel, investigates and prosecutes unfair labor practice proceed-
ings on behalf of complaining unions, employees, or employers. 52 In-
dependently, the NLRB, as a five-member, quasi-judicial body, reviews
the unfair labor practice decisions of administrative law judges."
Collective bargaining agreements, negotiated pursuant to the
NLRA, may also create enforceable rights. For example, the vast ma-
jority of such agreements provide for a "just cause" limitation on em-
ployee discipline and discharge." Most contracts also establish a
grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration to resolve
contract interpretation and application disputes. 55 Taken together,
47 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1994); NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 700 F.2d 385 (7th
Cir. 1983).
48 See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-35 (1967) (employer
committed unfair labor practice by paying accrued vacation benefits to all qualifying em-
ployees except those who participated in lawful strike).
49 See FRANK Eutotau & EDNA A. ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 8 n.34 (5th ed.
1997) (noting two studies which found that approximately 90% of collective bargaining
agreements with arbitration clauses also contain a limitation on the right to strike during
the life of the contract). The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that unless the
agreement specifies otherwise, it is presuined that the availability of grievance arbitration
waives the union's right to strike in response to an alleged breach of the labor contract. See
Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
85 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
51 29 U.S.C. § 158(6).
82 See 29 U.S.C. § 153 (d) (1994).
83 See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a), 160(c) (1994). NLRB decisions, in turn, are subject to fur-
ther review by the federal appellate courts. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1994).
" See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "fits( Cause" in Employee
Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 594 n.1 (1985) (94% of collective bargaining agree-
ments entered into under the NLRA contain clauses that provide that an employer may
discharge employees only with "just cause").
88
 See Characteristics of Major Collective Bargaining Agreements, July 1, 1976, 2013 U.S.
DEFT OF LABOR Butt. 82 (1979) (reporting that approximately 96% of agreements in
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this means that employers may discharge employees covered by union
contracts only upon convincing a neutral arbitrator that just cause
exists to support the termination decision. 56 If an employer fails to
carry this burden, an arbitrator typically issues a "make whole" rem-
edy consisting of an order for reinstatement and back pay.57 These
arbitration decisions are subject to very limited judicial review.55
Accordingly, the unionized sector was and remains characterized
by four important attributes. First, while the unionized sector was sub-
ject to greater governmental regulation than the at-will sector, this
regulation still has largely been only indirect and procedural in na-
ture. The NLRA, itself, has never mandated any substantive terms of
the employment relationship. 59 The Act, instead, regulates only the
process of collective bargaining, leaving the substance to private or-
dering by the effected parties. This, in turn, leads to a second attrib-
ute of the unionized sector—management and labor bilaterally estab-
lish terms and conditions of employment through the collective
bargaining process. Those employees who are represented by a union
representative have a collective voice in the governing of their work
life. Third, most employees in the unionized sector are subject to dis-
charge only upon an employer's showing that it had "just cause" to do
so 60 Finally, unions can enforce this job security standard in a rela-
tively expeditious and inexpensive arbitration forum. 67
II. THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE WORKPLACE-2000
Much has changed in the world of labor and employment law in
the past 50 years. Both unions and the at-will rule have declined in
relative importance. But while down, neither is yet out. The unionized
sector continues as a unique subset of the workplace regulatory struc-
effect during July 1976 in the nation's most important industries provided for arbitration
as the terminal point of the contractual grievance process).
56 Typically, labor and management jointly select a neutral arbitrator from a list of pri-
vate arbitrators maintained by a federal or state agency. See generally LAURA COOPER ET AL.,
ADA IN THE WORKPLACE 19 (2000).
57 See ABA SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN
ARBITRATION 369-71 (1998).
58 See Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,599 (1960) ("[S]o far as
the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business
overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.").
" See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99,103 (1970).
60 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Etscoum & Eamon, supra note 49, at 10-13 (noting the advantages of arbi-
tration over litigation); Roger 1. Abrams, The Integrity of the Arbitral Process, 76 Mims. L. REV.
231,236-37 (1977) (same).
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lure, though clearly reduced in size. And, while the at-will rule no
longer defines the entire legal relationship applicable to most em-
ployees, it still serves as the default presumption outside of the union-
ized sector.
Governmental regulation, meanwhile, has grown apace. The
American workplace has evolved front a largely unregulated arena to
one subject to regulation front a myriad of sources—federal and state,
legislative and judicial. Employers, correspondingly, attempt to ease
the weight of these regulations. American firms increasingly have
turned to non-employee, or contingent, work arrangements as a
means of avoiding employee-orientated regulation. The explosion of
the contingent workforce is, indeed, a third major phenomenon of
working life at the turn of the millennium.
A. The Decline of American Unions
The decline of the American union movement is a well-known
story. Beginning in the mid-1950s, union density as a proportion of
the non-agricultural labor force began a long and steady slide. Today,
union density is less than half of what it was in 1950.
1. The Numbers
In 1950, union members comprised 31.5% of the nonagricultural
labor force." This percentage rose to 34.7% in 1954 63 and then began
to fall. Union density dropped to 24.7% in 1970" and continued
downward to 16.1% in 1990. 65 The decline has slowed but not stopped
as the most recently available data in 2000 shows union membership
at approximately 13.5% of the nonagricultural labor force."
The actual drop in private sector union membership is even
more severe once the simultaneous rise in public sector unionism is
considered. In 1950, union membership among public employees was
negligible. During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, public sector
union density increased five-fold;67 since then thirty-six states have en-
6! See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 29, at 412 tb1.165.
65 See id.
m See GOLDFIELD, supra note 29, at 11 tb1.2.
65
 See Bureau of National Affairs, 26 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at B-8 (Feb. 7, 1991).
06
 See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Union Members Summary
(2000), available at littp://stats.bls.gov/newsiels.hun . The Bureau of Labor Statistics re-
ports a total of 16.3 million union members in the United States in 2000. See
07 hI 1956, only 915,000 federal, state, and local governmental employees were union
members, See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. 1865, HANDBOOK
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acted labor relations statutes protecting public employee bargaining
rights.° By 2000, 37.5% of all government workers were union mem-
bers accounting for approximately 40% of total union membership. 69
In reality, union members comprise only 9% of the private sector la-
bor force once the public sector boom is factored out."
2. Reasons for the Decline
Many reasons have been suggested for the decline in union
membership. A brief look at some of the most likely factors provides a
useful introduction to some of the most significant influences on to-
day's workplace.
a. The New Global Economy
Unions fare best in a climate in which they enjoy monopoly
power in product markets.n Put another way, where unions are suc-
cessful in organizing an entire sector of the economy, the presence of
a union no longer puts any particular enterprise at a disadvantage in
the marketplace. By "taking wages out of competition," unions thus
reduce the amount of resistance from employers and consumers 72
One of the reasons underlying the higher union density of 1950 was
the fact that organized labor was able to achieve wall-to-wall represen-
tation of workers in a variety of American industries."
OF LABOR STATISTICS 1975, at 382 tb1.155 (1975). By 1980, more than five million public
employees belonged to unions. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE &
LABOR-MANAGEMENT SERVS. ADMIN., No. 102, LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT& 1980, at 1 tbl.B (1981).
69 See DONALD, supra note 33, at 9-11.
69 See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Union Members Summary
(2000), available at http://stats.ffis.govinewsrels.hun .
70 See id.
71 See THOMAS KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS 26 (1986) ("Stability in collective bargaining could be achieved only as long as un-
ions were successful in organizing a sufficient part of the market and spread a standard
wage across the market so as to take wages out of competition."); Samuel Estreicher, Labor
Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 Cm.-Kusrr L. Rev. 3, 10 (1993)
("[U]nions for many years were able to pursue traditional high-labor-cost policies across
entire product markets and thus grow or at least maintain their positions.").
n RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 82 (1984); Estrei-
cher, supra note 71, at 12.
73 See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 114 (stating that "(u]nions bargaining power
was strengthened [during the 1950s and 1960s] by their substantial organization of a
number of the nation's core industries"); Clyde Summers, The Usefulness of Unions in a Ma-
jor Industrial Society—A Comparative Sketch, 58 Tut.. L. REV. 1409,1436-37 (1984) ("Where the
union is able to organize an entire product market, such as the steel and auto industry,
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American unions enjoy this status in few product markets today. 74
Advances in technology and transportation have created a global
economy in which American firms must compete on an international
basis." Given the lower wage structures of most developing nations, 76
American unions now face intense resistance in virtually every sector
in which international production is feasible."
This pressure has led to lower union density rates in two related,
but somewhat different ways. First, trade and technology have made
capital more mobile. 78 Modern advances in information and commu-
nication technologies, in particular, have enabled employers to pro-
duce goods wherever labor costs are the most attractive 79 American
airlines, longshore, or sections of trucking and construction, so that all competitors in the
product market pay the same wages and fringes, the union is able to increase substantially
the economic welfare of those it represents."); see also Peter Capelli, The New Deal At Work,
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2000) (noting that until recently, "RI oreign competition
was very limited, and domestic competition often operated as an oligopoly where unions
effectively took labor costs out of competition with standardized union contracts").
71 See ROCHAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 113-15 (noting that American unions suffered
a significant decline in numbers and bargaining power as they became less able to take
wages out of competition).
75 See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SunvisrE? 42-47 (1993) (describing the rise of
the global economy); HUDSON INSTITUTE, WORKFORCE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1-5 (1987) (depicting the development of an integrated world
economy since the 1960s); U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, COMM. ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT FINDING REPORT 2-3 (1994) (reporting that the ratio of
exports and imports to gross domestic product for the United States more than doubled
between 1960 and 1991).
7° See CRAVER, supra note 75, 43-47; INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL POLICY 77 (1973).
77 See Estreicher, supra note 71, at 13 n.33 (noting that "[t] he impact of international
product market competition has been principally felt in the tnanufacturing sector—in
particular, the clothing, steel, automobile, rubber, and electronics industries"). The fact
that public sector governmental services are less susceptible to production on an interna-
tional basis may help explain the greater degree of success that unions have achieved in
that sector
7" See generally ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS 113-22, 263-64 (1991) (describ-
ing the significant mobility of capital in the new global economy); Janice Bellace, Labor
Law—New Deal Model, in LABOUR LAW AT 'THE CROSSROADS: CHANGING EMPLOYMENT RE-
LATIONSHIPS 22 (Janice Bellace & Max Rood eds., 1997) (noting the greater mobility of
capital as compared to labor in the global economy).
" See Roger Blanpain, The Changing World of Work, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR Law AND
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 23, 24-26 (Roger Blan-
pain & Chris Engels eds., 1998) (describing the impact of technology on the global move-
ment of goods and services); Kenneth G. Dan-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade
and Technology: Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 ND. L. J. 1, 1-2, 11 (2000)
(saute).
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employers, accordingly, have shifted production to the Sunbelt" and
developing nations as a means of escaping unions and lowering labor
costs."
Second, American firms, whether or not they relocate operations,
face intense pressure to cut costs in order to compete in the new
global economy. 82 Since unionization tends to come with a sizeable
wage premium," union avoidance and resistance to union wage de-
mands have become a prime business strategy." The ability of unions
to organize is also affected indirectly by cost-cutting measures such as
reorganizations, downsizing, and contingent work arrangements to
which American businesses have turned since the 1980s. 85 These
measures destabilize long-term work arrangements and are inimical
to union strength.86
b. Changing Workforce Composition
A second factor frequently asserted as contributing to the decline
in union membership is the changing composition of the American
labor force. In particular, fundamental alterations in the nature and
identity of American employees between 1950 and today arguably
have resulted in a workforce that is less conducive to unionization.
One alteration concerns the nature of the jobs that American
workers perform. The American economy has changed from a pre-
dominately blue-collar workforce in 1950 to a predominately white-
collar workforce in 2000. 87 Unions traditionally have enjoyed greater
88 See SANFORD JACOBY, MODERN MANORS 255-56 (1997) (describing the relocation of
manufacturing operations to southern states); see also KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 66-
68 (describing the influence of labor costs and union avoidance on plant location deci-
sions).
81 See CRAVER, supra note 75, at 42-47 (describing the flight of American business to
"foreign export platforms"); Bellace, supra note 78, at 22 (noting that the global market-
place entices American businesses to move production facilities to lower wage countries).
82 See Dau-Schtnidt, supra note 79, at 2, 12 (describing how global competition has led
to a new flexibility in structuring work arrangements).
83 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 72, at 46, 64 (describing a 20-30% union wage
effect); see generally H. G. LEWIS, UNION RELATIVE WAGE EFFECTS: A SURVEY (1986) (de-
scribing a 14-17% union wage effect).
84 See generally KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 70, 107-08 (describing the financial in-
centive for American business to avoid unions).
86 See PETER CAPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 66-88 (1997) (describing various
changes in business practices beginning in the early 1980s).
86 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 72, at 221-45; Dau-Schmidt, aura note 79, at 20.
87 In 1950, 30% of employed Americans worked at manual labor jobs, and another
39% were industrial workers. By 1998, these percentages had shrunk to 28% and 20%,
respectively. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 9, at 146 tb1.12. In contrast, white-collar
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success in organizing blue-collar workers; it follows that unions would
not fare as well in organizing a white-collar workforce. In 1956, for
example, more than 82% of all union members were blue-collar
workers employed in manufacturing, mining, construction, and
transportation jobs." These jobs, however, have been replaced by
white-collar positions, primarily in the professional, service, and tech-
nical ranks. 89 Working in a less stratified environment, employees in
these latter types of positions generally have a lower incidence of un-
ion membership."
A second alteration concerns the demographic identity of Ameri-
can workers. The 1950 workforce overwhelmingly consisted of white,
male employees. 91 The workforce of 2000, in contrast, is considerably
more diverse owing to a large influx of women and minority employ-
ees. As an example, in 1950, 33.9% of adult women were members of
the labor force. 92 By 2000, 61.1% of all adult women, or almost double
the earlier percentage, are employed outside the horne. 93 Similarly,
the proportion of nonwhite employees in the American workforce has
increased by more than fifty percent since 1950.94 Since women and
minority employees traditionally have not been on the forefront of
the union movement, some commentators suggest that this demo-
graphic diversification also has contributed to lower union density
rates."
workers grew from 18% of the workforce in 1950 to 22% in 1998, and the service sector
grew even faster from 12% of the workforce in 1950 to 30% in 1998. See id. See also HUDSON
INSTITUTE, supra note 75, at 20-29 (describing the shift in jobs from producing goods to
providing services).
88 See WALTER GALENSON, THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 1955-1995, at 4 tb1.1.3
(1996).
89 Professional, service, and technical workers have grown from 30% of the 1950
workforce to 52% of the 1998 workforce. See U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, SUP/II note 9, at tb1.12
(reporting percentages of "white-collar" and "service" workers); see also U.S. DF.P'T OF LA-
BOR, supra note 75, at 7-8 (discussing the increase in white-collar jobs requiring advanced
education).
9° See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 107 (1990).
91
 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
02 See supra note 8.
93 See HUDSON INSTITUTE, supra note 75, at 85 tb1.3-4. As of 1993, 57.9% of working
age American females were workforce participants. See U.S. DEBT OF LABOR, ROM note 75,
at 10.
m See U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, supra note 75, at 12. In 1950, nonwhite workers made up
approximately 10% of the American labor force. By 1993, the presence of nonwhite work-
ers jumped to 15.2%. Id. This percentage is expected to increase further to 15.7% by 2000.
See HUDSON INSTITUTE, supra note 75, at 89 tb1.3-5.
95
 See, e.g., GOLDFIELD, supra note 29, at 123.
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Statistical data concerning union membership only partially
bears out this contention. Nonwhite employees actually have a higher
unionization rate than do their white counterparts. In 1980, for ex-
ample, 32.1% of nonwhite workers were organized as compared to
24.9% of white workers. The opposite is true for female employees,
however. Again, using 1980 data, only 18.9% of women belonged to
labor organizations as compared to 31% of men. 96
Economic and social circumstances likely have more to do with
union proclivities than any innate inclinations associated with gender
or race." Black workers, for example, probably have a higher unioni-
zation rate because of their generally lower economic status as well as
a greater concentration in basic industries that are heavily union-
ized." Women, on the other hand, tend to work at occupations that
traditionally have been subject to less union organization." Other
commentators suggest that since women still play a greater child-
rearing role in society, women workers tend to be more transitory and
perhaps less committed to a long-term struggle to improve working
conditions at any particular workplace)" Polling data, moreover, sug-
gests that when placed in the same circumstances as their male coun-
terparts, minorities and women are as likely, if not more likely, to fa-
vor union representation. 10 '
c. The Increase in Contingent Work
A third significant change in the employment landscape is the
growth of the contingent workforce. As late as the 1970s, the pre-
dominant employment model in the United States could be described
as that of a "core worker system" characterized by long-term employ-
ment relationships. 102 Today, however, a large and growing group of
96 See id. at 126.
97 See generally H.S. Farber & D.H. Saks, lily Workers Win( Unions: The Role of Relative
Wages and Job Characteristics, 88 J. FOL. ECON. 349 (1980).
98 See id. at 352; see also GOLDFIELD, supra note 29, at 134-35.
00 See Irving Bernstein, The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960, 2 LAB. HIST. 131,
150 (1961).
100 See DEREK BOK & JOHN DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 44 (1970).
101 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 72, at 227 (reporting studies showing nonwhite
workers more likely to vote for union representation, while female workers were just as
likely to do so); Lisa Schur & Douglas Kruse, Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Unions,
& LAB. REL. Rev. 89,89 (1992) (finding that female workers are at least as likely to
vote for union representation as similarly situated male workers).
102 RICHARD S. BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPO.
RARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE 12 (1989). As explained by Belous:
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workers provide labor or services based on a variety of arrangements
that deviate from the traditional core worker model. 103 Workers in this
diverse group tend to have a weak workplace affiliation and a lessened
expectation of long-term emplopnent. 104
Although the definition varies, the contingent workforce gener-
ally is described as including independent contractors, contracted
workers, leased employees, part-time employees, and temporary em-
ployees. 105 Although it is difficult to determine the exact number of
contingent workers, reliable estimates range upwards to twenty to
thirty percent of all American workers. 106 This accounts for more than
thirty million members of the American workforce. 107
It is helpful to think of these contingent workers in terms of two
broad categories. The first of these groups, which consists of inde-
pendent contractors, 108 contracted workers, 105 and leased employ-
Core workers have a strong affiliation with an employer and are treated by the
employer as having a significant stake in the company. Core workers can be
thought of as being a part of the so-called corporate family. They show long-
term attachment to a company and have a real measure ofjob stability.
Id. at 5.
lo See Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Mr* Force: The Ely Challenges and Op-
portunities, 52 WASH. & La L. Rev. 863, 867 (1995) (stating that the contingent workforce
has grown about 75% faster than the overall workforce between the years of 1980 and
1993); see also Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt,
or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557, 564 (noting a greater than 30% in-
crease in contingent workers between 1980 and 1996).
104 See Baous, supra note 102, at 5-6.
105 See, e.g., Sharon Dietrich et al., Work Reform: The Other Side of Welfare Reform, 9 STAN.
L. & Pothr REv. 53, 57 (1998).
l e° See Berms, supra note 102, at 15-17 (estimating that approximately 25-30% of U.S.
workers fall into contingent categories); STANLEY NOLLEN & HELEN AXEL, MANAGING
CONTINGENT WOMIERS 9-10 (1996) (estimating that approximately 20-25% of U.S. work-
ers fall into contingent categories); Middleton, supra note 103, at 564 (estimating that
about one-quarter of the nation's working population are contingent workers). But see
Dietrich et al., supra note 105, at 58 (using more stringent criteria to estimate that contin-
gent workers comprise about 5% of the U.S. workforce).
107 See Bonus, supra note 102, at 16 tb1.2.1 (calculating between 29.9 and 36.6 million
contingent American workers as of 1988); Middleton, supra note 103, at 564 (estimating
the number of contingent workers in 1996 at approximately thirty-two to thirty-seven mil-
lion). The two largest categories of contingent workers are part-time workers and inde-
pendent contractors. See BELOUS, supra note 102, at 16 tb1.2.1 (estimating 19.8 million part-
time workers and 10.1 million independent contractors).
IN Independent contractors are self-employed workers who are engaged by a company
to "provide specialized services on a contract basis." Mark Diana & Robin H. Rome, Beyond
Thuiitional Employment: The Contingent Workforce, N.J. LAW., Apr 1999, at 9.
1 " Contracted, or outsourced, work occurs when a company uses another firm to per-
form a particular service, such as janitorial services or copy services. SeeJonathan P. Hiatt
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ees,"° are not legally classified as employees of the entity for which
they provide services.'" The second group of workers, consisting of
part-tin-tem and temporary employees," 3 have the legal status of em-
ployees, but with a lower degree of attachment to the workplace as
compared to traditional core employees.
A number of factors have acted as catalysts for the contingency
explosion. First, many firms see contingent work arrangements as a
means to maximize labor market flexibility.'" Contingent workers add
to the flexibility of the workforce by enabling companies to adjust
personnel and staffing needs while avoiding "the expense of cyclical
hiring and lay-off periods:go Second, many workers, particularly
those with a need to balance work and family responsibilities, also
find flexible work arrangements to be desirable." 6 Third, technologi-
cal advances have spurred contingent work arrangements. 117 Ad-
vances in communications and information technology permit work
& Lynn Rhinehart, The Growing Contingent Workforce: A Challenge for the Future, 10 LAB. LAW.
143, 146 (1094).
"0 Leased employees are workers who are employed by one entity, typically an em-
ployee leasing firm, but who provide work for a separate entity. See id.; BeLous, supra note
102, at 46.
HI See infra notes 438-449 and accompanying text (discussing the legal tests for deter-
mining "employee" status).
"2 Part-time employees are those who are scheduled for less than a usual forty-hour
work week. See, e.g., Diana & Rome, supra note 108, at 8, 9.
113 Temporary employees perform work at a particular company as a short-term sup-
plement to the regular workforce. See id. at 9.
I" See N011.EN & AXEL, supra note 106, at 22 (1996) (noting that in an increasingly
global economy, companies experience the pressure of "severe fluctuations in their need
for labor"); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MOM note 75, at 22 ("The increase in 'contingent work'
is largely the result of the way in which employers offer jobs to increase flexibility with
uncertain product demand and to reduce labor costs by retaining a smaller core of full-
time workers.").
"5 See Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Case Against Regulating the Market for Contingent Em-
ployment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 858 (1995).
116 See NOLLEN & AXEL, supra note 106, at 23 (As "more people ... move in and out of
the labor force, [there are more] who prefer part-time or temporary jobs because of COM-
peting demands on their time, [who are in] different states in the life cycle, or [who have]
different family circumstances.").
117 See Brian A. Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A
View from Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & Pol:v J. 7, 8 (1999) (noting that "revolutionary de-
velopments in information technologies ... have conspired to create new modes of labor-
ing"); Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73, 112 (1998) (noting the
acceptance of many that, among other things, technological change has contributed to the
"drive toward contingent staffing").
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to be removed from• a physical worksite or a traditional nine-to-five
work schedule.n 8
Filially, American business entities have powerful legal and
financial incentives to increase their use of contingent workers. This is
particularly true for those contingent workers who fall outside of the
legal definition of an "employee."
Most statutes governing the Workplace only apply within the con-
text of the employment relationship. Since the factors scrutinized for
determining whether a worker falls within the legal definition of a
covered "employee" are prone to manipulation,n 9 many firms con-
sciously attempt to structure work relationships in a manlier that will
avoid "employee" status and its accompanying legal strictures. 12°
Firms also can garner cost savings through the use of contingent
workers. Business entities are responsible for payroll taxes as well as
contributions for unemployment insurance and workers compensa-
tion plans only for their employees. 121 Moreover, many firms provide
contingent workers with lower pay and benefits. 122 Although this later
phenomenon is not legally compelled, many companies view core
employee status as a convenient and defensible eligibility threshold
for conferring premium pay and benefits.'"
118 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 78 (4th ed. 1998);
U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, supra note 75, at 6. See generally MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMA-
TION AGE: Ecossomv, Sobrry AND CULTURE (1996) (describing the impact of changes in
information technology on social and economic trends).
11° See Middleton, supra note 103, at 568-69 ("Mlle legal test for determining em-
ployee/independent contractor status is a complex and manipulable multifactor test
which invites employers to structure their relationships with employees in whatever man-
ner best evades liability."); see also infra notes 438-449 and accompanying text (discussing
the legal tests for determining "employee" status).
1" See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 75, at 37-38 ("[C]urrent tax, labor, and em-
ployment law gives employers and employees incentives to create contingent relationships
not for the sake of flexibility or efficiency but in order to evade their legal obligations.");
Middleton, supra note 103, at 571 (noting that employers are motivated to categorize
workers as non-employees in order to avoid legal regulations applicable to employees).
121 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SI/pra note 75, at 40-41.
122 See, e.g., Hiatt & Rhinehart, supra note 109, at 148-49; Middleton, supra note 103, at
564-65 (1996) (noting that part-time employees earned 58% of the hourly wage of median
full-time employees in 1989); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitu-
tional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. Rev. 523, 525 11.11 (noting that the average hourly wage
for temporary employees in 1994 was 35% lower than it was for full-time employees). The
benefit shortfall is particularly notable with respect to health care insurance. See Middle-
ton, supra note 103, at 565 (noting that only 22% of part-time workers received health care
benefits through their employers in 1988 as compared to 78% of full-time employees).
128 See, e.g., Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (re-
viewing legality of pension and welfare plan benefits made available to common law em-
ployees but not to similarly situated workers designated as independent contractors).
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Contingent work arrangements contribute to union decline in
several ways. First, as noted above, many contingent workers are not
employees or, at least, not employees of the entity for whom they pro-
vide work.'" As such, these workers are not covered by the NLRA and
have no legal protection in seeking to unionize.'" Second, part-time
and temporary workers, even though legally classified as employees,
contmonly are excluded from bargaining units on the grounds that
they do not share a sufficient community of interests with more per-
manent etnployees. 126 Thus, they are not within the group repre-
sented even if a union is successful in obtaining exclusive representa-
tive status.'" Third, until recently, workers who are leased from a
supplier firm and who work alongside regular employees could not be
included in a bargaining unit with the user firm's employees without
the consent of both joint employers. 128 Since one or both of the em-
ployers invariably withhold consent," these workers could unionize
only in a separate unit consisting solely of employees of the lessor
firm.'"
Above and beyond these legal obstacles is the fact that contingent
workers, with their weak affiliation with the enterprise, are a difficult
group to organize."' Many contingent workers simply do not see the,
benefits of union representation in an environment of short-term
151 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
123 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994) (defining an "employee" for purposes of the NLRA).
The NLRB uses the common law test in determining employee status. See infra notes 438-
440 and accompanying text (describing the common law test).
126 See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1481-84 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1983); Clyde W.
Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 503, 513 (1997).
127 See generally Virginia L. duRivage, New Policies for the Part-time and Contingent
Workforce, in NEW POLICIES FOR PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKERS 89, 116 (1992) (re-
porting that part-time workers are only one-third as likely to be unionized as are full-time
workers).
128
 See Lee Hospital, 300 N.L.R.B. 947 (1990). The Board overruled Lee Hospital in
2000. See M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (2000). Under the new standard an-
nounced in Sturgis, the Board will include leased employees in a unit alongside regular
employees without requiring consent so long as the two groups share a sufficient CO11111111-
nity of interest so as to constitute a single appropriate bargaining unit. Id. at 19. Whether
Sturgis will survive appellate review and/or reconsideration by a new Bush labor board
remains to be seen.
12° See Bita Rahebi, Rethinking the National Labor Relations Board's Treatment of Temporary
Workers: Granting Greater Access to Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105, 1124 (2000).
' 3° See it at 1113-15; see also M.B. Sturgis, inc., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 173, at 12 (reaffir g
that the dispersed employees of a supplier firm may seek to bargain with the supplier firm
without needing to obtain the consent of the various user firms).
' 3 ' See KOCHAN ET AL, supra note 71, at 221; Katherine M. Forster, Strategic Reform of
Contingent Work, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 551 (2001); Middleton, supra note 103, at 589-90.
2002] 	 Labor & Employment Law at the Millennium	 371
employment. Employers are well aware that contingent work and un-
ions do not typically go hand-in-hand, and some employers hire con-
tingent workers as an affirmative tool of union avoidance."2
d. Employer Opposition to Unions and Deficiencies in the NLRA's Regulatory
Structure
The factors discussed above do not explain why the decline in
union membership has been far more severe in the United States
than in most other western industrialized countries. Those nations
also have experienced the effects of a global economy and the entry
of more women and contingent workers into the workforce, and yet,
with the exception of France, they have not suffered a similar extreme
drop in unionization rates.'" Indeed, union density actually has in-
creased in some northern European countries such as Sweden and
Denmark during the last quarter of the twentieth century, 194 and our
two North American neighbors have unionization rates that are two to
three times higher than our own. 135
Some commentators point to two related factors to explain the
steepness of the American decline. First, a unique attribute of the
American system of labor-relations is the active opposition of Ameri-
can employers to union organizing efforts.'" Second, commentators
point to weaknesses in the NLRA regulatory scheme, in that it treats
132 See Forster, supra note 131, at 551; Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors
in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness,
21 COMP. LAB. L. & PoCY .J. 187, 197-204 (1999).
133 See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM 14-15 tb1.2.1 (depicting union
membership as a percentage of the workforce from 1955 to 1990 in various industrialized
countries).
I" See id. (showing higher union density rates for both Sweden (95%) and Denmark
(88%) in 1990 as compared to 1980); see also Tore Sigeman, Insiders and Outsiders in the
Labour Market: Experiences of a Nordic Welfaie State in Labour Law Perspective, in LABOR LAW
AT TICE CROSSROADS, supra note 78, at 202 (noting that the percentage of organized em-
ployees in Sweden is "stable, or even increasing").
I" Union density in the early 1090s stood at 36% in Canada, Gomm, supra note 133,
14-15 061.2.1, and between 25-30% in Mexico, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, FOREIGN LABOR
TRENDS, MEXICO 1991-92, at 2 (1992). For a comparison of the labor and employment law
regimes in the United States and Mexico, see Stephen F. Behan & Virginia E. Cornett,
Beyond the Rhetoric of the NAFTA Treaty Debate: A Comparative Analysis of Labor and Employment
Law in Mexico and the United States, 17 COMP. LAB. L. J. 269 (1995).
136 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 72, at 230-39 (describing various employer tac-
tics in opposing union organizing efforts); Gomm, supra note 133, at 45 rate fact is that
American employers have never accepted trade unionism to the extent that their counter-
parts have in other industrialized countries throughout die world, a phenomenon some-
times encapsulated by the term 'American exceptionalism.'").
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many anti-union tactics as lawful and fails adequately to deter others
that are not)"
Much employer opposition is facilitated by the NLRA's use of an
electoral model for determining representational status) In many
industrialized countries, an employer automatically must bargain with
a union concerning the rights of its members)" Under such a system,
employers play no overt role in an employee's decision to join a un-
ion, and any opposition to union demands typically does not occur
until the parties meet at the bargaining table)" Under the NLRA, in
contrast, an employer is not obliged to bargain until after a union first
establishes its majority status in a representation election. U.S. em-
ployers, moreover, may participate actively in this election process.
The NLRA permits an employer to express its opposition to union
representation so long as it does not threaten reprisal for union sup-
port or promise benefits in order to entice union opposition. 141 Mis-
statements of fact and even intentional lies are not forbidden. 142 Many
employers hire professiofial consultantsi" for the purpose of orches-
trating sophisticated anti-union campaigns that not infrequently con-
sist of unlawful as well as lawful conduct)" Empirical studies show
that these anti-union tactics often are successful in influencing elec-
tion outcomes)"
157 Professor Paul C. Weiler is probably the most vocal and eloquent of these commen-
tators. SeeWEILER, supra note 90, at 111-14; Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers'
Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769,1776-81 (1983).
155 See U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, supra note 75, at 75 ('The United States is the only major
democratic country in which the choice of whether or not workers are to be represented
by a union is subject to such a confrontational process.").
155 See, e.g., JUAN B. CLIMENT BELTRAN, LEY FEDERAL DEL TRABAJO: COMMENTARIOS Y
JURISPRUDENCIA 268 (7th ed. 1993) (Mexico); ALEX LEUCHTEN, I INTERNATIONAL LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 4-22 (William L. Keller ed., 1997) (Germany).
149 See Roy J. Adams, The Right to Participate, 5 EMPLOYEE Rest.. & RTs. J. 91,94 (1992)
("Few advanced democratic societies condone open opposition by employers to unioniza-
tion.").
141 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1994).
142 See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
145 See GALENSON, supra note 88, at 88 (reporting on a 1983 survey conducted by the
AFL-C10 finding that outside consultants or lawyers directed counter-organizing drives on
behalf of employers in approximately 75% of union campaigns).
144 For a discussion of both the legal and illegal tactics used by U.S. employers in op-
posing union organizing efforts, see Weiler, supra note 131, at 1776-81 and FREEMAN &
MEDOFF, MOM note 72, at 230-33.
145 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, Sara note 72, at 233-39 (summarizing empirical studies
concerning the impact of anti-union campaigns). But cf. Julius G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 128-29 (1976) (finding that most an-
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Three examples illustrate that the remedial shortcomings of the
NLRA also have an impact on unionization rates in the United States.
First, a common employer tactic in opposing union organizational
campaigns is to discharge the leading employee organizers. 146 While
the NLRA makes this conduct unlawful, 147 it does little to deter its oc-
currence. The usual remedy under the NLRA for the illegal discharge
of an employee organizer is a cease and desist order coupled with re-
instatement and back pay.'" The NLRA does not provide for fines,
punitive damages, or any other "penalty," and the discharged em-
ployee is subject to a duty to mitigate losses by finding alternative
work.'" This "make whole" approach provides little deterrence
against employers who realize that they can chill union organization
efforts by immediately firing the employee organizers. 150 The lack of
remedial clout is compounded by the fact that lengthy procedural
delays in resolving the resulting unfair labor practice charges operate
to dissipate union support. 151
The NLRA's relatively weak remedial scheme also diminishes the
effectiveness of the Act's bargaining mandate. The only remedy rec-
ognized under the NLRA for a party's refusal to engage in good faith
bargaining is an order reqUiring that party to return to the bargaining
table. 152 The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the
NLRB is without power to impose substantive contract terms in the
event of a violation even where the NLRB has concluded that an em-
ployer has acted in a manner designed to frustrate the bargaining
ployees do not change their support for or against union representation because of an
employer's anti-union tactics).
146
 See U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, supra note 75, at 70 (reporting that unlawful employee
terminations occurred in one out of every four certification elections); Robert LaLonde &
Bernard Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at Employer Illegalities, 58 U. Cu,. L.
REV. 953, 994 (1991) (reporting that unlawful employee terminations occurred in one-
third of all elections, with one out of thirty-six union supporters being unlawfully dis-
charged).
147
 See 29 U.S.C. § I58(a) (3) (1994) (making it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer to terminate an employee for the purpose of "encouraging] or discouraging]
membership in any labor organization").
145 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994).
149 See CRAVER, supra note 75, at 151.
150 See id.; Weiler, supra note 137, at 1788-90.
151 As of 1988, the median length of time front the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge until adjudication by the NLRB was 762 days. If judicial review of the Board's deci-
sion was sought, the median interval between charge and resolution jumped to more than
three years. See GOULD, supra note 133, at 158-59.
152 See Ex-Cello Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enforced, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
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process.'" Thus, an employer may engage in protracted "surface"
bargaining with little fear of meaningful administrative interven-
tion. 154 The problem of "surface" bargaining is particularly acute
when used by an employer as a tactic to avoid the consummation of
an initial collective bargaining agreement. Approximately one-third of
all newly certified union representatives fail to conclude a first con-
tract. 155 At this early stage, a union's inability to obtain a collective
bargaining agreement virtually dooms it to an eventual de-
certification. 156
Finally, an additional shortcoming of the NLRA scheme flows
from an employer's ability to hire permanent replacements to fill the
positions of striking employees. 157 An employer lawfully may decline
to reinstate a striker at the conclusion of a strike so long as the posi-
tion continues to be occupied by a replacement employee. 158 This
practice significantly undercuts the power of unions in two respects.
First, the threat of being permanently replaced serves to deter strikes
and decreases the union's ability to use the threat of a strike as lever-
age in collective bargaining. 159 Secondly, the permanent replacements
have the right to vote in representation elections, while the voting
rights of displaced strikers typically cease twelve months after the be-
ginning of the strike. 160 These electoral rules, accordingly, permit an
employer to rid itself of a union by pushing the employees into a
strike and then hiring permanent replacements who vote to decertify
153 Seen.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970).
154 See, e.g., Gouus , supra note 133, at 222; see also WEILER, supra note 90, at 250 (noting
the incidence of "bad faith bargaining" has risen as employers "appreciate the lack of force
in their obligation to recognize and deal with a certified union").
'55 See U.S. DEFT OF LABOR, supra note 75, at 73-74.
156 See Goma supra note 133, at 169 ("If the union cannot negotiate an agreement,
the result is virtually the same as decertification or lack of certification during the organ-
izational campaign.").
157 The Supreme Court has ruled that an employer does not act unlawfully in hiring
either temporary or permanent replacement workers to fill positions vacated by those
engaged in a lawful strike. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). A
temporary replacement is a worker hired only for the duration of a strike and then is
bumped by a returning striker. An employer, however, may retain the services of a perma-
nent replacement for an indefinite period. The strikers whose positions are filled by per-
manent replacements are placed on a waiting list and entitled to return to work only as
their former positions become vacant. See id.; Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968).
158 See Mackay Radio & TeL Co., 304 U.S. at 333; Laidlaw corp., 171 N.L.R.B. at 1366.
'59 See Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve In-
dustrial Democracy, 34 Ann. L. REV. 397, 421 (1992); Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It
Off, Time It Out, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 295, 296-97 (1991).
is' See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (3) (1994).
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the union in an election held a little more than twelve months after
being hired.m
e. The Nature of American Unionism
The seeds of decline also may be traced, in part, to the historical
origins of the American labor movement. In contrast to many Euro-
pean countries where unions evolved as part of a broad political and
social movement, 162 American unionism had more pragmatic roots.
Although some early organizations such as the Knights of Labor
in the 1870s 163 and the International Workers of the Worldl" some
forty years later urged a broad platform of political and social reform,
the mainstream of the American labor movement chartered a very
different course. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), founded
in 1886, advocated a strategy of economic empowerment as opposed
to political upheaval. Composed mostly of craft workers, the AFL con-
centrated on a policy of "business unionism" that sought not to re-
place capitalism but to share in its gains. 165 Even during the heady
years of the New Deal era, organized labor focused on bettering the
lot of its members through collective bargaining rather than attempt-
ing to craft a new social and economic landscape through political
activism. 166
Business unionism fit America's lack of class-consciousness, but it
came with a price. American unions today are relatively unpopular
and isolated. Many Americans view unions as just another self-serving,
161 See WEILER, supra note 90, at 266-67; Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enerva-
tion of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. lu.. L. REV. 547,565,567 n.138.
In See, e.g., Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation
in a Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 39 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (contrasting the
United States with various West European countries in which labor is linked with social
democratic or labor political parties); Summers, supra note 73, at 1409,1418-19,1425-26
(1984) (describing the close affiliation between labor unions and political parties in the
United Kingdom and Sweden).
163 For an overview of the history and aims of the Knights of Labor, see LEON FINK,
WORKINGMEN'S DEMOCRACY: THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1983) and
JOSEPH RAYBACK, A Its:roltie OF AMERICAN LABOR ch. XI (1966).
104 For an overview of the history and aims of the International Workers of the World,
See DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORICERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA, ch. 4 (1979) and see generally
MELVIN UMW-SKY, WE SHALL BE Au.: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS OF
THE WORLD (1988). •
163 See LEWIS L. LORWIN, THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 44-54 (1970); Salo
PERLMAN, HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1922).
106 See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 27-28.
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special interest group. 167 And having gone it alone when times were
good, American unions lack the strong support of allied social part-
ners that many of their European counterparts receive. 168
The insular attitude of American unions also has interfered with
their ability to attract members from a new generation of workers. A
1972 statement by then AFL-CIO President George Meany illustrates
the problem:
Why should we worry about organizing groups of people
who do not want to be organized? If they prefer to have oth-
ers speak for them and make the decisions which effect their
lives, without effective participation on their part, that is
their right.... I used to worry about the size of the member-
ship. But quite a few years ago I stopped worrying about it,
because to me it doesn't make any difference. 169
This view, of course, is no longer official AFL-CIO policy. Current
President John J. Sweeney has made a serious commitment to organiz-
ing new workers.'" This belated attempt, howevér, may be too late to
change the popular perspective of American unions as bureaucratic
and outdated.
f. Rugged Individualism
One additional factor warrants a brief mention—unionism always
has been an awkward fit with the rugged individualism of the Ameri-
can psyche. This may explain why the United States has never fully
107 See Thomas A. Rocha'', How American Workers View Unions, Motatus LAB. REV., Apr.
1979, at 24 (reporting that unions suffer from a "big labor" stereotype with a majority of
Americans holding unions in low esteem); see also GALENSON, supra note 88, at 60-61 (re-
porting survey results showing that a majority of nonunion workers viewed unions as pur-
suing an agenda that was not beneficial to their needs). A related factor that has contrib-
uted to the erosion of public support for unions is the highly publicized disclosures of
illegal behavior by some labor officials. See THOMAS EDSALL, THE NEW POLITICS or INE-
QUALITY 173 (1984).
168 See GOULD, supra note 133, at 56; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 162, at 39.
1" U.S. Needs "30,000 New fobs Just to Break Even," U . S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 21,
1972, at 27-28.
1" See Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Wages of Syntax: Why the Cost of Organizing
a Union Firm's Non-Union Competition Should be Charged to Financial Core' Employees, 47 CATTI.
U. L. REV. 979, 979 (1998). During his first two years in office, Sweeney has committed
over thirty million dollars and has trained 250 workers to spread the "gospel of collective
bargaining to the next generation of American workers." See id.
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embraced the union movement,'" as illustrated by the fact that even
at its zenith, union density in the United States fell far short of that in
most industrialized countries. 17"
Unionization, of course, is a matter of collective action. The
dothinant American self-image, in contrast, is squarely grounded in
the cult of the individual.'" Fueled by generations of Horatio Alger
stories, working-class Americans dream of a middle-class future.'" In-
deed, Americans popularly view unions as reserved for the "lower
class."'" Since most Americans, whether by hard work or good luck,
plan not to be part of that lower class some day, union membership is
symbolic of opting out of the American dream.
B. The Decline of the At-Will Rule and the Rise of Governmental Regulation
The at-will principle is a rule of construction rather than a rule of
law. 176 The lack of governmental regulation concerning the workplace
in 1950, however, had the effect of making the at-will presumption a
virtual doctrinal rule.'" Thus, in the absence of a contractual agree-
ment explicitly promising some type of job security and supported by
additional consideration,'" an American employer in 1950 had the
absolute right to discharge an employee for any reason.
17 ' See Gouw, supra note 133, at 45 ('The fact is that American employers have never
accepted trade unionism to the extent that their counterparts have in other industrialized
countries throughout the world, a phenomenon sometimes encapsulated by the term
'American exceptionalism.'"); Steve Fraser The "Labor" Question, in arEvx FRASER & GARY
Celine, RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER 77 (1989) (quoting a labor official in
1950 complaining that "there is little evidence that employers are prepared to accept trade
unionism as a proper and permanent feature of our industrial relatiOns").
172 See GOVLD, supra note 133, at 14-15.
"3 StnAlvitt L. Goldman, Potential Refinements of Employment Relations Law in the 21st Cen-
tury, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POCY 269, 285 (1999) (noting that our national cultural
orientation is highly individualistic and, therefore, prone to regard collective action with
some suspicion"); Reinhold Fahlbeck, The Demise of Collective Bargaining in the USA:
Reflections on the Un-American Character of American Labor Law, 15 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L.
307, 333 (1994) (noting the "perceived un-American character of concerted activity").
"4 See STANLEY ARONOWITZ, FALSE PROMISES 141 (1973); CRAVER, supra note 75, at
51-52.
113 SeeBARBARA EHRENREIGH, FEAR OF FALLING 108-09 (1990).
175 See Pine River State Bank v. Metille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983) ("(T)he at-
will rule ... is only a rule of contract interpretation ... [not] a rule imposing substantive
limits to the formation of a contract.").
177 See generally Clyde W. Stunmers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine
Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMI'. L. 65, 68-70 (2000).
178 Traditionally, a contract providing for a limitation on an employer's right to termi-
nate an employee at-will was valid only if supported by some consideration in addition to
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That is no longer the case. The American employer in 2000 is
subject to numerous legal constraints emanating from a variety of
sources. This development has not eliminated the at-will rule, but in-
stead has transformed it into a true rule of construction. Today, the
at-will rule stands as the default legal presumption of the employment
relationship, but one subject to many limitations and exceptions.
1. Limitations on the At-Will Rule
The decline of the at-will rule and the rise of governmental regu-
lation concerning the employment relationship are two sides of the
same coin. That is, the recent growth in workplace regulation has re-
sulted in the reduced importance and application of the at-will prin-
ciple.
These new limitations are diverse in terms of both origin and
purpose. Unlike the traditional field of labor law which continues to
be regulated by a single federal statute, the new arena of employment
law is composed of numerous strands that often bear little relation-
ship to one another. This section attempts to categorize and summa-
rize the most significant of these limitations on the at-will rule pre-
sumption.
a. Statutory Regulation
Until the mid-1960s, the NLRA and the Fair Labor Standards
Act 79 were the only two federal statutes that comprehensively regu-
lated the workplace. That situation has changed dramatically as Con-
gress has adopted a host of more recent employment-related statutes.
These newer statutory enactments fall into two basic categories: 1)
statutes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of certain protected
characteristics; and 2) statutes that establish minimum workplace re-
quirements.
the employee's promise to perform services for the employer. See Stephen F. Befort, Em-
ployee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L. J. 326, 335-36 (1992).
1" The Fair Labor Standards Mt (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994), mandates that
employers pay covered employees a minimum hourly wage, currently pegged at $5.15 per
hour, and compensate work performed in excess of forty hours in a week at one and one-
half times the employee's regular rate of pay. The FLSA contains numerous exemptions,
the most significant being for executive, administrative, and professional employees. See id.
§ 213 (a) (1) .
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i. Antidiscrimination Statutes
The principal federal antidiscrimination law was enacted as Tide
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's° Tide VII prohibits employers and
labor unions from discrimination in employment on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
By its terms, Title VII bans intentional discrimination with re-
spect to hiring, discharge, compensation, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment."' The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII
as also prohibiting facially neutral employment practices that have a
disproportionate; negative impact on a protected class.' 82 An em-
ployer may avoid liability for such disparate impact claims only by
showing that the employment practice at issue is compelled by busi-
ness necessity."3
Congress extended the nondiscrimination principle in two sub-
sequent acts."4 Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 185
adopted in 1967, employees over the age of forty are protected from
discrimination in hiring, discharge, and mandatory retirement. The
Americans with Disabilities Act,"6 enacted in 1990, prohibits employ-
ers from discriminating against, an otherwise qualified disabled per-
son who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, is capable of
performing the essential functions of the job in question." 7 An em-
ployer need not provide an accommodation, however, if doing so
would impose an undue hardship on the employer. 188
Two characteristics of these, antidiscrimination statutes should be
noted. First, these statutes provide protection to individuals not as
workers, but as members of a particular group or on the basis of a
Is° Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I 7 (1994).
181 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
182 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
'8' See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i).
184 Antidiscrimination statutes also have been adopted by most states. Many of these
state statutes go beyond federal law in terms of the classes protected. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§§ 363.01— .20 (2001) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, mari-
tal status, and receipt of public assistance in addition to those groups protected under
federal law). An additional federal statute, The Equal Pay Act of 1963, prohibits gender-
based wage discrimination with respect M jobs that are substantially equal in skill, effort,
responsibility, and working conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
185 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
1 B8 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
182 Id. §§ 12112(a), 12111(8).
188 See id. § 12112(b) (5) (A).
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specified protected trait. 189 Second, even as to these protected
classifications, employers are prohibited only from acting in a dis-
criminatory manner; they are not required to act on the basis of some
more expansive notion of fairness or cause.
ii. Substantive Statutory Regulation
A second category of federal statutes are those that mandate
minimum workplace requirements. These include the following:
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act.'" The OSH Act author-
izes the Secretary of Labor to adopt workplace health and safety stan-
dards. The Secretary is empowered to enforce these standards by
conducting workplace inspections and by issuing citations for non-
compliance.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERLSA). 191 ERISA regulates
pension and employee welfare benefit plans. It establishes procedural
requirements with respect to the reporting, disclosure and fiduciary
responsibilities for such plans. 192 While ERISA contains detailed provi-
sions governing the funding and content of pension plans, it does not
regulate the substantive content of welfare benefit plans, such as those
providing health benefits. Instead, the principal impact of ERISA on
employment law matters is the Act's broad preemption of state regula-
tion. 193 As a result, nonpension benefit plans are largely unregulated
by either the federal or state governments.
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act. 194 The
WARN Act requires employers with 100 or more employees to provide
at least sixty days advance written notice to employees who will suffer
an employment loss by virtue of a plant closing or a mass layoff.
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 195 The FMIA requires em-
ployers with fifty or more employees to permit employees to take up
189 See Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial Disso-
nance, the Supreme Court's Responie, and the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78 On. L.
REV. 27, 68-70 (1999) (discussing the somewhat different models of discrimination used
by Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act).
19° 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
191 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
192 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994).
193 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) C[T) he provisions of [ERISA] shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereinafter relate to any employee benefit plan.").
See generally Stephen F. Befort & Christopher J. Kopka, The Sounds of Silence: The Libertarian
Ethos of ERISA Preemption, 52 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2000).
194 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
195 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
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to twelve weeks each year of unpaid leave in order to care for a new
child or a family member with a serious health condition. The FMLA's
leave entitlement also extends to an employee who is incapacitated
because of his or her own serious health condition. 196
b. Judicially Created Limitations on the At-Will Rule
Over the past fifteen years, the courts increasingly have become
less tolerant of the traditional at-will rule The judiciary has demon-
strated this growing intolerance in two different ways. First, courts are
now more receptive to adapting traditional tort and contract theories
as a basis for challenging employment decisions. For example, many
courts now authorize a discharged employee to maintain a defama-
tion action without third party publication for an employee's foresee-
able self-publication of the employer's stated reasons for discharge.'"
Similarly, many jurisdictions permit a discharged employee to chal-
lenge the manner of his or her termination by means of a tortious
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim without requiring a
showing of the presence of an accompanying physical injury. 198
Various state courts, in addition, have recognized new causes of
action in the employment context. The three claims most commonly
recognized are as follows:
Public Policy Tort. Most jurisdictions now permit an employee to
maintain a tort action claiming that a discharge decision offends pub-
lic policy.'" Based on this notion, courts have held that public policy
considerations bar employers from terminating employees who refuse
to commit an unlawful act,2" who exercise statutory rights?' or who
19° Id. § 2612(a)(I) (D).
197 See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 389 N.W.2d 876 (Mimi. 1986).
199 See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976).
199 See Michael A. Chagares, Utilization of the Disclaimer as an Effective Means to Define the
Employment Relationship, 17 Horses L. REV. 365,400-05 (1989) (citing forty-three states as
recognizing the public policy cause of action).
200 See, e.g., Tameny v. Ad. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (refusal to partici-
pate in an unlawful price-fixing scheme); Remington Freight Lines, Inc. v. Larkey, 644
N.E.2d 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (refusal to drive an illegally overloaded truck); Phipps v.
Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (refusal to violate antipollution laws
by dispensing leaded gas into car designed for unleaded gas).
201
 See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (III. 1978) (affirming award to em-
ployee discharged for filing workers' compensation claim); Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co.,
416 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. 1992) (finding public policy cause of action for employee who was
fired for refusing to work for less than the statutory minimum wage).
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report an employer's unlawful conduct."2 With respect to the last type
of conduct, a number of jurisdictions have enacted statutes
specifically prohibiting employee discharges for "whistleblowing" ac-
tivities."'
Contract Claims. Most states also recognize a contract-based excep-
tion to the at-will employment rule."'" These courts imply contractual
obligations, such as some form of job security or disciplinary proce-
dure, from an employer's unilateral promise expressed orally"' or in
an employee handbook."'
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. A few jurisdictions go fur-
ther and read a covenant of good faith and fair dealing into employ-
ment agreetnents."" This covenant requires that each party in an em-
ployment relationship refrain from acting in bad faith that frustrates
202 See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (finding
public policy cause of action for employee who was discharged for reporting labeling mis-
representations to employer); Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981)
(employee discharged for reporting criminal conduct to authorities); Fox v. MCI Commu-
nications, 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997) (finding public policy cause of action for employee
who was discharged for informing law enforcement authorities of fraudulent sales prac-
tices).
2°2 See, e.g., The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b) (9) (1994)
(protecting federal employees from retaliation for whistleblowing); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 15.361 (2000) (protecting both private and public sector employees from retaliation for
blowing the whistle on illegal acts); see also ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 118, at 923.
(reporting that thirty-seven states have enacted some form of statutory protection for em-
ployees reporting illegal activity).
204 See Chagares, supra note 199, at 400-05 (citing forty-one states as recognizing an
implied contract exception to the at-will rule).
2" See, e.g., Eales v. Tanana Valley Med:Surgical Group, 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983)
(holding representation that employee would not be discharged without cause may be
read into employment contract); Bullock v. Auto. Club, 444 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. 1989)
(finding revocation of oral promise in policy manual not necessarily binding).
2°0 See, e.g., Duldulao v. Saint May of Nazereth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314 (111. 1987);
Wooley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985); see generally Befort, supra
note 178.
"7 See, e.g., Mitford v. De Las-da, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983) (ruling against an em-
ployer who discharged an employee in effort to avoid profit sharing liability); K-Mart Corp.
v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987) (holding against an employer who dismissed an
employee in an effort to avoid retirement benefit payments). Most states have declined to
recognize the covenant because of the difficulty in determining what constitutes bad faith.
See, e.g., Parner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 629 (Haw. 1982) (rejecting the
covenant because it would necessitate "judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of
bad faith"); see also City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. 2000) (declining
to recognize the covenant cause of action because to do so "would completely alter the
nature of the at-will employment relationship").
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the other's expectations of receiving the benefits of his or her bar-
gain.zos
c. Constitutional Limitations in the Public Sector
The U.S. Constitution also provides an extra set of limitations on
the at-will principle. The Supreme Court has recognized that a public
employee may assert as many as three constitutional claims challeng-
ing a public employer's2® discharge decision.
i. First Amendment
A public employer cannot lawfully terminate an employee for
exercising his or her right to free speech. 2" The First Amendment,
however, does not protect all speech in all instances. To be protected,
the speech must relate to a matter of public concern. 211 In addition,
the employee's right to comment on matters of public concern must
be balanced against the employer's interest in effective and efficient
fulfillment of its responsibilities. 212
ii. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits states
from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.213 A public employer violates this provision if it de-
prives an employee of a property or liberty interest without complying
2°B /Ca? Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (holding in fa-
vor of salesman fired by employer in an attempt to avoid paying future bonus payments
under a contractual arrangement).
209 The federal constitution operates as a limit only on governmental action. See Shel-
ley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). For purposes of the "state action" prerequisite, the
"state" comprises all subdivisions of federal and state government, including local
branches. Set LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688 n.2 (2nd ed.
1988).
210 See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (finding that a county constable
violated the First Amendment in terminating a clerical employee for privately expressing
her hope that an assassination attempt on the President would succeed); Pickering v. Bd.
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (finding that a school board violated the First Amendment
in terminating a teacher for sending a letter to a local newspaper criticizing a proposed
school tax increase).
2" See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (explaining that speech is a matter
of "public comer!'" if it relates to a political, social, or other community issue).
212 The disruptiveness of the employee's conduct is one factor to be considered in this
balance, particularly where close working relationships may be impaired. The time, place,
and manner of the expression is also relevant. See id. at 151-52.
Ill U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
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with certain due process safeguards. 214 An employee has a protected
property interest if he or she can point to state law sources, such as a
contract2 t5 or statute,2" that supports a claim of entitlement to con-
tinued employment. A liberty interest arises if a public employer dis-
seminates a false and defamatory impression about an employee in
connection with the employee's termination that imposes a stigma
that effectively forecloses the employee's freedom to take advantage
of other employment opportunities. 212
Once a liberty or property interest is found in public employ-
ment, a public employer may terminate an employee only if it pro-
vides certain basic due process procedures. Prior to termination, the
employer must notify the employee of the impending disciplinary ac-
tion, explain the charges against the employee, and provide the em-
ployee with an "opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in
writing, why [the] proposed action should not be taken." 2" The em-
ployer also must provide the employee with an evidentiary hearing
before a neutral decision-maker within a reasonable time following
discharge 219
iii. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause provides a third constitutional ave-
nue for challenging employment terminations in the public sector. 220
A public employee may assert an equal protection claim if he or she
can show that the employer discriminated in making the termination
214 See generally Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
218 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (finding that a college
teacher had a property interest flowing from a written contract with an explicit tenure
provision guaranteeing continued employment absent cause for termination).
216 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermilk 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985) (finding
that a statutory civil service system creates property interests if it provides that employees
may be terminated only for cause).
217 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-75; see also Poison v. Davis, 635 F. Stipp. 1130, 1142 (D.
Kan. 1986) (holding that to establish that a charge is stigmatizing, an individual must show
that his "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the gov-
ernment is doing to him") (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 933, 437 (1971).
218 Londe:mill, 470 U.S. at 546.
219 See id. at 546-47.
229 "No State shall ... deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause applies to the states directly through
the Fourteenth Amendment and to the federal government as incorporated through the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1959).
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decision 2 21 Once a prima facie showing is made, the public employer
then must carry the burden to justify its action or policy. Under the
analytical framework created by the Supreme Court, the sufficiency of
the employer's justification varies with the likelihood that the state has
singled out for unfavorable treatment a group that is unable to pro-
tect itself in the political process or that has traditionally faced dis-
crimination.222 Applying this rationale, the Court has identified three
different levels of review: (1) strict scrutiny for governmental action
affecting suspect classes (race, alienage, and national origin); (2) in-
termediate scrutiny with respect to quasi-suspect classes (gender and
illegitimacy); and (3) rational basis review for all other governmental
classifications. 223
2. Reasons for the Regulatory Boom
Because of the piecemeal adoption of these limitations on the at-
will rule, it is difficult to isolate the precise origins of this transforma-
tion. Nonetheless, it again is useful to attempt to identify some of the
principal forces that may have contributed to this development.
a. The Changing Nature of the Workplace
The workplace of today is far different than the nineteenth cen-
tury workplace that gave birth to the at-will rule. Many critics point to
this changed work environment as evidence that the at-will rule is at
odds with the realities of the contemporary employment relation-
ship ,224
rn See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a plaintiff must show
that a governmental employer engaged in intentional discrimination in order to prevail on
an equal protection claim).
222 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (explaining that the Court
considers several factors to determine when this risk is high and a class of people deserve
the more stringent levels of judicial protection: whether the class is identified by an immu-
table characteristic, whether the class has a long history of suffering from invidious dis-
crimination, and whether the class is relatively politically powerless).
223 See generally TRIBE, SUP2/ note 209, ch. 16.
224 See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Comm. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967); Joseph DeGi-
useppe, Jr., The Effect of the Employment-al-Will Rule on Employee Rights to fob Security and Fringe
Benefits, 10 FORD1MM Uns. LJ. 1, 69-70 (1981); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection
Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute; 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 482-84 (1976); Richard A.
Winters, Note, Employee Handbooks and Employment-At-Will Contracts, 1985 DUKE L.J. 196,
198-99 (1985).
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Smaller enterprises dominated the nineteenth century American
economy. Within these businesses, employers, foremen, and employ-
ees often enjoyed a personal relationship. 225 Employment relation-
ships typically were transitory in nature,226 and because labor had
greater mobility than capital at that time, the entrepreneur's natural
advantage in bargaining power tended to be datnpened. 227
Now, the growing predominance of large corporate employers
and specialized job functions has triggered criticism of the at-will rule
as harsh and lopsided.228 As one commentator has concluded:
[I]n principle there is widespread agreement that the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine has no economic or moral
justification in a modern industrialized nation. The idea that
there is equity in a rule under which the individual em-
ployee and the employer have the same right to terminate
an employment relationship is obviously fictional in a society
in which most workers are dependent upon employers for
their livelihood. 2"
Recent advances in trade and technology have severely exacer-
bated the imbalance between employers and employees. The emer-
gence of the global economy has put great pressure on American
business to reduce costs in order to compete internationally. 2" Cor-
porate reorganizations, downsizing, and a growing reliance on con-
tingent workers increasingly became the norm beginning in the early
1980s.231 These measures, in turn, have significantly eroded employee
228 See SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1900-1945, at 13-23 (1985) (describ-
ing factory labor in the period prior to 1915).
258 See id. at 31-37; Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucrathatimt of Wm*: Employer Policies
and Contract Law, 1986 Wts. L. REV. 733, 751-52 (1986).
227 See generally SUMNER H. SLIGHTER, UNION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT
100 (1941).
528 See, e.g., Paltnateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (citing Blades, supra note 224, at 1405) ("With
the rise of large corporations conducting specialized operations and employing relatively
immobile workers who often have no other place to market their skills, recognition that
the employer and employee do not stand on equal footing is realistic."); Blades, supra note
224, at 1404-05; Pratt, supra note 27, at 197, 200-01.
228 Jack Steiber, Most U.S. Workers Still May be Fired Under the Employment-at-Will Doctrine,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1984, at 34, 36.
238 See CAPELLI ET AL., supra note 85, at 15-64; DamSchniidt, supra note 79, at 2, 12;
Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition: The Case for
Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NI.RA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 136 (1994).
221 See CAPELLI ET AL, supra note 85, at 66-88 (describing various changes in business
practices resulting from global economic pressures)
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job security. 232 Similarly, modern information and communication
technology has made capital considerably more mobile than labor. 233
Employers can move, or threaten to move, production facilities to lo-
cations with lower labor costs. 234 This mobile capacity thus greatly en-
hances die relative bargaining power of employers vis-a-vis employ-
ees. 235
In this new climate, the purported equality of the at-will rule be-
comes even more "obviously fictional." 236 This obvious fiction has pro-
vided fuel for the movement to adopt or overhaul governmental regu-
lation to redress the power imbalance between employers and
employees.
b. Employee Expectations and the Decline of the Social Contract
In a 1997 law review article, Professor Pauline . Kim reported the
results of an empirical study designed to ascertain employee percep-
tions concerning the legal rules governing the workplace. 237 Her sur-
vey data indicated that workers greatly overestimate the extent to
which the law provides limitations on an employer's discretion to
dismiss einployees. 238 She reported, for example:
overwhelming majorities of the respondents erroneously be-
lieved that an employer cannot legally fire an employee in
order to hire someone else at a lower wage (82.2 percent),
for reporting internal wrongdoing by another employee
(79.2 percent), based on a mistaken belief of the employee's
232 See id. at 1179-83 (summarizing empirical research indicating an increase in em-
ployee turnover and a decrease in employee job security); Dau-Schtnidt, supra note 79, at
20 (noting the impact of trade and technology on the decline in long-term employment).
233 See e.g., BELLACE & ROOD, supra note 78, at 22 (noting that labor law and unions are
"bound by national borders, but capital is not"); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 79, at 11 (noting
the increased mobility of capital in the new global economy).
2" See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
255 See Capelli, supra note 73, at 1179 (concluding that the business restructuring
spurred by trade and technology has systematically shifted business risk to employees);
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 79, at 11 ('The increased mobility of capital in the international
economy has meant that employees must now compete with workers in other countries
merely to retain the allegiance of their employer.").
2" See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
2" See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions
of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997).
238 See it at 133-46.
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own wrongdoing (87.2 percent), or out of personal dislike of
the employee (89 percent). 239
On the other hand, these same workers correctly presumed that they
lawfully could be terminated for unsatisfactory job performance or a
lack of work.240 These survey results, which are corroborated by other
studies,241 suggest a serious disconnect between the expectations of
employees and the realities of contemporary employment law.
Why do many employees incorrectly believe that the law protects
them against discharge so long as work is available and they perform
satisfactorily? The answer, in part, may lie in the fact that American
employers for many years fostered those expectations. As noted
above, employment tenure during the late 1800s and early 1900s was
very transitory in nature. 242 One study, for example, showed that the
majority of industrial workers in the period from 1905 to 1917
changed jobs at least once every three years."' Many firms during this
period experienced monthly separation rates in excess of ten per-
cent. 2" Beginning with the era of World War II, however, American
employers invested great efforts in reducing employee turnover."
These employers realized that a stable workforce helped to reduce
recruitment and training costs while simultaneously boosting em-
ployee morale. 246 To achieve this stability, employers designed per-
sonnel policies to encourage career rather than casual employment
tenure.247 Among the cornerstones of this policy were managerial
commitments to long-term job security and the creation of defined
paths of progression and promotion."' This "bureaucratization of
work"249 not only reduced employee turnover rates,250 but also fos-
239 Id. at 133-34.
240 See id. at 134 tb1.1.
241 See, e.g., Frank S. Forbes & Ida M. Jones, A Comparative-Attitudinal, and Analytical
Study of Dismissal of At-Will Employees Without Cause, 37 LAB. LJ. 157,165-66 (1986) (report-
ing the results of a telephone survey showing that only 15-22% of respondents knew that
employers could terminate employees without cause).
242 See supra notes 226-227 and accompanying text.
243 See D. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1850-1920, at 163
(1978).
SCPJACOBY, supra note 225, at 32.
243 See generally CAPELLI ET AL., supra note 85; JAconY, supra note 225, at 243-70.
246 See CAPELLI ET AL., supra note 85, at 23; WEILER, supra note 90, at 191-52.
242 See JAcons, supra note 225, at 262-79 (describing the rise of internal labor markets
and increased employee job security); see also WEILER, supra note 90, at 146 (noting the
transition of the employment relationship from casual to career in nature).
249 SeeJACOBY, supra note 225, at 262-74; Finkin, supra note 226, at 741-42.
249 Finkin, supra note 226, at 733.
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tered the development of an extra-legal social contract in which both
employers and employees had legitimate expectations of a long-term
relationship R51 A key ingredient of this social contract was the under-
standing that employees could expect continued employment so long
as they performed their job duties in an adequate fashion. 252
Legal rules generally reflect widely-held beliefs and practices. 255
Thus, the at-will principle was consistent with the nineteenth century
ethos of unfettered entrepreneurship254 coupled with the reality of
high labor mobility. 255 On the other hand, the at-will rule does not fit
easily with the job security expectations flowing from the social con-
tract of the mid-twentieth century. 256
Some scholars suggest that the expectations of the social contract
explains at least some part of the newer limitations on the at-will
rule. 257 A more likely source of these limitations, however, is the de-
mise of this social contract, as many American employers began to
withdraw their support for this set of implicit workplace rules. Under
pressure from global competition and enabled by technological ad-
vances, these employers relocated plants and downsized operations. 258
They hired contingent workers and reduced the number of core
workers. 259 In short, many employers abandoned their commitment to
long-term employment. The employment relationship once again be-
250 See JACOBY, supra note 225, at 276.
251 See CAPELLI ET AL., supra note 85, at 200-01 (describing an implicit employment
contract by which loyalty and retention by the employee are rewarded by stable employ-
ment and income"); see aiS0 JACOBY, supra note 225, at 269 (noting the "widespread accep-
tance of the principle that a worker could be dismissed only for just cause").
252 See GouLn, supra note 133, at 80; KOCHAN ET AL., MOM note 71, at 138; 'Catherine V.
W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and
Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 539 (2001).
255 See Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting
Marhet Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 33 (2001) (stating that "law and social forces have a
multidirectional causal relationship").
254 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 226-227 and accompanying text.
256 See Martin H. Malin, The Distributive and Corrective Justice Concerns in the Debate Over
Employment Some Preliminary Thoughts, 68 CHs: KENT L. REV. 117, 137 (1992)
("(I] linking dismissal to just cause ... more accurately reflects the unstated expectations of
the parties than does permitting dismissal at will.").
"7 See Finkin, supra note 226, at 751 (contending that the recently recognized con-
tract-based limitations on the at-will rule do not represent so much a change in the law as
the application of "the extant law of contract to a world of vastly changed business prac-
tice").
252 See, e.g., CAPELLI ET AL., supra note 85, at 27-29, 44-63; KOCHAN ET AL., supra note
71, at 114-15.
252 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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came more transitory,26° however, this time the cause was capital mo-
bility rather than labor mobility. 261
Many Americans perceive this change in employment practices as
an unfair breach of the earlier social contract. 262 Many see this aban-
donment of internal labor markets as driven by greed, and not simply
by considerations of just efficiency. 263 Viewed in this light, the gov-
ernment has stepped in and restricted the at-will principle, not to ef-
fectuate a social consensus, but to redress some of the more egregious
employer practices.
Some commentators suggest that these events have ushered in a
new social contract based upon notions of "employability" rather than
employment security. 264 Professor Katherine V. W. Stone, for example,
sees a new "boundary-less" employment realm 268 in which employees
no longer desire or expect long-term employment, but, instead, seek
only the capability of continuous employment with a series of em-
ployers facilitated by employer-provided training.266
I have my doubts about this proposition. Internal labor markets
hardly are extinct. Professor Sanford Jacoby recently published an ar-
ticle in which he examined the purported demise of long-term em-
ployment relationships and found that claim to be "exaggerated." 267
Professor Jacoby's research detected "only a slight drop in the overall
prevalence of long-term jobs" over the past twenty years and found
that internal labor markets continue to be the norm in the U.S. econ-
omy. 269 He summarized his conclusions as follows:
To summarize, a variety of sources have been examined to
assess the degree of change in career-type employment prac-
tices. Without doubt, blue-collar workers in the early 1980s
and white-collar workers in the early 1990s experienced
higher levels of permanent job loss. As a result, aggregate
job tenure rates have declined modestly since the late 1970s.
260 See CAPELLI rs AL., supra note 85, at 177-79 (discussing various studies showing a
decline in job tenure during the 1980s and 1990s).
261 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
262 See CAPELLI ET a., supra note 85, at 200-01; Sanford M. Jacoby, Melting into Air?
Downsizing, fob Stability, and the Future of Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1195,1220-21 (2000).
263 See Jacoby, supra note 262, at 1221.
204 See CAPELLI ET AL., supra note 85, at 203; Stone, supra note 252, at 569-72.
265 See Stone, supra note 252, at 553-56.
256 See id. at 569-72.
"7 Jacoby, supra note 262, at 1205.
268 Id. at 1206.
265 Id. at 1196.
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On the other hand, the majority of workers continue to hold
career-type jobs that offer fringe benefits, training, and
prospects of continuity. 270
In addition, I doubt that the purported new social contract is
rooted in an increased commitment of employers to employee train-
ing. To the contrary, some research shows that shorter-term employ-
ment relationships are accompanied by a decrease in employer train-
ing efforts. 271 Short-term employers tend to hire skills rather than to
invest in thern. 272
A more plausible explanation is that the former social contract
has declined, but that it has not yet been replaced by a new set of mu-
tual understandings. A number of employers may have reduced their
commitment to long-term employment, but the evidence is scarce
that society has embraced a new "boundary-less" order. Contemporary
surveys repeatedly show that workers still expect continued ethploy-
ment for good work and that they want more attachment and partici-
pation in their employment relationships. 273 It is true, of course, that
fewer objections to more flexible workplace practices have been
voiced during the boom years of the 1990s than in the lean years of
the 1980s.274 But, a return to a less robust economy, as we now seem to
be experiencing, will again tilt the workplace balance of power more
decidedly against employees and unleash displeasure with the demise
of the old social contract. 275
c. The Rise of the Nondiscrimination Principle
The post-World War II civil rights movement also contributed
significantly to the decline of the at-will rule. Indeed, the first modern
statutory departure front at-will employment was enacted in the form
of Title VII276 The antidiscrimination principle embodied in that act,
270 Id. at 1219-20.
zn See, e.g., CAPELLI ET AL., supra note 85, at 141-42; Wiji Arulampalam & Alison L.
Booth, ?}wining and Labor Market Flexibility, 36 Barr. J. INDUS. REL. 521,525-27.
272 See CAPELLI ET AL., 51/1011 note 85, at 141-42.
2" See, e.g., RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT? (1999) (finding
that a majority of workers want greater participation in workplace decision-making); Kim,
supra note 237, at 133-46 (finding that most employees believe that they were entitled to
continued employment in the absence of poor work performance).
274 See Schwab, supra note 253, at 36 (contending that pressure to limit the at-will rule
decreases in a climate where employees change jobs frequently).
275 See Jacoby, supra note 262, at 1219 (explaining that employee leverage in the em-
ployment relationship varies with the demand for labor).
276 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1999).
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in turn, both directly and indirectly led to other limitations on em-
ployer discretion.
The legislative history of the 1964 Act shows that its principal aim
was to eradicate racial discrimination. 277 The push to ban racial dis-
crimination, however, had broad coattails. Title VII, as enacted, also
prohibits discrimination in employment practices on the basis of re-
ligion, gender, and national origin. 278 Congress subsequently ex-
tended the antidiscrimination principle to bar discrimination based
on agen and disability status. 280 In short, Congress directly has lim-
ited the at-will rule in order to eliminate discrimination against cer-
tain groups of workers who have suffered from a history of "unfair
and unnecessary diScrimination."281
The nondiscrimination principle also may have contributed to
the withering of the at-will rule in a more indirect fashion. A basic
premise of antidiscrimination legislation is to compel employers to
make employment decisions based on individual capabilities as op-
posed to stereotypical assumptions. 282 By prohibiting a certain subset
of unfair employment practices, these statutes create a climate in
which expectations of fair treatment are fostered even beyond the
precise contours of statutory coverage. 283 As former NLRB Chairman
William Gould has explained, "[Coday, the average employee enters
277 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1964 U.S.C.CAN. 2355, 2513-17. The employment
context of Title VII was only one of the Act's eleven titles. Other titles extended the anti-
discrimination principle to such areas as voting rights, education, and public accommoda-
tions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994).
278 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994). Of interest is the fact that the amendment add-
ing "sex" to the list of protected classifications was offered on the floor of the House of
Representatives by an opponent of the bill one day before final adoption and with the
apparent intent of making the bill unacceptable to most legislators. See WILLIAM F. PEPPER
& FLORENCE KENNEDY, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 17-18 (1981).
279
 See The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994).
28° SeeAmericans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
"I 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (9) (1994) (Congressional findings relating to the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
or See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (ruling that Title VII
bans employment decisions resulting front sex-based stereotyping); School Board v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (explaining that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which bans dis-
ability discrimination by federal employers, contractors, and grant recipients, was designed
to redress "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability").
255 See Gomm, supra note 133, at 78-80 (describing how recognition of the antidis-
crimination principle has contributed to a broader expectation of fair treatment); Rosa-
beth Moss Kanter, Work in America, in DAEDALUS 53-54 (1978) (noting the increasing ten-
dency of American employees to assert demands for individual rights, justice, and equality
in the workplace).
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into the employment relationship with the expectation that if he or
she does a fair day's work, that he or she will not only receive com-
pensation but also fair treatment." 284 The antidiscrimination statutes,
accordingly, provide a useful analogy on which legislative and judicial
bodies can draw in prohibiting certain employer actions that fall short
of this expected standard of conduct.
d. The Lack of a Viable Union Alternative
The contemporaneous decline of both unionization and the at-
will rule likely are related phenomena. With the shrinking union sec-
tor less capable of providing a meaningful counterweight to unde-
terred employer discretion, governmental regulation becomes the
next best line of defense. 285
In 1950, the union sector offset the potential harshness of the at-
will rule in two ways. First, employees unhappy with unilateral em-
ployer authority had the option to organize their workplace and seek
union representation. 286 The bilateral regulation of the union sector,
then, was an alternative regulatory structure available through collec-
tive employee choice. As discussed above, approximately one-third of
all non-agricultural employees chose this option at the mid-century
mark.287
Second, the impact of the union sector reached far beyond un-
ionized workplaces. Bargains struck in the union sector effectively set
the pattern for much of the nonunion sector as well. Nonunion firms,
whether to attract good workers or to stave off unions, frequently
adopted the compensation rates and personnel practices of their un-
ion counterparts. 288 In this manner, the strength of the union sector
deterred excessive employer practices even in the absence of formal
legal restraints.
The union movement of 2000 can no longer perform either of
these functions effectively. Employees of today, even those favorably
284 GOULD, supra note 133, at 80.
288 See id. at 55-58 (discussing the interrelationship between the decline of unioniza-
tion and the rise of governmental regulation); Clyde W. Sutmners, Labor Law as the Century
71trns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 15 (1988) (swing that with the decline
in labor unions, "]flociety is now looking to the courts and legislatures to protect employ-
ees not covered by collective bargaining").
286 The right of employees to join a union and select a union representative is dis-
cussed supra at notes 35-61 and accompanying text.
287 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
288 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 72, at 151-59; KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 71, at
35.
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inclined toward union membership, 259 are less likely to be successful
in securing union representation. The odds of a union obtaining ma-
jority support in a representation election simply are longer in a
world in which only one in eleven private sector employees is union-
ized and unions control few industries in which they can "take wages
out of competition."295 This difficulty is exacerbated by the wide-
spread use of anti-union tactics by American employers. 291 While un-
ions routinely won more than seventy-five percent of all representa-
don elections in the years around 1950, the success rate plummeted
to less than fifty percent by the 19805. 292
Furthermore, union agreements now exert far less influence over
the nonunion sector. Beginning in the 19805, unionized firms increas-
ingly made concessionary demands on unions to help alleviate the
impact of competition from lower-paying foreign plants and nonun-
ion firms493 Unions responded by agreeing to accept lower compen-
sation and more flexible work arrangements in order to avoid massive
lay-offs.294 In short, the tables have turned in many industries with pat-
tern-setting influences now flowing from the nonunion sector rather
than from the union sector. 295
A strong union movement fifty years ago provided a practical
counterweight to unbridled employer power. As union density has
declined, the scales have tipped to a degree that many find to be un-
acceptable. Direct governmental regulation is the most obvious way to
rectify this imbalance. 296 Increased governmental regulation, accord-
ingly, has filled the gap vacated by a weakened labor movement and
serves as a new counterweight in the American employment relation-
ship.
2" See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 273, at 68-69 (reporting survey results that show
that approximately one-third of all currently unrepresented American workers would like a
union form of representation); KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 217 (reporting polling
data showing that 101 ne-third of the nonunion workforce does see unionization as a ve-
hicle for improving specific job conditions and would prefer to have a union represent
them, if given the opportunity").
290 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
1'1 See supra notes 136-161 and accompanying text.
1'2 See GOLDFIELD, supra note 29, at 23 fig.4.
255 See KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 119-21,144-45.
254 See id. at 116-18; Peter Capelli, Concession Bargaining and the National Economy, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE IND'L REL. RESEARCH As-
soc. 362-71 (1983).
"5 See generally KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 144-45.
1'5 See generally Summers, supra note 285, at 10,15.
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C. Summary
This part has chronicled a major shift in the legal regulation of
the workplace over the past fifty years. The collective oversight pro-
vided by labor/management relations has shrunk in importance,
while the role of governmental regulation of the individual employ-
ment relationship has substantially increased.
This historical view, moreover, reveals a subtext to this story that
is perhaps even more important. The emergeffce of a global economy
and advances in technology have changed the face of work itself.
These two factors have unleashed a number of forces, such as capital
mobility and short-term work arrangements, that alter both where
and how work is accomplished. These forces, in turn, have
significantly skewed the balance of economic power in a manner that
is detrimental to employee interests. Any realistic assessment of the
new legal landscape must be cognizant of this new disequilibrium as
well.
III. PRINCIPAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE CURRENT REGIME
This section shifts the focus from the historical to the critical.
More precisely, this section attempts to identify and analyze the major
shortcomings of the current system of American labor and employ-
ment law.
This concentration on deficiencies is not meant to suggest that
the current regime is wholly devoid of any favorable attributes. It in-
stead reflects a need to identify the unfavorable attributes of the cur-
rent landscape in order to find solutions that will augment those that
work today. Put another way, identifying today's problems may be a
first step toward designing tomorrow's solutions.
Unfortunately, finding deficiencies in the current labor and em-
ployment law system is not a difficult task. The current system fails to
serve the best interests of those governed by this framework in a
number of respects. Workers, employers, and the American public
alike needlessly suffer under the highly complicated rules of the
workplace developed over the past fifty years.
A. Lack of Doctrinal Coherency
A properly structured body of law should exhibit at least three
basic attributes. First, it should be grounded in a set of fundamental
and widely-accepted principles that order social and economic con-
duct. Second, a legal code, whether statutory, judge-based, or a coin-
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bination, should build upon and implement these principles in a
logical and coherent manner. Finally, this body of law, or legal sub-
system, should be administered in a fair and efficient fashion under
the auspices of a tribunal with sufficient expertise to guide future doc-
trinal development.
The labor law wing of the labor and employment law sub-system
scores relatively well when measured against these objectives. Section
7 of the NLRA recognizes three fundamental guiding principles of
American labor law: the rights of employees to organize, to bargain
collectively, and to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and
protection 297 As amended by the Taft-Hartley Ad, section 7 also rec-
ognizes the right of employees to refrain from engaging in each of
these activities. 298 The NLRA provides a statutory framework for im-
plementing these basic rights; the NLRB and an informal system of
labor arbitration serve as accessible arbiters of labor-management dis-
putes. While the NLRA has some serious shortcomings in terms of
adequately protecting the employee rights conferred by section 7,299
the American body of labor law is, at least, relatively coherent and
efficient.
The employment, or non-collective, wing, in contrast, fails to ex-
hibit any of the attributes of a properly structured body of law. First of
all, the current body of employment law has never been grounded in
any well-accepted foundational principle. The closest pretender to
that throne, the at-will rule, is now limited by numerous exceptions.
Most Americans, moreover, appear to believe that the at-will rule ei-
ther is not or should not be the prevailing principle governing the
employment relationship. 899
Moreover, one cannot extrapolate a unifying principle from the
spate of new regulations emerging in the past fifty years. Some of the
regulations prohibit conduct that discriminates on certain narrowly
specified bases, other statutes mandate minimum workplace stan-
dards, and still other at-will limitations seek to deter particularly egre-
gious types of employer behavior. What we have is not one or two bed-
rock principles, but a number of competing, overlapping, and
sometimes contradictory themes.
297 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
298 Id.
299 See infra notes 386-392 and accompanying text.
3°° See supra notes 237-241 and accompanying text (discussing surveys showing that
most adult Americans believe that an employer may terminate an employee only based on
a reasonable cause).
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Needless to say, the resulting body of employment law is anything
but logical and coherent. Unlike the unitary statute implementing
federal labor policy, the legal rules governing the employment rela-
tionship consist of a crazy quilt of regulation emanating from a variety
of sources—federal and state, legislative and judicial. These regula-
tions, in turn, bear little relationship to one another beyond having
applicability in the workplace setting.
Filially, the means of enforcing the rights created by these regula-
tions is wholly inadequate. The principal, although not exclusive,
means of enforcement is through private suits in courts of general
jurisdiction."' Unlike the NLRB and arbitrators, who are experts in
labor law, federal judges are hardly experts in the complicated world
of employment law. Of course, they are becoming more so as em-
ployment cases increasingly crowd federal court dockets." As dis-
cussed in greater detail below, this litigation model of enforcement is
overly cumbersome and costly."
B. The Maze of Multiple Claims and Forums
The legal landscape resulting from the employment law regula-
tory boom is a very complicated one. The current landscape, particu-
larly in the context of employment termination, is garbled by a maze
of potential claims and forums." The parties involved in an employ-
ment termination lawsuit, as well as the judiciary, must divert consid-
erable time and attention to navigating this maze.
A fired worker may assert a host of possible claims challenging his
or her former employer's termination decision. It is not uncommon
for employee discharge complaints today to plead claims numbering
in the double digits. The chart below lists only those claims that are
"'During the fiscal year 1983, about 9000 employment discrimination cases were filed
in court. See John J. Donohue & Peter Siegehnan, The Changing Nature of Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 985 (1991). In comparison, only 1973 employ-
ment discrimination cases were filed with the American Arbitration Association in 1999. E-
mail from Toni L. Griffin, Vice President of Corporate Communications, American Arbi-
tration Association, to Sarah A. Link (Oct. 26, 2000) (on file with author).
302 See Donohue & Siegehnan, supra note 301, at 983-94 (suiting that federal employ-
ment discrimination litigation has grown at such a rapid rate that it is now raising concerns
that employment discrimination litigation is imposing a significant burden on federal
judges).
303 See infra notes 313-337 and accompanying text.
304 See Summers, supra note 285, at 18 (stating that the most difficult problem of the
near future will he reconciling overlapping protections").
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discussed in this article, with many more possible based upon lesser
known state laws and miscellaneous tort theories.
Federal Claims 	 State Claims
Antidiscrimination Laws
—Tide VII
—ADEA
—ADA
Other Statutory Claims
—NLRA—unfair labor practice
—Retaliation—FMLA, ERISA, OSHA
Constitutional Claims
—First Amendment
—Due Process
—Equal Protection
Collective Bargaining Agreement
—private sector grievance arbitration
Statutory Claims
—antidisc rimination statutes
—whistleblowel statutes
Common Law Claims
—public policy tort
—contract
—covenant of good faith & fair dealing
—defamation
—intentional infliction of emotional distress
Collective Bargaining Agreement
—public sector grievance arbitration
•
This maze is further complicated by the possibility of multiple forums.
Discharge-related claims potentially may be heard by a federal court,
state court, administrative agency, or an arbitrator.
Much of current employment litigation entails the sorting and
accommodation of these multiple claims and forums. Some federal
statutes, such as ERISA,306 broadly preempt state law claims, while
others, such as Tide VI1, 306 do so narrowly. In between are no less than
three different strands of federal labor law preemption, each with its
own complicated standard for ousting state law claims. 307
At the state level, courts sometimes find that certain statutory
claims are exclusive and preclude common law claims based upon the
same set of facts. 3°8 Other courts, however, view common law claims as
305 Section 1149(a) provides that ERISA supercedes any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1149(a)
(1994). This standard has led to an "expansive sweep" of federal preemption under ERISA.
See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,47 (1987). See generally Befort & Kopka, supra
note 193.
306 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to ex-
empt or relieve any person from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any
present or future law of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such
law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this title.").
3°1 See Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 13
LAB. LAW. 429,430-37 (1998) (discussing NLRA and section 301 preemption).
3°8 See, e.g., Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 489 (1987); Giese v. Phoenix
Co. of Chicago, Inc., 639 N.E.2d 1273 (III. 1994).
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supplementary and permit both statutory and parallel common law
claims to proceed at the same time." Still other jurisdictions chart
something of a middle course by permitting multiple claims to pro-
ceed simultaneously, but limiting the amount of damages to a single
claim where the harm alleged in the multiple counts is essentially
identical.mo
Sometimes the end result of all this sorting and accommodating
is that a discharged employee gets two bites at the apple. The most
well-known example is that of a unionized employee who contends
that he or she was terminated because of race or gender discrimina-
tion. The employee usually can contest the discharge in labor arbitra-
tion under the just cause standard of the governing collective bargain-
ing agreement.311 Whether the employee wins or loses in that forum,
the Supreme Court has held that the discharged employee also can
proceed with a suit under Tide VII with no collateral estoppel ef-
fect. 312
C. Administrative Burdens of the Litigation Enforcement Model
Despite the variety of forums available for certain types of claims,
most nonunion employment termination matters are heard in courts
of general jurisdiction. This is true whether the claim at issue is based
upon a federal statute or a state-based common law theory. To a con-
siderable extent, turning an old phrase, we have made a federal case
out of routine employment disputes.
This litigation enforcement model has considerable drawbacks.
The litigation model, coupled with the employment law regulatory
boom, has resulted in an explosion of employment litigation. The
number of employment suits in federal court increased by 430% be-
tween 1971 and 1991. 313 The four following years witnessed another
so See, e.g., Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc., 543 N.E.2d 1212 (Ohio 1989);
Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 536 A.2d 1375, 1381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
310 See, e.g., Williams v. Mariott Corp., 864 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (M.D. Fla. 1994); Whig v.
Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 379 (Minn. 1990).
311 See supra notes 54-58 and accomPanying text (discussing the near universal provi-
sions in collective bargaining agreements requiring just cause for termination and the
access to an arbitration forum to enforce such a standard).
512 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1974). While the Court ruled
that the Title VII claim in Alexander should be considered de novo, it added that the prior
"arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as may be ap-
propriate." Id. at 60.
315 U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, supra note 75, at 113. Between 1991 and 1995, employment-
related civil rights lawsuits in federal courts shot up 128%. See id.
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jump of 128%. 314 In the last thirty years, the amount of employment
litigation has grown at a rate almost ten times greater than the rate of
increase in other types of civil litigation 9 15 Due to this explosion,
court dockets have become overwhelmed with litigation. In May of
1999, there were approximately 25,000 wrongful discharge and dis-
crimination cases pending nationwide. 316
Aside from the problems associated with the sheer volume of
cases, civil litigation is a relatively slow method of dispute resolution.
Research shows that the "median time between the date a lawsuit is
filed and the commencement of a civil trial is 2.5 years." 3" While wait-
ing for a trial date, parties typically engage in discovery, pre-trial mo-
tions, and settlement discussions. The litigation timeline may be ex-
tended further by post-trial proceedings and appeals. 318
Litigation also is an expensive mechanism for resolving employ-
ment disputes. The cost of taking a case from complaint to trial typi-
cally reaches or exceeds $300,000. 333 Attorney fees paid by defendant
employers make up the vast bulk of this amount. 32° In addition, par-
ties to an employment suit incur indirect expenses due to the neces-
sary diversion of time and resources from productive activity to litiga-
tion preparation activity.321 Many employers also hire lawyers and
consultants to assist them in avoiding litigation by auditing corporate
practices, creating policies, and generating favorable evidence. 322
314 See Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of Employment Dis-
putes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 22 (1997) ("Approximately ten percent of the docket of the federal
courts is estimated to be employment issues.").
316 See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 Dtse. RESOL. J. 8,
10 (1997); see also Bompey et al.; supra note 314, at 22 ClEimployment litigation has in-
creased by 400% in the past twenty years."). The number of employment discrimination
cases has increased twenty-five fold between 1970 and 1998. See Evan J. Spelfogel, Manda-
tory Arbitration vs. Employment Litigation, 54 Dise. Resca.. J. 78, 78 (1999).
316 See Spelfogel, supra note 315, at 78.
317 Bompey et al., supra note 314, at 22.
318 See Spelfogel, supra note 315, at 78.
316 See Bompey et al., supra note 314, at 22 (citing figures based on litigation in Cali-
fornia).
326 See JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR-MARKET RESPONSES TO EM-
PLOYER LIABILITY 35 (1992) (reporting that as of 1986, defense lawyer costs could exceed
$250,000 in the course of a lengthy wrongful-termination trial).
321 See Bompey et al., supra note 314, at 22 ("Defending against a wrongful discharge
claim brought by a former employee can cost an employer hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars in legal fees and considerable time of corporate personnel diverted from productive
activity to providing information or testimony.").
362 See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form From Substance: Understanding Employer Litiga-
tion Prevention Strategies, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL 1 Y J. 1, 14-18 (1999); Denise V. M.
Hubert, Exactly What is Employment ADR?, HUM. RESOURCE Prior., July-Aug. 1998, at 23 (not-
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Finally, the litigation model also fails to interject the views of an
expert body into the decision-making process. In contrast to the labor
law arena, in which an expert NLRB oversees individual decisions and
the development of controlling legal principles,323 employment law
disputes generally are heard in courts of general jurisdiction. These
courts hear employment cases with a mix of criminal cases, contract
disputes, and other matters. Given the increasing complexity of
American employment law, this is not the most efficient means of
guiding and coordinating future doctrinal developments.324
Beyond these systemic problems, the litigation model also results
in some unique problems for employees and employers. For termi-
nated employees, the problem is one of access to the justice system.
The high cost of attorney fees, out-of-pocket expenses, and the con-
siderable amount of time it takes to litigate a claim all make it difficult
for employees to access the courts.325 These obstacles disproportion-
ately impact lower paid employees S26 It is more difficult for this group
to afford the combined cost and delay of litigation than for more
highly compensated workers.327 While some attorneys are willing to
handle employment discharge cases on a contingency fee basis, they
are less likely to do so on behalf of lower-income workers.328 In part
this is because workers who earn modest wages prior to discharge are
less likely to receive large monetary jury verdicts even if. they are suc-
cessful in a discharge suit.329 As a result, contingent fee lawyers are
ing that the cost of undertaking steps to avoid litigation sometimes exceeds the cost of
litigation itself).
323 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
324 See GOULD, supra note 133, at 86 ("A problem with the existing system is that judges
and juries have less expertise than administrative agencies or labor arbitrators who special-
ize in the employment relationship.").
323 See Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. & Este.
Poiv.j., 221, 241 (1997).
328 See Gomm, supra note 133, at 85 (noting that "the average employee below the
managerial ranks simply cannot afford [the litigation] process."); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
ROB note 75, at 105 (noting that the time and expense of the litigation model make it
especially difficult for low-wage workers topinsue employment claims).
322 See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS.
& Erste. POL'Y J., 189, 198-99 (1997); see also FitzGibbon, supra note 325, at 241 (noting
that most employment plaintiffs are workers who were removed from professional and/or
managerial positions).
328 See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COMM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 58 (1998) (reporting estimates that only about 5% of employees
with potential claims are successful in retaining an attorney).
323 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 421, 424
(1999) (reporting that between 60 and 80% of successful plaintiffs in employment termi-
nation cases come from the ranks of middle or upper management and professional em-
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more likely to decline representation of lower paid workers due to
fear that the cost of litigating such a claim would exceed the likely
amount of recovery. 330
Many employers experience a similar problem at the opposite
end of the spectrum. Here, employers have a strong incentive to settle
employment claims in order to avoid the costs associated with litiga-
tion.333 Given that defense costs through trial hover at around
$250,000 in a typical employment termination case, 332 settling even a
non-meritorious claim may make financial sense. This incentive is
heightened by the potential for a sizeable jury verdict if a case is taken
to trial ass A study by the Employer's Resource Group revealed an av-
erage award of $733,000 in employment termination cases tried to a
jury.334 Moreover, while employers prevail in most employment
suits,335 this same study indicated that plaintiffs won in sixty-four per-
cent of those cases that ended by means of a jury verdict. 336 Not sur-
prisingly, the vast majority of employment law suits result in voluntary
settlements.'"
What we have, in effect, is a uniquely American employment law
lottery. Most employees work on an at-will basis and have no viable
legal claim in the event of a job termination. Many of those workers
ployees); FitzGibbon, supra note 325, at 260 (noting that in addition to lower back pay
awards, lower paid workers tend not to be as successful in winning discharge suits as com-
pared to high wage professionals).
IN See Bickner, supra note 315, at 12.
531 See U.S. DEP 'T or LABOR, Mira note 75, at 112 (noting that employment litigation
"imposes legal costs on the targeted employers, many of whom turn out to be fully in com-
pliance with the law").
332 See DERTOUZOS & Kumla, supra note 320, at 35; Bompey et al., supra note 314, at
22.
3" See Hubert, supra note 322, at 23 (stating that the fear of litigation also "causes
managers to accept inadequate performance, avoid re-engineering positions and systems,
and miss development opportunities").
334 See id. at 23; see also DERTOUZOS & !CAROLE, MOM note 320, at 35 (reporting on a
California survey in 1986 showing average jury trial awards in wrongful termination cases
at "nearly $700,000").
333 e.g., 158 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 257 (1998) (reporting a study by the American
Bar Association showing that employers have prevailed in 92% of all cases filed under the
ADA, most frequently at the summary judgment stage).
333 See Hubert, supra note 322, at 23.
332 See DERTOUZOS & KAROLY, sup-a note 320, at 36 (reporting that about 95% of all
wrongful termination cases settle before trial with employers paying an average of $25,000
to the terminated employee and another $15,000 in legal costs); Howard A. Simon &
Yaroslav Sochynsky, In-House Mediation of Employment Disputes: ADR for the 1990s, EMPLOYEE
REL. Lj., Summer 1995, at 29, 30 (noting that more than 85% of all employment cases
settle before trial).
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who may have a legitimate claim are unable to pursue it because of
the high entry cost of our justice system. Employers, nonetheless, fear
employment termination suits and spend considerable sums in deter-
ring and settling lawsuits. The only real winners in this system are the
handful of plaintiffs who strike it big before a jury.
The administratively cumbersome nature of the litigation model
is underscored when compared to possible alternative systems. In the
United States labor sector, as discussed above, employment termina-
tion disputes usually are addressed through an interactive grievance
process that culminates in arbitration. This process is widely believed
to be "faster, cheaper, and simpler than litigation: 139 Most European
and Latin American countries test the validity of job termination deci-
sions in proceedings before a specialized labor tribunal of one form
or another. 339 Here again, the use of these specialized tribunals is
"thought to dispense a cheaper, quicker, more accessible and expert
justice. "340
Data compiled by Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS), the federal agency primarily charged with overseeing private
sector labor arbitration matters, tend to confirm the faster, cheaper,
and simpler assertion. In contrast to the typical two and one-half year
timetable for litigated employment termination cases to reach tria1, 343
FMCS statistics show that the average labor arbitration case in 1996
was completed from start to finish in less than one year's time. 342 In
reality, the contrast is greater still because arbitration awards typically
are final and subject to a very narrow scope of review. 343 Similarly, the
average labor arbitration hearing in 1996 took only 1.12 days to coin-
313 See COOPER, supra note 56, at 500-01; see also &Room & ELROUTU, supra note 49, at
10-13; Abrams, supra note 61, at 236-37.
222 See, e.g., Befort & Cornett, .supra note 135, at 296-97 (discussing Mexico's use of
specialized conciliation and labor tribunals); Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissals in Other
Countries: Some Cautionary Notes, 10 EMP. REL. L.J. 286, 296 (1984) (surveying the employ-
ment termination lawsiof six countries).
"1 See Estreicher, supra note 339, at 296.
341 See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
342 See FMCS, Public Information, Arbitration Services, Average Elapsed Time in Days
Per Case for FMCS Closed Arbitration Award Cases Sampled in Fiscal Year 1992 Through
1996, available at http://www.fmcs.gov/pubinfo (last visited Apr. 4, 2002) (showing an
average time of 318.58 days from the time of filing a grievance to the date of the arbitra-
tion award); see also Spelfogel, sttpra note 315, at 81 (explaining that arbitration moves
faster than litigation because it avoids the possibility of huge jury verdicts, reduces internal
costs, and minimizes the expense of discovery due to less extensive rules).
343 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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plete, a far cry from the length of a formal jury trial. 344 An additional
piece of FMCS data shows that the average fee charged by an arbitra-
tor in a grievance case was approximately $2500. 345 These figures cer-
tainly suggest that arbitration is both quicker and cheaper than litiga-
tion.346
D. The Lack of a Unitary Standard for Employment Termination
The United States stands virtually alone among industrialized
nations in failing to provide general statutory protection against un-
just dismissals. Most other industrialized countries recognize an em-
ployee's right to continued job security unless either work is unavail-
able or an employer has sufficient cause to terminate the employment
relationship.347
Most industrialized nations, even those with a common law heri-
tage,3" have adopted an explicit statutory limitation on an employer's
right to dismiss its employees.TM 9 While Mexico was the first to do so in
1917,35° most of the legislation dates from the 1960s following the
strong encouragement of an International Labor Organization (ILO)
recommendation issued in 1963. 351 Article 4 of current ILO Conven-
tion No. 158 states that "the employment of a worker shall not be
terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination con-
nected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the
344 See FMCS, Public Information, Arbitration Services, Average Number of Days
Charged by Arbitrator for Travel, Heating and Study Time Based on Closed Arbitration
Award Cases Sampled in Fiscal Year 1992 Through 1996, available at
hup://www.fmcs.gov/pubinfo (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
345 See FMCS, Public Information, Arbitration Services, Arbitrator's Per Diem Rate Fees
and Expenses Charged Fiscal Yeats 1992 Through 1996, available at
http://www.fincs.gov/pubinfo (last visited Apr. 4,2002).
346 COOPER, supra note 56, at 501.
147 See generally B. Hepple, Flexibility and Security of Employment, in COMPARATIVE LABOUR
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 277-303 (It
Blanpain & C. Engels eds., 1998).
M9 Both the United Kingdom, infra note 358, and Canada's federal sector, infra note
354, for example, have statutes that authorize employee terminations only upon a showing
of sufficient cause.
349 See Estreicher, supra note 339, at 287-94 (summarizing employment security statutes
in Canada, Great Britain, Germany, France, IL*, and Japan); Hepple, supra note 347, at
298 (summarizing employment security statutes in worldwide industrial market econo-
mies).
35° See Hepple, supra note 347, at 280.
331 Id. at 298.
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operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or serv-
ice."352
Most countries require some variant of a just cause standard in
order to justify employee dismissals. 353 Our North American neigh-
bors, for example, bar dismissals that are "unjust," 354 or which are not
supported by "just cause." 355 Similarly, virtually all European countries
have enacted statutory limitations on wrongful dismissal. In France,
an employer must show a reason that is both genuine and serious to
support a lawful termination." In Germany, the Constitution pro-
scribes "socially unwarranted dismissals ... not based on reasons con-
nected with the person or [his conduct] ... or [not based] on urgent
social needs that preclude his continued employment." 357 The stan-
dard is somewhat lower in Great Britain where a dismissal will be up-
held so long as an employer has a good faith belief in the existence of
a sufficient reason to warrant termination.358
Although several variations , exist, most statutes follow a similar
pattern in terms of procedures and remedies. Specialized labor tribu-
nals rather than courts of general jurisdiction generally preside over
unlawful dismissal claims.'" This means that claims generally are
processed much more quickly than under our litigation-based
mode1. 3" Another common feature is that the remedies provided by
these statutes are considerably more limited than under American
s52 Convention No. 158: Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer,
June 22, 1982, 65 ILO Official Bull. Series A, No. 2, 72.
333 See Hepple, supra note 347, at 298-99.
354 CANADA LABOR CODE § 290; see G. England, Unjust Dismissal in the Federal Jurisdiction:
The First Three Ymm, 12 MANI. L.J. 9 (1982).
155 MEX. CONST. art. 123, pt. A., chs. XIX, XXII; by Federal de Trabajo arts. 47, 53; Be-
fort & Cornett, supra note 135, at 280-81 (Mexico).
358 See Stephen E. Tallent, France, in I INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS
3-7 to 3-8 (William L. Keller ed., 1997); Estreicher, supra note 339, at 291.
352 Estreicher, supra note 339, at 290. This right is extended to employees who work at
firms with more than five employees. See id.
35° See Dorothy Henderson, United Kingdom, in I INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOY-
MENT LAWS 7-11 to 7-15 (William L. Keller ed., 1997); Hepple, supra note 347, at 298-99.
Under this statute, the employer must point to one of five reasons warranting dismissal:
(1) capability or qualifications; (2) conduct; (3) redundancy; (4) inability to work without
contravening a statute; or (5) some other substantial reason. See John D. R. Craig, hivacy
in the Workplace and the Impact of European Convention Incorporation on United Kingdom Labour
Law, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & Poiv J. 373, 385-86 (1998). The final category, of course, pro-
vides an employer with considerable leverage. See id.
352 See Estreicher, supra note 339, at 286; Summers, supra note 224, at 519.
35° See Estreicher, supra note 339, at 286; Summers, supra note 224, at 519. Dismissal
cases in Sweden, for example, generally are determined by the labor court within a six
month period. See Hepple, supra note 347, at 301.
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law. Outside of Canada, monetary awards for wrongful dismissal tend
to be modest and predictable."' In Belgium, for example, the statute
sets a fixed amount of compensation for a wrongfully discharged
white-collar worker at three months pay. 362 More typically, the tribunal
has discretion to set the award subject to statutory minimum or
maximum amounts. In France, au employee terminated without cause
is entitled to a minimum of six months of wages. 363 Sweden sets a
maximum of sixteen to forty-eight months of pay depending upon the
employee's age and length of service. Punitive damage awards gen-
erally are not authorized ass
A growing number of commentators have urged that the United
States adopt a similar statutory approach to employment termina-
tion.'66 Many of the reasons underlying a call for a statutory just cause
standard have been discussed in other parts of this article. These in-
clude the following:
1) A growing imbalance in bargaining power between em-
ployers and employees with the rise of large corporations
and the capital mobility of the global economy:367
2) the demise of the social contract and the resulting dis-
connect between societal expectations and actual legal
rules 368
3) the decline of a union alternative to the at-will rule; 369
and
4) the possibility that a unitary statute could overcome the
current maze of multiple claims and forums.3"
361 See Estreicher, supra note 339, at 295.
362 See Hepple, supra note 347, at 302.
363 See id.
364 See Reinhold Fahlbeck, Labour Law, in SWEDISH LAW: A SURVEY 262 (1995).
363 See Estreicher, supra note 339, at 295; see also Fahlbeck, supra note 364, at 262 (ex-
plaining that "since legal rights and obligations in [Swedish] labour law are considered
private this blatant act of disobedience on the part of the employer will not result in fines
to society or any contempt of court type sanction").
366 See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads to
Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56 (1988); Jack Stieber & Michael Murray, Protection Against
Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 319 (1983); Sum-
mers, supra note 224, at 508-19.
367 See supra notes 228-236 and accompanying text.
368 See supra notes 237-263 and accompanying text.
369 See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
370 See supra notes 304-312 and accompanying text.
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The almost universal adoption of statutes in other countries limit-
ing an employer's right to terminate employment provides an addi-
tional push toward a similar American statute. These statutes, along
with the ILO convention, establish a global norm of fundamental
fairness with respect to the legal status of the employment relation-
ship."' Our "American exceptionalism," 3" by comparison, falls short
of this normative standard in its treatment of employee rights?"
Some commentators go so far as to see in the American at-will rule a
violation of international human rights principles." 4
Further, as the global economy reduces national boundaries, in-
ternational bodies increasingly respond by attempting to harmonize
governing legal principles.s 75 International directives, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and free-trade zones all point to-
ward a greater degree of legal uniformity. With American businesses
reaping the benefits of global trade, American law should reciprocate
by adopting employment termination standards that approximate
those recognized by the rest of the world. Quite simply, continued
371 SreAnn C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment At Wilt Thward a Coherent
Discharge Policy, OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1501-02 (1996) (noting that all major industrialized
nations other than the United States have ratified ILO Convention No. 158).
372 See Estreicher, supra note 339, at 286.
373 As of 1983, approximately sixty million private sector workers were subject to the at-
will rule, and at least 1.4 million of these workers are fired each year. See Sdeber & Murray,
supra note 366, at 322-24. Stieber and Murray estimate that 150,000 of these annual dis-
charges are unjust or without cause. See id.'
374 SeeArthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. Rev.
631, 678-80 (1988) (stating that legislation exists to protect employees from termination
because of race, sex, age, religion, union activities, or other personal characteristics; how-
ever "[1110 such legal requirement exists under an at will regime for those employees
whose personal characteristics or activities do not place them in a statutorily protected
group"); Theodore J. St. Antoine, You're Fired, Hum. RTS., Winter 1982, at 32 (stating that
the contract doctrine of employment at will subjects employees to legally protected ( 1
abusive discharge").
375 SO? Alfred C. Atrial', Jr., The Global zing Slate: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Pub-
lic/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VANO. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769, 817 ("(1] he
global pressures felt by domestic lawmakers stem ... from global actors who simultane-
ously are located in many of these states and who wish to create legal systems that can fa-
cilitate their ability to carry out their operations as efficiently as possible. As a result, there
are increasing pressures for various forms of harmonization or deep integration of na-
tional economies into the global economy."); Global Dynamics of (Un)fair Employment: Pro-
ceedings of the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Em-
ployment Discrimination, 4 Enacwee RTS. & EMP. Poth. J. 141 (2000) (discussing the
emergence of European social policy norms that are not limited by national boundaries).
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American economic dominance should not be built on the backs of
its workers.'"
Finally, the adoption of a unitary, statutory standard would ease
some of the tensions that currently divide workers in the United
States. Under the current regime, not all workers receive the same
level of legal protection against unfair termination. This uneven play-
ing field breeds resentment at the workplace and contributes to socie-
tal conflict along the race, gender, and disability divides.
The employment security statutes of most countries provide un-
just dismissal protection to workers qua workers. That is, these statutes
adopt a standard for employment termination that applies universally
to all employees, or at least to all who have worked for an employer
for more than a certain period of time.'" This universal standard
does not vary depending on an employee's non-work characteristics
such as race, gender, or age.
This is not the case in the United States, at least outside of the
shrinking unionized sector. Here, the coexistence of the at-will pre-
sumption and antidiscrimination statutes results in both real and per-
ceived differential standards for termination. Some antidiscrimination
statutes overtly protect only a discrete group of individuals. The ADEA
and the ADA fall into this category.'" Title VII, on the other hand,
applies universally and simply bans an employer's use of certain char-
acteristics, such as race and gender, in making employment deci-
sions.'" Theoretically, Tide VII protects white and black, male and
female, on an equal basis. Yet, that is not society's perception and
perhaps also not the reality. The legislative history leading to the
adoption of Title VII shows that Congress's purpose in enacting that
376 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, Prefatory Note, 7A U.LA. 421, 426
(1999) (stating that the "adoption of a 'good cause' standard [for employment termina-
tion] would not put this country at a disadvantage in global competition by imposing re-
straints not borne by firms overseas—quite the contrary. The United States is the last ma-
jor industrial democracy in the world that does not have generalized legal protections for
its workers against arbitrary dismissal.").
377 See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 339, at 291 (discussing legislation in France that gen-
erally bars the dismissal of employees without cause who have served at least two years at
firms with eleven or more employees).
378 The ADEA limits an employer's right to discharge only those employees who are
aged forty years or older. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994). The ADA, similarly, confers stand-
ing only on individuals who have an impairment that substantially limits one or more ma-
jor life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a) (1994) (generally banning discrimination
against "a qualified individual with a disability"), § 12102 (defining a covered "disability").
"9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994) (banning discrimination in employment because
of an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
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law was to improve the status of previously disadvantaged groups,
principally African-Americans, 3" and Title 'VII more readily facilitates
litigation designed to protect the interests of women and ra-
cial/ethnic minorities than it does for suits brought by white men. 381
Many white men perceive Title VII as establishing special protec-
tive rules for women and minorities. 382 This perception has led many
white males to resent those groups that receive more legal protec-
tion."' This resentment is most clearly manifested in the racial arena
and in the context of affirmative action. 384 Some studies have shown
that the negative views of white men toward antidiscrimination laws,
in turn, lead to an increasingly negative view of African-Americans as
well 385
The adoption of a unitary standard for discharge would diminish
the resentment fueled by real and perceived disparities in employ-
ment protection rights. An across-the-board prohibition on termina-
tions absent just cause would level the playing field while still banning
dismissals wrongly premised on stereotypical notions of race or gen-
der.
3" See Civil Rights Act of 1996, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2513-17.
"I See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (2001).
582 See, e.g., Jeanne Duquette Gorr, The Model Employment Termination Act: Fruitful Seed or
Noxious Weed?, 31 DuQ. L. REV. 111, 113 (1992) (stating that some overtly wonder why
only white males under the age of forty lack some kind of job protection").
"3 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS
CoNst L.Q. 921, 958-59 (1996) (stating that when asked, 68% of white respondents be-
lieved that black Americans currently have the same or more economic opportunitiesitie  as
white Americans do to become "really successful and wealthy"); Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding
Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 Mtcn. L.
REV. 1729, 1788-89 (1989) (stating that because of preferential treatment for minorities,
certain whites who have never actively engaged in discriminatory treatment are harmed
and as a result some whites who would have otherwise succeeded did not); Ronald Walters,
Affirmative Action and the Politics of Concept Appropriation, 38 How. L.J. 587, 604 (1995) (stat-
ing that those opposing affirmative action have claimed that the use of quotas has led to
reverse discrimination against white males).
"4 Many Americans express deep resentment with affirmative action. See Tanya Y.
Murphy, An Argument for Diversity Based Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 1995 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 515 (1995). According to a January 1995 Time/CNN poll of eight hundred
adults, 75% thought that affirmative action sometimes or frequently discriminated against
whites. See id. Additionally, a 1994 Times Mirror poll indicated that the majority of whites
feel that we have gone too far in implementing the idea of equal rights in this country. See
385 See, e.g., PAUL SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAllA, THE SCAR OF RACE (1993), cited Isy
John Donohue, Rethinking of Equality Global Conference, 75 WAsH. U. L.Q. 1586, 1592 (1997).
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E. A Deficient Federal Labor Law
1. Lack of Choice
Turning to the labor law arena, two significant and related short-
comings predominate. First, employer opposition to unions and
weaknesses in the NLRA regulatory scheme undercut employee free
choice in obtaining union representation. Secondly, the decline in
union density along with the NLRA's limitations on employee in-
volvement plans (EIPs) severely restrict the ability of American work-
ers to participate in workplace decision-making.
United States labor law is not kind to employees who desire un-
ion representation at the bargaining table. As discussed above, the
most significant impediment to the ability of employees to exercise
free choice in the selection of a union representative flows from em-
ployer participation in the election process.'" Given management's
natural economic leverage in the workplace, the significance of em-
ployer opposition activities is not lost on the employee electorate.'"
Management opposition tactics, moreover, frequently spill over to in-
clude illegal conduct, and the NLRA's tepid remedies fail to deter
such illegal tactics as the discharge of union supporters.'"
The weakness of the NLRA's regulatory structure also encourages
employers to continue to oppose unions even if the latter successfully
has run the election gauntlet. American employers not infrequently
dispense with union representatives by refusing to bargain in good
faith for an initial contract or by pushing unions into a strike and hir-
ing permanent replacement workers.'" Both strategies often result in
a decertification election or an employer's lawful withdrawal of rec-
ognition.'"
These forces seriously erode the free choice principle on which
the NLRA is grounded. Many employees who voluntarily would
choose union representation lack the practical ability to convert that
desire into reality. While polling data reveals that more than forty per-
cent of American workers, including almost a third of current nonun-
ion workers, desire to have union representation,'" labor organiza-
369 See supra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
587 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 72, at 233-39 (summarizing empirical studies
indicating the negative impact of anti-union campaigns on employee free choice).
383 See supra notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
389 See supra notes 152-161 and accompanying text.
39° See supra notes 156, 160-161 and accompanying text.
391 See FREEMAN & Rooms, supra note 273, at 68-70.
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tions currently represent less than fourteen percent of the workforce.
Few other nations, if any, tolerate this degree of interference with
worker rights to representation 9 92
2. Lack of Voice
American employees also suffer from a lack of voice in workplace
decision-making. In part, this flows directly from the decline in union
membership. Federal labor law compounds this problem, however, by
serving as a significant obstacle to the creation of alternative mecha-
nisms of employee participation.
Freeman and Medoff describe the concept of employee voice in
the following terms:
"Voice" refers to the use of direct communication to bring
actual and desired conditions closer together. It means talk-
ing about problems.... In a political context, "voice" refers
to participation in the democratic process, through voting,
discussion, bargaining, and the like. In the job market, voice
means discussing with an employer conditions that ought to
be changed, rather than quitting the job. 393 In short, the no-
tion of employee voice connotes some participatory process
in which employees have input on matters of workplace de-
cision-making.
Most commentators believe that industrial systems benefit from
mechanisms that foster employee participation in addressing matters
of workplace concern. 394 This participation, in turn, is more effective
if undertaken as a collective process rather than as an individual, ad
hoc exchange between employee and employer. In this regard, Pro-
fessor Estreicher states:
Voice is important not only because of the contribution it
makes to the dignity and autonomy of the individual worker.
Voice mechanisms in the workplace also promote efficient
contracts between workers and firms. Some contractual
terms like a meaningful grievance procedure are "collective
goods" that are likely to be underproduced in individual
39* See Adams, supra note 140, at 94 ("Few advanced democratic societies condone
open opposition by employers to unionization.").
393 FREEIVIAN & MEDOFF, supra note 72, at 8.
394 See, e.g., itl. at 8-11; Bellace, supra note 78, at 24-25; Estreicher, supra note 71, at 21-
22; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 162, at 27.
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bargains, and unilateral employer promulgation may not
adequately capture employee preferences. 393
Labor unions are the traditional vehicle for facilitating employee
voice in the American workplace.'" Under the NLRA's regulatory
scheme, a union that attains exclusive representative status not only
has the capability of communicating employee concerns, but the
statutory mandate to compel employers to listen and respond to this
collective voice in the context of bilateral negotiations. 397 Where it
succeeds, unionization is a very powerful mechanism for amplifying
employee voice. But, as the proportionate size of the union sector has
shrunk, so too has this form of collective employee voice. The new
employment law regulatory structure that has waxed while the union
movement has waned, unfortunately, provides no mechanism to re-
place the resulting silence. These statutes and claims may limit an
employer's right to terminate workers at-will, but they leave the issue
of workplace participation to the diminishing domain of the NLRA.
Unions, however, are not the only possible vehicle for employee
voice. One alternative is some form of employee involvement and par-
ticipation program (ElPs). 398 These programs come in many forms,
such as joint labor-management committees 9 99 quality circles, 4" qual-
ass supra note 71, at 21-22; see also John T. Addison et al., German Works
Councils and Firm Performance, in Emaoree REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 305, 313-14 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993) (summariz-
ing arguments generally advanced for finding collective voice to be superior to individual
voice).
376 See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 72, at 8 ("In modern industrial economies, and
particularly in large enterprises, a trade union is the vehicle for employee voice—that is,
for providing workers as a group with a means of communicating with management.");
Clyde W. Sununers, Questioning the Unquestioned in Collective Labor Law, 47 CATti. L. REV.
791, 808 (1998) ("It is through collective bargaining that employees have a voice in the
decisions that affect their working lives.").
"7 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
398 See Bruce E. Kaufman, Does the NLRA Constrain Employee Involvement and Participation
Programs in Nonunion Companies?: A Reassessment, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y Rev. 729,729 (1999).
Such programs are referred to by other names, for instance, "employee participation pro-
grams." See Michael S. Albright, The Legality of Employee Participation Programs Following the
NLRB's Electromation, Inc. Decision, 1993 Der. C.L. Rev. 1035,1037-38.
3" See Martin T. Moe, Note, Participatory Workplace Decisionmaking and the NLRA: Section
8(a)(2), Electromation, and the Specter of the Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1127, 1157-58
(1993). Joint labor-management committees usually include employees and management
officials and are generally "designed to address multiple issues at the department or plant
level and often serve as an umbrella under which smaller employee involvement efforts
operate. They may also serve as one component of a larger program." /d. at 1157.
4" See id. at 1158. Quality circles, also known as quality control circles, usually involve
programs in which employers give employees the responsibility of identifying product-
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ity of work-life progratns," and self-directed work teams." Despite
the diversity of possible EIPs, these programs share a key characteris-
tic: primarily, they are employer-instigated efforts to improve produc-
tivity, performance, and employee job satisfaction through a coopera-
tive dialogue involving both management and employee
representatives.'" Research suggests that employee involvement gen-
erally enhances the economic productivity of the firm:" This is par-
ticularly true for participation mechanisms that remain in place over
time and are integrated in a systemic way with other innovative man-
agement practices."
Over the last two decades, American companies have begun to
use EIPs in ever-increasing numbers." These plans, accordingly, ar-
guably could serve as an important means to offset the loss of voice
resulting from the decline of the union movement. However, one
critical problem remains: The NLRA renders many, if not most, of
these EIPs illegal.
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice
(ULP) for an employer to "dominate or interfere with the formation
or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or
quality and production-related problems. See Moe, supra note 399, at 1158; Note, Participa-
tion Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 Mice'.
L. REV. 1736, 1740 (1985). Employees are then charged with finding solutions to those
problems. See id. at 1158. Employers frequently model these programs after Japanese plans.
See id.; Note, supra, at 1740.
444 See Moe, supra note 399, at 1158-59; Note, supra note 400, at 1739-40. Quality of
work-life programs "focus primarily on making workers' jobs more meaningful and satisfy-
ing, which presumptively leads to gains in worker productivity." Moe, supra note 399, at
1159. These programs "involve various teclutiques intended to bring about fundamental
changes in an employer's organizational structure and in the relations between workers
and managets." Id.
4" See Moe, supra note 399, at 1159. These EIPs are comprised of employees who are
accountable for some discrete segment of production. See id. The company divides the
employees into groups or teams and each team has its own area of responsibility. See id.
4" See, e.g., Albright, supra note 398, at 1036; Kaufman, supra note 398, at 729; Michael
H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium: Redefining a Labor Organization Under
Section 8(a)(2) of the NI-RA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1651-53, 1663-64 (1999); Moe, supra
note 399, at 1127.
4" For summaries of these studies, see FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 273, at 103-05;
Brian Becker & Barry Gerhart, The Impact of Human Resource Management and Organizational
Performance, 93 ACAD. MGM. J. 779 (1996); Casey Ichnttiowski et al., What Works at Wm*:
Overview and Assessment, 35 INDUS. REL. 299 (1996). After reviewing the various studies,
Freeman and Rogers conclude that "lab a broad summary, employee participation raises
productivity modestly—say, by two to five percent." FREEMAN & ROGERS, Dr/ note 273, at
105.
105 SeeU.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 75, at 45.
900 See Kaufman, .supra note 398, at 729.
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other support to it...."07 This provision was incorporated into the
original Wagner Act primarily as a means of outlawing the sham,
company-dominated unions that proliferated during the 1920s and
1930s. 408 Because the NLRA's definition of a "labor organization" is
worded broadly, however, section 8(a) (2) has the effect of also ban-
ning most types of EIPs. Section 2(5) of the NLRA defines a labor or-
ganization as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or em-
ployee representation committee or plan in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of
dealing with employees concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. " 409
As a result of these two provisions, determining whether an EIP
violates the NLRA requires a two-part analysis. In the first, step, the
NLRB must determine whether the EIP in question is a "labor organi-
zation" under section 2(5). If it is, the Board must then ascertain
whether the employer is dominating or interfering with the EIP. 41°
As an initial matter, three requirements must be met for an EIP
to be deemed a "labor organization." First, employees must partici-
pate in the EIP. 411 Second, the EIP must exist in whole or in part for
the purpose of "dealing with" the employer. 412 It is important to un-
derstand that "dealing with" is not. synonymous with collective bar-
gaining. The Supreme Court has adopted a broad understanding of
"dealing with" to include an interactive exchange in which employees
make recommendations to representatives of management. 4" Finally,
the topics dealt with by the EIP must concern terms and conditions of
employment such as "grievances, labor disputes, wage rates, hours of
employment, or conditions of working. ”414
Most EIPs meet each of these requirements. The majority of EIP
arrangements involve committees in which employees discuss and
make recommendations to management concerning terms and con-
ditions of employment. 415 Except for EIPs that only address manage-
ment functions or that act in a purely adjudicatory fashion, almost all
407 29 U.S.C. § I 58(a) (2) (1994).
422 See S. REP. No. 74-1, at 9-11 (1945).
4® 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
40 See, e.g., Albright, supra note 398, at 1047.
411 See Note, Labor-Management Cooperation After Electromation: Implications for Workplace
Diversity, 107 MARV. L. Rev. 678, 684 (1994).
412 See id. at 684.
412 See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203, 210-14 (1959).
4" 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994); see Note, supra note 411, at 684.
412 See Kaufman, supra note 398, at 809.
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EIPs come within this broad definition of a covered "labor organiza-
tion" for NLRA purposes.'"
Most EIPs similarly meet the second prong of section 8(a) (2)'s
test. For instance, an employer who acts to establish, administer, or
support an EIP likely will be found to "dominate or interfere" with the
organization." In addition, an employer may not contribute
financially to an EIP without triggering this prong.'"
The NLRB's landmark decision in Electromation, Mc." illustrates
the reach of the section 8(a)(2) prohibition. In that case, an em-
ployer established five "action committees" in which certain employ-
ees and management representatives met to discuss such issues as ab-
senteeism, workplace smoking, and pay progression for premium
positions. The NLRB found that the committees constituted "labor
organizations" because the participating employees bilaterally dis-
cussed terms and conditions of employment with management repre-
sentatives:12o The NLRB further ruled that the employer "dominated"
these organizations by creating the committees and by determining
their structure and functions:to The NLRB, accordingly, concluded
that the employer violated section 8(a) (2) in spite of the lack of any
evidence that the employer established the committees for the pur-
pose of deterring union organization efforts. 422
Many existing EIPs survive despite their illegality. At least part of
the reason for their survival is that these devices are viewed by em-
ployees as desirable mechanisms for providing some type of voice in
the workplace. 423 Accordingly, few complaints are actually brought to
the NLRB on these issues. 424 Nonetheless, the fact remains that many
EIPs survive only because no one has challenged their legality.
416 See David W. Orlandini, Comment, Employee Participation Programs: How to Mahe Them
Work lbday and in the 7irren0I-First Century, 24 CAP. U. L. Rev. 597, 607 (1995); Note, supra
note 411, at 684.
417 See, e.g., Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), affil 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.
1994); Orlandini, supra note 416, at 608.
918 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1994); see also Orlandin i, supra note 416, at 608.
419 309 N.L.R.B. 990.
42° See id at 997.
421 See id. at 997-98.
4n See id. at 991-92, 997-98.
423 See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 273, at 151 exhib.7.4 (showing that most em-
ployees want workplace participation through a joint employee-management committee).
424 See U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, supra note 75, at 54. "Few cases have actually been
brought to the NLRB on ... issues [surrounding the use of EIPsJ. A recent study found an
average of about three such NLRB decisions a year over the last quarter century." Id. (in-
ternal citation omitted).
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F. Contingent Work—The Black Hole of Workplace Regulation
The surge in contingent work has brought several problems.
Contingent workers tend to earn less pay than their core employee
counterparts. They are less likely to enjoy employer-paid health care
coverage and other employee benefits.426 Contingent workers gener-
ally receive less training and are more often unemployed.427 They also
feel less loyalty and commitment to their employers. 428 Not surpris-
ingly, contingent workers are disproportionately female and African-
American. 429
The most significant societal problem posed by the rise in non-
standard employment arrangements, however, is the fact that many of
these workers fall outside of the regulatory safety net constructed for
the employment relationship. This regulatory "black hole" occurs
primarily for three reasons.
First, some employment statutes only apply to employees who
have attained a certain level of workplace attachment with a particular
employer. The FMIA, for example, guarantees leave time only to em-
ployees who have worked for the same employer for at least one year
and for at least 1250 hours during the previous twelve-month pe-
riod.430 Under ERISA, employers may establish a minimum five-year
employment period before an employee's pension fully vests. 43 I In
addition, ERISA does not compel an employer to allow participation
in a pension plan until an employee works at least 1000 hours in a
twelve-month period. 432 Similarly, most state statutes require an em-
ployee to work twenty weeks per year in order to qualify for unem-
428 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
428 See supra note 122-123 and accompanying text.
427 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Labor Market Transformed: Adapting Labor and Em-
ployment Law to the Rise of the Contingent 14'orkforce, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879, 881-82
(1995); see also CAPELLA ET Al.., supra note 85, at 141-42 ("As more part-time and subcon-
tracted employees are taken on board, companies are unwilling to underwrite both reme-
dial and technical skills training, on the presumably accurate perception that such workers
will not remain with the company long enough to pay back their investments.").
428 See BELOUS, supra note 102, at 6 (noting that "contingent workers have a weak
affiliation with a specific employer and do not have a significant stake in a company");
Summers, supra note 126, at 520 (noting that contingent workers generally have a "re-
duced sense of attachment and loyalty to the enterprise").
428 Patricia Schroeder, Does the Growth in the Contingent Work Force Demand a Change in
Federal Policy? 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 731, 733 (1995) (noting that "the percentage of
African Americans in the temporary work force is double that of the whole work force
[and that] two out of every three temporary workers are women").
482 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (A) (1994).
431 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2) (1994).
432 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a) (1), 1052(a) (3) (A) (1994).
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ployment insurance benefits. 433 Part-time and temporary employees
often fail to meet these threshold requirements for obtaining statu-
tory benefits or protection.
Second, several statutes only apply to employers having a mini-
mum number of employees. The FMLA, for example, does not apply
to employers with fewer than fifty employees. 434 Title VII435 and the
ADA436 each require a minimum of fifteen employees for coverage to
occur. Some employers can avoid the applicability of such laws by us-
ing independent contractors and temporary workers to stay under the
respective numerical thresholds.
Third, and most significantly, American labor and employment
regulations invariably extend only to "employees."4" Given the restric-
tive tests currently used to determine employee status, many contin-
gent workers fall outside of the zone of statutory coverage.
American courts have used a variety of tests to determine
whether a worker is an "employee" and thus entitled to the benefits of
protective labor and employment legislation. The most restrictive of
these tests is the common law agency test. 438 This test primarily fo-
cuses on the employer's right to control not only the "result accom-
plished by the work," but also the "details and means by which that
result is accotnplished."4" If such a right to control is found to exist,
the worker is deemed to be an employee. 44° In the absence of such a
right to control, the worker is classified as an independent contractor
and falls outside of the coverage of labor and employment regulation.
4" See duRivage, supra note 127, at 106.
434 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (A) (1994).
433 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1994).
436 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (A) (1994).
437 See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 37 (1994) [hereinafter REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS] (noting that the "single most important factor ill determining
which workers are covered by employment and labor statutes is the way the line is drawn
between employees and independent contractors"); Dau.Schmidt, supra note 427, at 883
("Under our social welfare system, the receipt of statutory protection or benefits is de-
pendent on a person meeting the definition of employee under the relevant statute.").
438 The multi-factor formula of the common law test is set out in RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
4" Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The Case for Amend-
ing Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV.
239, 248 (1997).
440 See id.
418 	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 43:351
A more inclusive "economic realities" test is used to determine
employee status under the RSA."' A 1968 Department of Labor
opinion letter summarized that "an employee, as distinguished from a
person who is engaged as a business of his own, is one who, as a mat-
ter of economic reality follows the usual path of an employee and is
dependent on the business for which he serves?"' While an em-
ployer's right to control the manner in which work is performed is
still an important factor under this approach, the economic realities
standard assesses these and other factors by asking "whether the puta-
tive employee is economically dependent upon the principal or in-
stead is in business for himself?"'
During the 1970s and 1980s, most federal courts of appeals
adopted a "hybrid" test, combining elements of both the common law
and economic realities test, for determining employee status under
federal discrimination statutes.""" Under the hybrid approach, courts
examine the economic realities of the work relationship, but with par-
ticular emphasis on "the employer's right to control the 'means and
manner' of the worker's performance." 445
Despite the growing popularity of the hybrid test, the Supreme
Court reinvigorated the common law standard in its 1992 decision in
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden.446 At issue in that case was
the appropriate test for employee status under ERISA. The Court re-
jected the use of an economic realities test under that statute suggest-
ing that this broader standard was limited in application to the
unique statutory formulation of the FLSA. 447 The Court instead
adopted a thirteen-factor formulation of the common law test."' The
44 ' The economic realities test was first developed under the National Labor Relations
Act in NLRB u Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944). That decision was overturned by the
Taft-Hartley amendments later that same year, see supra note 31 and accompanying text,
and the NLRB now uses the common law test for ascertaining employee status, see Road-
way Package System, 326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998).
442 W & H Opinion Letter No. 832, U.S. Dep't of Labor (June 25, 1968).
493 Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1992).
444 See Deanne M. Mosely & William C. Walter, The Significance of the Classification of Em-
ployment Relationships in Determining Exposure to Liability, 67 Miss. LJ. 613, 636 (1998); see
also Maltby & Yamada, supra note 439, at 250 ("the hybrid test ... became the favored
standard for claims under both Title VII and the ADEA.").
445 Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying hybrid
test to ADEA claim).
446 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
447 Id. at 323-26.
448 In Darden, the Court articulated thirteen factors that should be considered when
determining whether a worker is an employee:
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Darden decision has led many courts to replace the hybrid test with
the common law test in ascertaining employee status Under other
statutes. 449
The Darden test is problematic for several reasons. For one thing,
the test can produce unpredictable results. Ally formula with thirteen
variables is bound to have considerable play in the joints. And, as Mi-
crosoft has learned recently, mistaken assumptions about employee
status can entail potentially costly consequences. 450
The Darden test also is prone to entrepreneurial manipulation. As
the final report of President Clinton's blue-ribbon Dunlop Commis-
sion noted, the test provides employers with both "a means and incen-
tive to circumvent the employment policies of the nation." 451 The in-
centive, of course, is to avoid the costs and loss of flexibility associated
with governmental regulation 4 52 The means is to structure work ar-
rangements so that subcontractors and leased employees fall on the
non-employee side of the Darden divide. 453
(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished; (2) the skill required; (3) the source of the instru-
mentalities and tools; (9) the location of the work; (5) the duration of the re-
lationship between the parties; (6) whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; (7) the extent of the hiring
party's discretion over when and how long to work; (8) the method of pay-
ment; (9) the worker's role in hiring and paying assistants; (10) whether the
work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; (11) whether the hir-
ing party is in business; (12) the provisions of employee benefits; and (13) the
tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 323-24.
as See Maltby & Yamada, supra note 439, at 253; we also Lainbertsen v. Utah Dep't of
Corn, 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1996) (favoring common law test for Title VII claim,
but finding that because the common law and hybrid tests are so similar, the lower court
did not commit reversible error by applying the latter standard); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987
F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting the common law test for ADEA claim).
45° See Vtzcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(holding that a group of workers erroneously classified by Microsoft as independent con-
tractors may be eligible as employees to participate in the company's pension plans).
451 REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437, at 38.
452 Id. at 37-38 ("[C]urrent tax, labor, and employment law gives employers and em-
ployees incentives to acme contingent relationships not for the sake of flexibility or
efficiency but in order to evade their legal obligations."); Middleton, supra note 103, at 571
(noting that employers are motivated to categorize workers as non-employees in order to
avoid legal regulations applicable to employees).
453 Linder, supra note 132, at 227 (stating that the common law test "enables employers
and judges to manipulate the appearances of control"); Middleton, supra note 103, at 578
(explaining that businesses "enter complex arrangements of subcontracting and employee
leasing in order to circumvent their responsibilities towed the workers involved"); Sum-
mers, supra note 126, at 518 (stating that "kJ mployers and their lawyers use all their inge-
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Finally, the common law test is inconsistent with the fundamental
objectives of modern labor and employment legislation. This legisla-
tion is rooted in the premise that "individual workers lack the bar-
gaining power in the labor market necessary to protect their own in-
terests and to obtain socially acceptable terms of employment." 454 The
common law test, which was fashioned in the nineteenth century
search for the purpose of determining the reach of respondeat supe-
rior tort liability, 455 is blind to this goal. By focusing primarily on the
right to control, the test denies the benefits of protective social legisla-
don to many workers who labor under subordinate economic circum-
stances. As Professor Marc Linder puts it, the common law test is
rooted in "a denial of socioeconomic purpose." 456
The Tide VII sex discrimination claim of Patricia Knight provides
just one example of this lack of purpose. 457 Ms. Knight worked as an
insurance agent selling Farm Bureau Insurance Company policies.
Toward that end, Farm Bureau trained Ms. Knight in the art of insur-
ance sales and assigned her to a designated sales territory. It provided
her with an office, a secretary, and a computer. Farm Bureau required
her to be present in the office during three specified periods each
week and to retrieve mail and messages on a daily basis. Farm Bureau
gave Ms. Knight written performance standards which were backed up
by periodic evaluations. Her contract with Farm Bureau prohibited
Ms. Knight from selling. the insurance products of any other com-
pany.458 The district court, after a two-day trial, found substantial evi-
dence of sexual harassment. 459 Nonetheless, the court dismissed Ms.
Knight's claim because Farm Bureau did not control the intricacies of
"the manner and means by which she sold insurance."460 Deterring
nuity to create forms of detached employment which will free users of all employee re-
sponsibility").
t" Summers, supra note 285, at 7; see also Taco van Peijpe, Independent Contractors and
Protected Workers in Dutch Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & PoL'y J. 127,155 (1999) (stating that the
fundamental rationale of protective labor law is "to compensate for the social inequality
constituted by economic dependence in labor relations").
455 See MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 133-70 (1989).
°Ps Linder, supra note 132, at 187; see also REPORT ON FirrintE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437, at 38 (noting that the test for defining employee
status "is based on a mi n eteentir-century concept whose purposes are wholly unrelated to
contemporary employment policy").
457 Knight v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1991).
459 Id. at 378-79.
457 Id. at 378.
463
 Id. at 380.
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the sexual harassment of a subordinate and dependent worker such as
Ms. Knight is apparently beyond the purposes of the common law test.
IV. FOUR PROPOSALS FOR SYSTEMIC REFORM
The numerous shortcomings of the current labor and employ-
ment law regime require significant legal reforms for the future.
Given the jumbled maze of today, these reforms must not only be fair
in substance, they also must be coherent and administratively
efficient. Nothing short of systemic change will suffice to correct the
mess of the present system.
This Part lays out a proposed four-prong program for meaningful
systemic change. Many of the individual recommendations are not
new, but instead, reflect and build upon issues that are the subject of
current scholarly debate. The proposed program, nonetheless, at-
tempts to go beyond that debate in several respects. First, this set of
recommendations was formulated with an express recognition of the
historical roots of the current system, the likely direction of historical
trends, and an assessment of their future impact. Second, the recom-
mendations attempt to respond directly to the present-day shortcom-
ings of today's labor and employment law as outlined above. Finally,
the proposals are not made in isolation; they seek a holistic
reformulation of the American law of the workplace.
Before turning to these recommendations, an obvious potential
objection to any reform efforts needs to be addressed. Some com-
mentators view the recent rise in flexible job arrangements, such as
contingent work and higher employee turnover rates, as creating a
new order in which the only form of acceptable employment regula-
tion is that which serves the cause of "flexible" business practices. 461
Professor Katherine V. W. Stone, for example, sees a "boundaryless
workplace"462 as the new norm in which workers expect "employability
security" rather than continued employment with a single em-
ployer.463 With internal labor markets rapidly disappearing,464 meas-
ures that further employment security and workplace regulation are
out of step with the realities of the modern workplace.
461 See generally Stone, supra note 252, at 572-76.
462 See id. at 553-56,605 (describing the notion of "boundaryless careers" and identify-
ing a new boundaryless workplace "with its depreciation of long term employment and its
rejection ofjob ladders").
463 M. at 569-72.
164 id. at 539-49,555-56; DamSchtnidt, supra note 79, at 1-2,8.
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This basis for objection to reform is both overstated as a matter
of fact and misguided as a matter of policy. As a factual matter, inter-
nal labor markets have not evaporated. As noted above, Professor
Sanford Jacoby has amply demonstrated that long-term employment
relationships have suffered only a slight decrease and that internal
labor markets continue to be the norm in the U.S. econorny. 466
As a matter of policy, Professor Stone's view inevitably invites a
disastrous "race to the bottom." If the sole objective of modern labor
policy is to facilitate flexible employment practices, then the absence
of regulation is necessarily the superior form of regulation. In the
global economy, individual nations will have a clear incentive to de-
crease regulation so as 16 afford their entrepreneurs with the greatest
degree of flexibility possible. In short, a single-minded concentration
on achieving flexibility will set off a leapfrog game of competitive le-
gal deregulation.
Such a "race to the bottom" would be disastrous for workers be-
cause maximizing employer profits through flexible employment ar-
rangements is not, or, at least, should not be, the sole objective of
modern labor policy. Labor market regulation 'appropriately serves
other extremely important purposes such as ensuring equality of op-
portunity and fair treatment for workers. 467 The unvarnished truth of
U.S. labor and employment law at the millennium is this: American
capital is reaping the benefits of the new global economy without af-
fording American labor anywhere near the degree of regulatory pro-
tection deemed minimally desirable by international norms. The
adoption of meaningful reform would not undercut the ability of
American businesses to compete in the global marketplace. Instead, it
simply would nudge the United States toward playing by a fair set of
rules with respect to employer-employee relations, just like everyone
else.
It is true, of course, that innovations in technology and trade
have led to many changes in business practices over the past quarter
century. But these same forces have badly skewed the balance of
power between management and labor. The greater mobility of capi-
tal in the new global economy enhances management's leverage at
465 See supra notes 267-270 and accompanying text.
466 Jacoby, .51070 note 262, at 1196, 1219-20; see also HENRY S. FARBER, JOB CREATION IN
THE UNITED STATES: GOOD JOBS OR BAD? 25 (Indus. Relations Section, Princeton Univ.
Working Paper No. 385, 1997).
467 See REINHOLD FAHLBEGE, FLEXIBIIISATION OF WORKING LIFE: POTENTIALS AND
CHALLENGES FOR LABOUR LAW, AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 12 (1998).
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the expense of employee interests. This shift in power exacerbates the
fact that American labor and employment law already is far less pro-
tective than the international norm. 468
A historical perspective offers a valuable lesson at this juncture.
This is not the first time that a technological revolution has tilted the
economic forces of the workplace powerfully against worker interests.
Technological change generally enables employers to alter produc-
tion modes in ways that boost productivity and profitability.° While
innovation benefits those who have ownership rights to the new tech-
nology, it also tends to displace and diminish the many workers who
now find themselves with an outdated mix of skills. 4"
Technological changes in the form of power machinery and mass
production ushered in the industrial revolution of the early to mid-
1800s.4" This technological revolution, however, also brought "child
labor, shocking working conditions, subsistence or lower wages, the
disappearance of artisans, and the displacement of male workers."472
Employers adamantly argued against reform, 475 but eventually the in-
creased inequality between capital and labor led legislators to adopt
reform legislation that restricted the hours of work and abuses in
child labor. 474
Advances in transportation, communication, and manufacturing
instigated another technological revolution beginning in the 1890s.475
By the 1920s these developments and the rapid introduction of ma-
chinery throughout the economy again weakened the position of la-
bor to the point of creating an intolerable imbalance in workplace
464 Not surprisingly, the United States now leads the world in income inequality be-
tween the haves and the have-nots. See Goldman, supra note 173, at 286-93; Michael
Harper, A Framework for the Rejuvenation of the American Labor Movement, 76 IND. U. 103,
109-05 (2001).
409 See generallyJOSEPH G. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 187-94 (1959).
47° See Charley Richardson, The Role of Technology in Undermining Union Strength, in RE-
STORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 223, 228 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds.,
1994) ("Changes in technology also inevitably alter the strength of the workforce in rela-
tion to management in that they affect the number  of workers, the location of critical
skills, the ability to relocate production, and the ability of management to divide and
monitor the workforce. Although there are certainly examples of technological change
that have increased the power of the workforce, historical experience points primarily in
the other direction?).
47 ' See Philip F. Feldblum, A Short History of Labor Law, 44 LAB. L.J. 67, 71 (1993).
414 Id.
477 Id. at 72.
474 Id. at 72-73.
474 See RAYBACK, SUM note 469, at 187-94.
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forces:" With the impetus of the Great Depression, however, the im-
balance was ultimately redressed by the many social reforms of the
New Deal era, including the enactment of the NLRA and the FLSA. 477
We now have entered into yet another era in which technological
change has produced a decided workplace imbalance. Once again,
meaningful reform is needed to create a new and fairer equilibrium.
In the new global economy, we need a global consensus on labor and
employment norms that will stave off an inevitably disastrous race to
the bottom in workplace regulation.
A. Recommendation #1—An American Employment Security Act
Congress should enact a statute that systematically governs the
issue of employment security. This statute should adopt a unitary, just
cause standard for termination. In addition, the statute should estab-
lish a streamlined administrative structure for adjudicating individual
cases coupled with a reasonable cap on monetary damages.
This recommendation, of course, is not new. As noted above,
many commentators have called for a statutory solution to today's
cumbersome employment termination system. 478 Moreover, the Uni-
form Law Commissioners in 1991 adopted a Model Employment
Termination Act (META) 479 that embraces each of the objectives sug-
gested above. META, however, fails to strike the proper balance be-
tween employee and employer interests and largely has been ignored.
A reformulated solution is necessary.
1. The Model Employment Termination Act
META incorporates many of the common attributes of European em-
ployment security acts. 480 META would prohibit the discharge of most
private sector employees in the absence of "good cause." 481 The prefa-
tory note to META explains that this is meant to be similar to the "just
cause" standard incorporated in most labor agreements. 482 As such,
META's official comments suggest that "principles and considerations
476 See id. at 304.
477 See Feldblum, supra note 471, at 73, 79.
478 See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
478 MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 421 (1999).
480 See supra notes 347-365 and accompanying text (discussing employment termina-
tion statutes adopted by other industrialized countries).
481 MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 3(a).
in Id. Prefatory Note.
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generally accepted in [labor] arbitration" should be applicable in de-
termining the existence of good cause in particular circumstances. 83
META departs from traditional labor arbitration principles, however,
in placing the burden on the discharged employee to show an em-
ployer's lack of good cause 9 84
META adopts arbitration as the preferred method for enforcing
these rights.483 META contemplates that a state agency would adopt
rules specifying the appointment of arbitrators and the procedures
applicable to the arbitral proceeding. 489 Arbitrators would be empow-
ered to award successful claimants back pay and either reinstatement
or front pay for a period riot to exceed thirty-six months. 487 An arbi-
trator further could award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a
prevailing party. 88 On the other hand, META expressly denies arbitra-
tors authority to award punitive damages or monetary awards for pain
and suffering989
The cause of action provided by META would preempt most cur-
rently available common law claims including implied contract ac-
tions and all tort actions. 490 META, however, would not bar claims
based upon either an express contract or a federal or state statute."'
META would apply to all private sector employers having five or
more employees.492 Covered employees would include those who
work a minimum of twenty hours per week and who have been em-
ployed by the same employer for at least one year. 493 META would
permit an employer arid employee jointly to waive the good cause
limitation on discharge by entering into an agreement whereby the
489 Id. § 1(4)
484 Id. § 6(e). META also provides for a greater scope of judicial review than that af-
forded to labor arbitration awards, by adding "prejudicial error of law" as a grounds for
vacating or modifying an arbitration award issued under META. See it § 8(c) (4). The
commentary explains that this broader review is appropriate because "individual statutory
rights are at issue [under META], and arbitration has been imposed upon, not agreed to
by, the parties." Id. § 8(c) (4) cut.
489 See id. § 6. An Appendix to the model act sets out language providing for alternative
enforcement mechanisms through either an administrative agency or the civil courts. See
id. Appendix; see also id. Prefatory Note ("the preferred method of enforcement is the use
of professional arbitrators, appointed by an appropriate state agency.").
488 MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 6 ( a)—( b) .
487 Id. § 7(b).
488 Id. § 7(e)—(f).
489 M. § 7(d).
498 See id. § 2(c).
491 MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 2(e).
192 Id. § 1(2).
498 Id. § 8(b).
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employer promises to "provide severance pay in an amount equal to
at least one month's pay for each full year of employment." 494
The basic philosophical premise underlying META is that of
"compromise—an equitable tradeoff of competing interests."495 As
Professor St. Antoine, the reporter for the drafting committee, has
noted, META recognizes the significant and sometimes competing
interests of the parties to the employment relationship and "tries to
meet these manifold needs by a series of practical compromises." 496
META makes the largest single concession to covered employees who
would receive an expanded substantive right to continued employ-
ment in the absence of "good cause" for termination. The drafters of
META attempt to balance this significant departure from the tradi-
tional at-will rule with three smaller, yet significant, concessions for
employers. First, META would extingtiish most common law limita-
tions on an employer's discharge prerogative, including all tort-based
actions. Second, META would cap available damages to eliminate the
costly punitive and compensatory damage awards that can result from
successful tort claims under the current system. Finally, META would
route termination claims into an arbitral forum, presumably facilitat-
ing proceedings that are quicker and less costly for all parties con-
cerned. 497
At this point, however, META is a compromise that has not yet
borne fruit. Only one state, Montana, has enacted legislation bearing
any resemblance to META, and that statute predates META's 1991
birth date.498 Thus, no state has adopted META's proposed
reformulation of employment termination law in the decade follow-
ing its much heralded promulgation.
Critics have assailed META's compromise from many angles.
Some commentators fault META for failing adequately to protect em-
ployee interests. 499 At the opposite end of the spectrum, many cony
4"" Id. § 4(c).
4" Id. Prefatory Note.
4" Theodore St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination Act, 69 WASH.
L. REV. 361, 370 (1994).
497 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT Prefatory Note (explaining the "equi-
table tradeoff" embodied in META).
4" See Monrr. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 2-914 (1989) (prohibiting employers from
discharging employees without good cause, or in violation of either public policy or ex-
press provisions of the employer's own written personnel policy).
4" See, e.g., Dawn Perry, Deterring Egregious Violations of Public Policy: A Proposed Amend-
ment to the Model Employment Termination Act, 67 WASH. L. REV. 915, 925 (1992) (arguing
that META s I llll itation on damages would fail to deter violations of public policy by em-
ployers); Paul H. Tobias, Defects in the Model Employment Termination Act, 43 LAB. L.J. 500,
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mentators criticize META for imposing too many burdens on employ-
ers.500
2. Rebalancing META's Attempted Compromise
In spite of the many criticisms, META embodies a rational, policy-
based attempt to redress a number of the shortcomings of the current
employment law regime. The fundamental problem with the current
version of META is that it does not provide employers with an ade-
quate trade-off for their loss of the at-will prerogative. This problem
may be rectified and the META compromise rebalanced through two
pro-employer alterations outlined below.
a. Broadening META's Preemptive Scope
First, META should more broadly replace existing bases for chal-
lenging an employment termination. As noted above, the current law
of employment termination encompasses a multitude of potential
claims and forums.sm This is particularly burdensome to employers
who may be forced to defend a single termination decision in multi-
ple proceedings. Although a purported goal of META is to simplify
the current maze by "extinguish[ing] a variety of subsidiary tort
clainis,”502 META's current formula tends to do the opposite by add-
ing yet an additional layer without removing much from the table.
META, as currently formulated, would preempt most common
law claims including those asserting an implied contract and all claims
grounded in tort. 509 This approach, however, leaves most of the cur-
rent maze intact. An employee still would he able to pursue statutory
claims such as those based on federal antidiscrimination statutes and
state whistleblowing laws. Employees also could challenge dismissals
501-502 (1992) (contending, among other things, that META fails employee interests by
eliminating punitive and compensatory damages and by expanding the scope of judicial
review).
5® See, e.g., Mary Jean Navaretta, The Model Employment Termination Act—META—More
Aptly the Menace to Employment Tranquility Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1027, 1044 (1996) (argu-
ing that META would unduly intrude on managerial discretion); Ellen Pierce, Reactions to
the Proposed Model Employment Termination Act, 1 J. INDIV. EMPL. RIGHTS 19 (1992) (report-
ing that 63% of surveyed human resource management professionals believed that META
would create expensive bureaucratic problems); Stewart .). Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accom-
modating just Cause and Employment At Wig 92 Micti. L. REV. 8, 9 (1993) (contending that
META does not serve legitimate employer interests in preventing employee shirking).
501 See supra notes 304-312 and accompanying text.
502 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT Prefatory Note.
5°3
 See id. § 2(c).
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under antiretaliation provisions contained in statutes such as federal
OSHA and state workers' compensation laws. 504 Further, claims based
on express contractual arrangements, whether written or oral, and
whether collective or individual, still would survive. 505 When the new
claim provided by META is added to the mix, a welter of legal chal-
lenges to a single employment termination decision still could be as-
serted in federal courts; state courts, administrative tribunals, and
now in arbitration as well.
The META claim should supplant rather than add to the existing
host of alternative claims. My proposal is that all existing termination
claims, except for those arising under a collective bargaining agree-
ment,506 should be funneled into the arbitration forum created by
META and merged with META's good cause claim. In this manner,
statutes and express contracts would not survive as independent
claims, but they would inform META's good cause substantive stan-
dard. 5°7
Take, for example, the claim of an employee who believes that
she was selected by her employer for lay-off because of her age. Under
my proposal, the employee could not maintain a separate action in
court under the ADEA. The employee, however, could argue in a
META-based arbitration proceeding that the employer's lay-off action
was influenced unlawfully by considerations of age. If the employee
succeeds in establishing to the arbitrator's satisfaction that the em-
ployer's action violated the substantive standards of the ADEA, then
she automatically has established a violation of META's just cause pro-
5°4
 See id. § 2(e).
5°F Id.
Fo° I agree with the drafters of META that the substantive rights and procedures estab-
lished through the collective bargaining process should not be extinguished by META, and
that employees governed by collective agreements should not be barred from exercising
the rights afforded under META. See id. §§ 2(e), 2(e) cant. The process of collective bar-
gaining under the NLRA establishes a system of industrial self-democracy whose objectives
are not symmetrical with those of statutory regulation such as that embodied in META. See
generally Katherine ran Wesel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between
Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. Cm. L. REV.
575 (1992). It does not necessarily follow, however, that a unionized employee should be
able to invoke the protections of each system in challenging a single employment decision.
But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1974) (holding that an em-
ployee's prior resort to labor arbitration did not bar an action under Title VII challenging
the same employment termination decision).
5437 Because the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2,
makes federal law superior to state law, the approach I propose would require either that
META be enacted as a federal statute or that Congress pass some type of enabling legisla-
tion that would permit a state META statute to trump federal law in this manner
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vision. In essence, META's good cause inquiry would subsume the
standards established by other statutes and by express contracts. The
resulting violation and remedy, however, would flow solely from
META.
This proposal would have the benefit of eliminating the burden
of multiple claims and multiple forums by transferring all employ-
ment termination challenges into a single just cause claim subject to
resolution in an expeditious arbitration proceeding. This unitary
claim also would serve to correct another of the shortcomings of the
current regime. Under this proposal, all employees would enjoy the
same just cause guarantee of job security. 508 This unitary standard
would help to alleviate much of the resentment directed at minority
groups owing to the perceived preferential treatment of the current
legal framework.ms
At least two cogent objectives can be lodged against this proposal.
First, critics undoubtedly will voice the concern that META's remedies
will not serve adequately to deter workplace discrimination. Second,
critics likely will argue that arbitration lacks many of the procedural
safeguards built into our system of court-based litigation. Both criti-
cisnis have merit and warrant some adjustments in this proposal.
At present, the remedial schemes embodied in federal antidis-
crimination laws go beyond that of simply making whole the victims of
employment discrimination. Title VII and the ADA authorize awards
of compensatory and punitive damages in addition to that of back pay
and reinstatements" The ADEA, similarly, permits an award of liqui-
dated damages in an amount equal to the backpay award in the event
of a willful violation.s" These remedies reflect the fact that these stat-
utes serve a societal goal of eradicating discrimination in the work-
place 5 12 The enhanced remedies, accordingly, are designed to deter
discriminatory conduct as well as to compensate employees who have
been injured by such conducts"
META, on the other hand, only authorizes an award of back pay
and, in certain circumstances, a lump-sum severance amount in the
1551 The just cause standard would still result in differential degrees of actual legal pro-
tection since existing statutes would be encompassed within the just cause concept. None-
theless, a greater equality would result from the just cause baseline applicable to all ens-
.ployees.
500 See supra notes 382-385 and accompanying text.
5" 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
511 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
512 See McKenuon v. Nashville Banner Pad); Co., 513 U.S. 352,358 (1995).
515 See id.
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fonts of front pay. 514 The model act expressly states that "the arbitrator
may not award damages for ... punitive damages; compensatory
damages; or any other monetary award."515 While this formula com-
pensates employees for lost earnings, it does not fulfill the deterrent
function of current antidiscrimination statutes. Since this is an impor-
tant societal goal, META should be modified to provide arbitrators
with the power to double or treble damage awards upon a finding
that the lack of good cause for termination was attributable to unlaw-
ful discrimination.
META also should mandate fundamental fairness in arbitration
procedures. Many commentators, particularly in the context of indi-
vidual arbitration agreements, 516 have raised concerns about the lack
of basic due process safeguards in the arbitration of statutory em-
ployment claints. 517 These concerns involve such basic hallmarks of
fairness as the selection and training of arbitrators, pre-hearing dis-
covery, and the issuance of a written decision. In the individual arbi-
tration context, guidelines have been developed that identify basic
procedural requirements that should inhere in arbitration proceed-
ings.5 l 8 These or similar guidelines should•be incorporated by refer-
ence in META as a means of ensuring that the arbitration process will
be fair as well as expeditious.
514 See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 7(b). The commentary states that
front pay may be awarded where reinstatement is "unfeasible because of the personal rela-
tions between the employer and the employee [or because of] changes in the employer's
business." Id. § 7(b) (3) mu.
5" Id. § 7(d).
516 By "individual arbitration agreements," I am referring to pre-dispute agreements in
which an employer and an employee in a nonunion setting agree to resolve employment-
related disputes, including those arising under antidiscrimination statutes, through resort
to an arbitral rather than a judicial forum. Prior to 1991, considerable doubt existed as to
the validity of such agreements. In that year, the Supreme Court generally upheld the va-
lidity of pre-dispute agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). See Gilmer y
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). More recently, the Supreme Court
clarified that an exclusionary clause in the FAA applies only to agreements covering trans-
portation workers and not to employment agreements generally. See Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
517 See, e.g., Joseph IL Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. LJ...1 (1996); David M. !finite-
come, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a Method of Weakening the Sub-
stantive Protections Afforded by Employment Rights Statutes?, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 745 (1999).
515 See Am. ARBITRATION ASS'N, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOY-
MENT Diseirres (1997); Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes,
9A Lab Rd. Rep. (BNA) 534:401 (1995).
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b. Scaling Back META's Remedies
The second basic flaw in the current version of META concerns
its remedial scheme. Given the traditional individualistic nature of
American society,519 it is highly unlikely that the United States will
adopt an employment security statute that is more protective than the
international norm. As the global marketplace shrinks the economic
world, pressure will mount to develop greater consensus on compara-
tive legal ptinciples. 520 In terms of reforming American labor and
employment law, the most that can be hoped for is a solution that falls
somewhere in between our at-will dominated current regime and the
more protective systems of other countries.
The model act in its current form proposes a remedial scheme
that is more expansive than that adopted in most countries. In most
European countries, for example, the statutory response to dismissal
without cause is a modest transfer payment, often in the range of
three to twelve months of pay. 521 Orders requiring reinstatement tend
not to play a major role.522 In short, the typical remedial response to
wrongful discharge among most industrialized countries is to provide
a modest monetary cushion to alleviate the economic hardship of a
temporary period of unemployment.523
META's remedies should be adjusted in that direction as well. In
particular, I propose the following modifications:
I) Delete reinstatement as a remedy except in cases where
the societal goal of eliminating discrimination is impli-
cated;
2) cap front pay awards at a maximum of one year's pay; and
3) reduce the buy-out cost of a waiver so that an employee
may waive the good cause requirement in exchange for
an employer's agreement to provide severance pay in an
amount equal to at least one month's pay for each full
year of employment up to a total maximum payment of
twelve months' pay.
519 See supra notes 171-175 and accompanying text.
6Y0
	 Bob Hepple, European Rules on Dismissal Law, 18 COMP. LAB. L.J. 204, 206 (1997)
(noting that "there is a need for guaranteed minimum labor standards as a foundation for
prolonged economic and social progress").
521 See id. at 302; supra notes 362-364 atul accompanying text.
522 See Estreicher, supra note 339, at 294; Hepple, supra note 520, at 223.
M6
	 Estreicher, supra note 339, at 294.
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These adjustments would still preserve the core objectives of the
model act to establish a unitary standard for job security that would
be enforceable in a streamlined, yet fair process. At the same time,
this modified act would provide a better trade-off for employers. The
modified remedies would impose less direct financial costs on em-
ployers and pose less of a burden on employers who seek to maintain
flexible employment practices.
B. Recommendation #2—Level the Labor Law Playing Field
A second tier of reform law should focus on the NLRA. In its cur-
rent form, the NLRA no longer fulfills its stated purpose of adjusting
"the inequality of bargaining power" through free and fair collective
bargaining.524 While many reforms may be warranted, 525 the most
crucial need is to address the three principal deficiencies noted
above 526 In short, Congress should amend the NLRA in order to pro-
tect the fundamental rights of employees to organize, to bargain, and
to engage in concerted activity. 527
Once again, a set of recommendations from a blue-ribbon panel
of experts provides a useful starting point for this task. President
Clinton, in 1993, charged The Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations with the task of examining the need for labor
and employment law reform. Commonly referred to by the name of
the committee's chair, the Dunlop Commission issued a fact finding
report in 1994,528 and, after receiving considerable input, issued its
final report and recommendations later that same years?? With the
Republican sweep of the 1994 Congressional races, the report was
dead upon arrival and promptly archived. 558 As discussed below, it is
time to dust off the report, make a number of critical adjustments,
524 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
525 In addition to the reforms discussed below, many commentators have proposed
other adjustments to the NLRA. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 159, at 397 (proposing in-
creased union access to employees during organizational campaigns and permitting lim-
ited forms of secondary pressure); Estreicher, supra note 71, at 43 (proposing relaxing
existing prohibitions on pre-hire agreements and repealing the NLRA's authorization of
state "right to work" laws); Summers, supra note 396, at 801-809 (proposing, among other
ideas, limitations on employer speech and broadening the scope of mandatory bargain-
ing).
5" See supra notes 136-161 and accompanying text.
527 See 29 U.S.C. § 151.
5" U.S. DEP'''. OF LABOR, supra note 75.
5" REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437.
550 See GALENSON, SWAN note 88, at 79; Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Introduction:
Worker Representation . . . Again!, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 375, 377 (2001).
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and use it as a basis for correcting the current tilt in American labor
policy.
1. Facilitating Free Choice in the Representational Process
The Dunlop Commission's final report makes two principal rec-
ommendations that attempt to reduce the strife and intimidation
typical of today's election campaigns. First, the report calls for speedy
representation elections, typically occurring within two weeks of the
filing of an election petition."' This change would be accomplished
by postponing hearings involving contested bargaining unit composi-
tion issues until after the election. 532 Second, the report proposes that
the NLRB General Counsel be authorized to seek immediate injunc-
tive relief to remedy discriminatory employer actions such as the dis-
charge of employee union supporters. 533 The report estimates that the
General Counsel could obtain temporary injunctive relief within five
days of the filing of a facially meritorious unfair labor practice charge
if the NLRA mechanism for enjoining secondary boycotts were made
applicable to section 8(a) (3) claims. 534
The Commission report noted several advantages in such a re-
vamped electoral scheme. The report found that "much of the
conflict that mars the [current] election process would be eliminated
if the process was shortened." 535 This, in turn, would lead to a more
cooperative employer-union relationship in the event of an
affirmative representation vote. 536 The report suggested that the
prompt injunctive remedy not only would undo the illegal act, but
also produce a "backfire" effect of making the discriminating em-
531 See REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, SUpTa note 437, at 18.
532 See id. at 18-19. The Board currently hears and resolves such issues prior to an elec-
tion, resulting in an average of seven weeks time from the filing of all election petition
until the actual election itself. Id. at 18.
533 See id. at 18.
534 Id. at 21. Section 10(1) of the NLRA mandates that the Board seek injunctive relief
if it has reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice charge alleging that a
union is engaging in an unlawful secondary boycott is meritorious. See 29 U.S.C. § 1600)
(1994). At present, the Board may use only the slower section 10(j) injunctive procedures
with respect to claims of employer unfair labor practices. A section 10(j) injunction is dis-
cretionary and may be sought only after the filing of a formal unfair labor practice com-
plaint. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). The Board traditionally has been reluctant to authorize peti-
tions for injunctive relief under section 10(j). SIVIARGHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW 262-
63 (12th ed. 1996).
535 REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, Supra 110IC 437, at 19.
535 Id.
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ployer look bad in the eyes of the employees.557 In sum, the report
concluded that "the combination of prompt elections and immediate
injunctive relief would eliminate much of the incentive for engaging
in discriminatory behavior."538
While the Commission's recommendation certainly improves on
the current system, it falls short of an ideal solution. The truncated
election period would compress rather than eliminate strife and in-
timidation. Both employer anti-union efforts and employee trepida-
tion likely would be intensified during this shorter campaign pe-
riod.538
Rather than simply shorten the election period, the more desir-
able solution is to eliminate it altogether. A majoritarian election pro-
cess is a representation hurdle that does not exist outside of North
America548 and for good reason. Given the financial incentive for em-
ployers to avoid unionization and the economic dependence of em-
ployees, a competitive, political-style election campaign inevitably re-
sults in a tilted playing field on which pro-union sentiments slide into
anti-union votes.
At least two alternative approaches should be considered. One
possibility is members-only representation.TM' Under this approach, a
union negotiates on behalf of all those employees who voluntarily de-
sire representation, even if union membership constitutes less than a
majority of the employer's workforce. 542 This is the model used in
much of the industrialized world.543 In order to transplant this model
to the United States, Congress would need to amend the NLRA to
compel employers to bargain with a union that has some minimum
level of membership, such as ten percent, among that employer's
workforce. The advantages of members-only representation, besides
avoiding the pitched battle of an election campaign, is that union
representation would coincide with individual employee desires. Fur-
5" Id. at 20.
51B Id.
5" Of course, an employer's anti-union campaign could begin well before the filing of
an election petition.
"'See supra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
mi A number of labor law scholars have urged the adoption of a members-only repre-
sentational model. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Non-
majority Employee Representation, 69 CHL-KENT L. REV. 195, 218 (1993); George Schatzki,
Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity
Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 898 (1975); Summers, supra note 396, at 795.
sts SeeFinkin, supra note 541, at 199-200.
543 See Summers, supra note 396, at 795.
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thermore a non-majority union, if successful, may evolve into a major-
ity institution 544 The disadvantages, on the other hand, are that non-
majority representatives may lack the clout to be effective and, where
multiple unions are on the scene, may result in a cumbersome system
of labor relations.545
A second and probably superior approach is to adopt a card-
check certification process. This would retain the principle of major-
ity rule, but without the drawbacks of a contested election campaign.
Under this system, which is used in a number of Canadian prov-
inces,546 au employer would be obliged to recognize and negotiate
with a union that presents signed authorization cards from a majority
of employees in an appropriate unit. 547
Two principal objections may be lodged against a card-check sys-
tem of certification. One objection is that employees would make a
more informed choice concerning representation if they have the
opportunity to hear the viewpoint of the employer as well as that of
the union. This objection would have more validity if representation
campaigns truly focused on a respectful exchange of information.
But, this certainly is not the case in the one in four campaigns during
which an unlawful discharge of a union supporter occurs. 548 Even law-
ful campaigns abound in misinformation and intitnidation. 50 As Pro-
fessor Clyde Summers has aptly summarized:
Elections no longer serve to encourage and promote the
process of collective bargaining, but rather to minimize and
impede constructive collective bargaining. When a union pe-
titions for an election, it marks the beginning of a bitter
campaign which may last for weeks or months. The employer
"4 See id. at 801.
848 COX ET AL., supra note 534, at 1010.
548 See Roy L. Heenan, Canada, in I INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS
21-16 to 21-17 (William L. Keller ed., 1997) (reporting that labor legislation in most
Canadian jurisdictions permits labor relations boards to certify unions without holding a
vote when they present evidence of having more than a specified percentage of the bar-
gaining unit employees as members").
547 See generally Roy J. Adams, The North American Model of Employee Representational Par-
ticipation: "A Hollow Mockery,"15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 4, 9-10 (1993); Sheila Murphy, A Compari-
son of the Selection of Bargaining Representatives in the United States and Canada: Linden Lum-
ber, Gissel, and the Right to Challenge Majority Status, 10 COMP. LAB. L. J. 65, 82 (1988).
518 See U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, MOM note 75, at 70.
sa The Board has taken the position that it will not set aside an election on the basis of
misleading statements made by one of the parties during an election campaign unless a
party has used forged documents such that the voters ale unable to recognize, the source
of the misrepresentation. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982).
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and the union each lay claim to the loyalty of the employees.
Misinformation as to the employer's profitability and as to
the union's effectiveness is spread widely by both sides. Ac-
cusations of dishonesty, bad conduct, and illegal actions are
exchanged and name-calling becomes commonplace. 55°
This certainly is a strange seed bed for what the NLRA envisions as a
precursor to "the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes." 551
A second possible objection concerns the reliability of authoriza-
tion cards as a measuring device for gauging employee desires. One
empirical study, for example, found a 12.5% falloff in union support
when cards are compared to actual votes in representation elec-
tions.552 This discrepancy, by itself, does not tell us which is the more
accurate measuring device. But even if we were to assume that
authorization cards as currently used in the United States generally
are less reliable because of peer pressure or a lack of clarity regarding
the purposes for which the card will be used, 553 the Canadian experi-
ence shows that proper safeguards may be crafted to reduce these
concerns.
Three attributes of the Canadian practice are particularly note-
worthy in this regard. First, a number of the provincial labor boards
attempt to make explicit the ramifications of signing an authorization
card by requiring that the employee also apply for union membership
and pay a nominal application fee at the time of signing. 554 Second,
some provinces require signed cards from a minimum of fifty-five per-
cent of the unit employees before certifying a union in the absence of
an election.555 Third, the provincial labor boards generally retain dis-
cretion to order an election if the cards were collected under circum-
stances that draw their accuracy into question. 556
55° Summers, supra note 396, at 799-800.
551 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,
supra note 437, at 20 (noting that card check agreements, in contrast to election cam-
paigns, are a non-conflictual way to determine employee desires concerning representa-
tion and "build trust between union and employer").
652 See Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome: An
Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Decision, 79 Nw. U.
L. REV. 87,120 (1984).
555 See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 71, at 31 ("NLRB policy over the decades has recog-
nized that employees often sign cards (even when properly worded) under the mistaken
impression that they are merely authorizing an election or simply to avoid a personal en-
counter with the union organizer.").
554 See Murphy, supra note 547, at 82.
555 See GOULD, Mira note 133, at 162; Murphy, supra note 547, at 85.
555 See Murphy, supra note 547, at 84.
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The possibility of a decertification election would serve as an ad-
ditional safety valve for a card-check certification system. The stan-
dards enunciated in the NLRB's recent Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific
decision seem appropriate for this purpose. 557 Pursuant to that deci-
sion, a union enjoys a one-year irrebuttable presumption of majority
support. 558 After that period, the presumption may be rebutted in
several ways. An employer may withdraw recognition unilaterally if it
establishes that the incumbent union actually has lost the support of
the majority of bargaining unit employees. 588 Alternatively, the em-
ployer may petition for a RM election by demonstrating a good-faith
reasonable uncertainty as to the union's continuing majority status, 888
or the unit employees may petition for a decertification election
based upon a thirty percent showing. 581 In this context, where the un-
ion has the benefit of incumbency to counter the employer's natural
position of economic superiority, an election contest is less problem-
atic than it is in the initial organizing setting.
Accompanied by these safeguards, a card-check certification sys-
tem is the most desirable format for resolving representational issues.
The card-check system enables employees to exercise free choice in
an environment free from the intimidation and misinformation all
too typical of election campaigns. The card-check approach also still
retains the majority rule framework that is so deeply, rooted in our
labor law policy.882 Further, as the Dunlop Commission report noted,
the card-check method of determining majority status "build[s] trust
557 See 333 N.L.R.B. No. 105 (2001).
555 Id. at 5.
559 Id. at 11. The Board in this decision overruled prior precedent which had permit-
ted an employer to withdraw recognition based on a good-faith doubt as to the union's
continued majority status. The Supreme. Court in Allentown Mack Sales & Seru, Inc. Is
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998), had interpreted this standard as requiring only a reasonable
uncertainty as to the union's majority status, as opposed to the Board's practice of requir-
ing an objectively-based disbelief of majority status. Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, 333
N.L.R.B. No. 105 (Mar. 29, 2001), accordingly, in requiring an employer to show an actual
loss of majority status, raises the bar for unilateral withdrawals of recognition.
Pm Levitz Furniture, 333 N.L.R.B. at 11. Thus, in contrast to the heightened standard for
withdrawal of recognition, the Levitt Furniture decision retained the lowered Allentown
Mack interpretation as the benchmark for an employer's RM petition.
mil See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c) (1) (A) (ii) (1994).
562 See generally Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578 (1984) (decf g to impose a
non-majority bargaining order to remedy serious and repeated unfair labor practices
committed by an employer during an election campaign because "the majority rule prin-
ciple is such an integral part of the Act's current substance and procedure").
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between union and employer," and thereby provides a less conten-
tious foundation for successful collective bargaining. 563
As a final matter, a revamped representational process also
should entail a set of remedies that will adequately deter the commis-
sion of unfair labor practices. Two recommendations are appropriate
in this regard. First, the NLRA should be amended to provide for the
prompt injunctive relief suggested by the Dunlop Commission. Sec-
ond, the Board should be empowered to remedy discriminatory dis-
charges in a manner similar to the ADEA by including an award of
liquidated damages in an amount up to the size of the compensatory
award.564
2. Facilitating First Agreements
The NLRA also should be amended to deal with the problem of
bad-faith bargaining in the first contract setting. As noted above,
more than one-third of newly certified union representatives never
succeed in consummating an initial collective bargaining agree-
ment. 565 In many instances, this failure results from the continued
opposition of employers to unionization, even in the face of a union
election victory.566 The incentive for employers to engage in bad-faith
bargaining tactics is great, because the lack of a first agreement almost
invariably leads to the eventual disappearance of the union 5 67 At pre-
sent, the only remedy available to the Board is an order directing the
parties to return to the bargaining table. 568
The Dunlop Commission's final report proposes a multi-level sys-
tem of alternative dispute resolution to address this problem. The
Commission report suggests, as a first step, that the parties be permit-
ted early access to the mediation assistance provided by the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service. 569 The report also proposes the
creation of a tripartite First Contract Advisory Board (FCAB). The
FCAB would be empowered to review disputes and order the parties
565 See REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437, at 20.
764 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(6).
565 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
56° See GOULD, supra note 133, at 222.
567 14. at 169.
56° See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
'6 See REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437, at 22.
Currently, the NLRA only requires the parties to notify the FMCS of a bargaining dispute,
but, other dean with respect to disputes involving health care institutions, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (C) (1994), it does not require the FMCS or the parties actually to engage in me-
diation efforts. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (3) (1994).
2002]	 Labor ei Employment Law at the Millennium	 439
to engage in various dispute resolution procedures, including fact-
finding, further mediation, and arbitration."' In what the report de-
scribes as likely necessary only in rare circumstances, the FCAB could
require the parties to submit the disagreement to final and binding
interest arbitration.571 This step could be ordered, the report suggests,
without the need for any preliminary finding of an unlawful failure to
bargain in good faith. 572
There is much to commend in the Dunlop Commission's pro-
posal. The dispute resolution machinery would advance sound labor
law reform by facilitating agreements and deterring unfair labor prac-
tices. Further, the fact that this machinery would apply only to first
contract disputes removes any concern over a possible "narcotic ef-
fect" that might impede true collective bargaining. 573
Nevertheless, critics have objected to the report's proposed use of
binding interest arbitration on two principal grounds. One objection
is that the use of interest arbitration runs counter to the NLRA's ob-
jective of promoting voluntary agreements. 574 The Dunlop proposal,
in contrast, would authorize the imposition of a government-
compelled substitute for a bargained agreement. A second objection
is that a first contract imposed by an outside source "offers no assur-
ance of the ongoing viability of the [future] bargaining relation-
ship. "575
These objections are not without merit. However, these concerns
could be lessened if the binding arbitration alternative was restricted
to situations in which a party has failed to bargain in good faith. In
this context, arbitration would serve as a suitable remedy for unlawful
conduct, rather than as a universally available substitute for collective
bargaining. In addition, while there is no certainty that arbitration
would lead to a permanent bargaining relationship, the union would
have the opportunity to demonstrate its effectiveness in administering
575 See REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437, at 22.
571 Id.
572 Id.
575 See generally Rynicki & Gausden, Current Mends in Public Sector Impasse Resolution, in
STATE GOVERNMENT 274-76 (1976) (postulating that the availability of arbitration as a
dispute resolution device could have a chilling effect on the parties' incentives to bargain
in good faith).
574 See Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12 LAB.
LAW. 117, 128 (1996); see also K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970) (stating
that the NLRA is based on the fundamental premise that agreements will be the result of
"private bargas g under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any
official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract").
575 Estreicher, supra note 574, at 129.
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the first contract. Unit employees would have. a more informed and
less intimidating atmosphere in which to determine their support of
the union's efforts at negotiating a second contract.
As noted by the Dunlop Commission, a drawback to limiting in-
terest arbitration to the remedial context is the resulting delay in
processing unfair labor practice charges. 576 This problem could be
reduced by requiring the NLRB to expedite hearing procedures in
circumstances where the FCAB has reason to believe that a party to
first contract negotiations is not bargaining in good faith. Given the
administrative burden that this would impose on the Board, perhaps a
better alternative would be to amend the NLRA to empower the Gen-
eral Counsel, acting on behalf of the FCAB, to obtain an order to
compel arbitration upon demonstrating a clear lack of good faith
bargaining to a federal district court.
3. Restricting the Use of Permanent Replacement Workers
A third essential objective of labor law reform is to curtail the
permissible use of permanent replacement workers. As discussed
above, the Supreme Court has ruled that employers may hire workers
on a permanent basis to replace striking employees, with the latter
possessing no bumping rights upon the conclusion of the work stop-
page.577 Potential strikers face the prospect of job loss and an eventual
transfer of unit voting rights to their replacements. 578 The permanent
replacement rule, accordingly, acts as a powerful deterrent to the ex-
ercise of lawful strike rights and enables employers to gerrymander
bargaining unit composition in a manner that paves the way for union
decertification.
Although the Supreme Court first recognized the right of em-
ployers to hire permanent replacement workers in its 1938 NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. decision,579 this tactic seldom was used
until the 1980s.55° Emboldened by President Reagan's discharge of
the striking air traffic controllers represented by the PATCO union in
578 REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437, at 22.
3" See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
578 See supra notes 160-161 and accompanying text.
5" See 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
588 SeeFinkin, supra note 161, at 548 ("For much of its history, the Mackay rule had lim-
ited practical significance, for large nationally-based unionized companies tended not to
avail themselves of it.").
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1981,581 thirty percent of U.S. employers indicated in a 1989 study
undertaken by the General Accounting Office that they would hire
permanent replacements in the event of a strike. 582 Not surprisingly,
this same study revealed that this increased willingness to employ
permanent replacements was accompanied by a significant decline in
strike activity. 583 Other data, meanwhile, reveals a concomitant in-
crease in the number of decertification elections. 584 As Professor
Finkin has noted, "resort to the statutory 'right' to strike would be, for
many employees, au exercise in permanent job loss, and, for the un-
ion, an act of potential self-immolation." 585
The Mackay rule represents a considerable departure from inter-
national norms. Most other countries do not permit employers to re-
spond to lawful strikes by hiring permanent replacement workers. 588
In these countries, an employee engaged in a lawful job action has the
right to reclaim his or her former position upon the end or aban-
donment of the strike. 587 Legislation in some jurisdictions go even fur-
ther and bar the hiring of temporary as well as permanent replace-
ments. 5"
The current permanent replacement rule clearly needs to be al-
tered; the question is in what manner. A prohibition on the hiring of
any replacement workers, whether temporary or permanent, would
go too far, as it is generally recognized that employers have an entre-
preneurial right to continue business operations during a strike. 588
581 See Craver, supra note 159, at 421 (noting that "the Mackay Radio doctrine has been
employed with greater frequency since President Reagan decided in 1981 to terminate
11,000 air traffic controllers who participated in an illegal strike against the federal gov-
ernment").
582 See Finkin, supra note 161, at 548-49 n.12 (summarizing the data generated by the
Government Accounting Office study). The study also revealed that about 15% of those
employers involved in a strike in 1989 actually did hire permanent replacement workers.
See id.
583 See id. (reporting that the number of strikes in the United States during the 1980s
was about one-half of what it was during the 1970s); see also Gouw, supra note 133, at 181
(summarizing Bureau of Labor Statistics data showing that there were 1250 work stoppages
per year in the 1980s as compared to 2660 per year in the 1970s).
644 See GOLDFIELD, supra note 29, at 52 tb1.10 (showing a steadily rising volume of de-
certification elections during the 1970s and early 1980s).
esa Finkin, supra note 161, at 567.
586 See id. at 569-70; A. J. M. Jacobs, The Law of Strikes and Lock-outs, in COMPARATIVE
LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED MARKET ECONOMIES 461,
493 (It Blanpain & C. Engels eds., 1998).
587 See Jacobs, supra note 586, at 488.
588 See, e.g., Treu, Italy, in 7 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA FOR LABOUR AND INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 183 (R. Blanpain ed., 1995); Heenan, supra note 546, at 21-26.
589 See generally Craver, supra note 159, at 422; Jacobs, supra note 586, at 492.
442
	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 43:351
Similarly, a ban on all permanent replacements probably is excessive
since circumstances can arise in which an employer may have a le-
gitimate need to hire permanent replacement workers in response to
union pressure tactics or in order to stay in business. 59° A compromise
solution suggested by some commentators is to ban permanent re-
placements unless an employer demonstrates that hiring such workers
will serve a legitimate business purpose and would not be inherently
destructive of the union's right to bargain and strike 5 91 While this ap-
proach is conceptually consistent with the standard used for measur-
ing the validity of other employer counter-measures to concerted ac-
tivity,592 it offers little in the way of predictability and entails a
continued need for NLRB intervention.
Legislation adopted in Ontario provides a preferable model. The
Ontario statute authorizes struck employers to hire temporary, but
not permanent, replacement workers for the first six months of a law-
ful strike.595 If a strike continues beyond that point without resolution,
employers then may deny reinstatement to those strikers who have
been replaced. 594
Although a two or three month automatic reinstatement period
may be a more appropriate time line, the Ontario approach offers a
number of advantages. First, this approach would restore the right to
strike as guaranteed by the NLRA. 595 Employees could resort to a law-
ful strike in support of bargaining demands for a period of time with-
out the fear of practical job loss or the unwanted loss of union repre-
sentation. Second, employers still would have the capability to
continue business operations through the use of nonstrikers, tempo-
rary replacements, and, after a specified period of time, permanent
replacements. 596 Finally, the Ontario model provides a predictable
599 An employer arguably may have a need to hire permanent replacement workers
due to special skill requirements or local labor conditions, see Craver, supra note 159, at
421, or where a strike has continued for a prolonged period of time, see GOULD, supra note
133, at 202.
591 See generally WEILER, supra note 90, at 267; Craver, supra note 159, at 422-23.
592 See Metro. Edison Co. u NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983) and NLRB u Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32-34 (1967) for generally applicable standards for deter g the valid-
ity of employer responses to protected concerted activity.
593 See The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. ch. 1, sched. A, §80 (1995); see also Heenan,
supra note 546, 21-26.
”. See The Labour Relations Act §80; see also WEILER, supra note 90, at 268.
595 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (1994).
599 See Gouw, supra note 133, at 202 (opining that the Ontario model "would provide
the [struck] employer with a chance to recruit a new work force with some permanency").
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bright line rule in which both employers and employees would be
aware of their respective rights and responsibilities.
C. Recommendation #3—Pawide Employees a Works Council Form of
Collective Voice
The proposals set out in the preceding section would do much to
correct the current tilt in the labor law playing field. These sugges-
tions, if adopted, would put employers and unions on a more equal
footing and help to reinvigorate the NLRA's stated objective of pro-
tecting employee rights to self-organization and collective bargain-
ing.597 As a corollary matter, these reforms also likely would reverse
the long decline in American union membership.
Even with these reforms, however, it is doubtful that union den-
sky in the United States ever will extend beyond twenty or twenty-five
percent of the workforce 598 As discussed above, deficiencies in the
NLRA are only one of the several factors that have contributed to la-
bor's decline. Other factors, such as the global economy, the loss of
manufacturing jobs, and America's traditional antipathy for collective
action, will continue to militate against any greater rebound in union
strength 599
This means that some mechanism other than traditional union
representation must be found in order to provide a collective voice
for the vast majority of the workforce. The NLRA's current prohibi-
tion on many types of EIPs is not acceptable in an environment in
which the vast majority of Americans are not represented by unions.
As discussed above, a workplace voice mechanism serves funda-
mental societal interests.6® Voice enhances workplace democracy and
individual dignity. Research also shows that employee involvement, if
appropriately structured, generally improves the economic productiv-
ity of the firm.
697 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
696 See KOCIIAN ET AL., supra note 71, at 252 (predicting that labor law reform only
would have the effect of slowing the continued decline in union membership); Bellace,
supra note 78, at 23 (predicting that labor law reform would result in only a modest in-
crease in union density to encompass about 15% of the private sector workforce); WEILER,
supra note 90, at 279-81 (predicting that substantial labor law reform would make a
significant difference in the prospects for union representation, but that the rise in union
membership would fall far short of the then 45% union density figure for Canada).
699 See supra notes 71-175 and accompanying text.
669 See supra notes 393-395 and accompanying text.
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Workers, moreover, strongly desire a collective workplace voice.
In what the authors have termed as the "mother of all workplace sur-
veys," Professors Freeman and Rogers have painstakingly demon-
strated that employees want more influence at work through an inde-
pendent voice mechanism 601 Freeman and Rogers interviewed more
than 2300 workers as part of the Worker Representation and Partici-
pation Survey that first was summarized as an appendix to the Dunlop
Commission report, 602 and then expanded upon in their recent book,
What Workers Want.60 Approximately ninety percent of the survey re-
spondents expressed a preference for workplace representation
through some type of independent institution. 604 One-third of the re-
spondents stated that they would like a union form of employee rep-
resentation.60 A majority of the workers, however, expressed a prefer-
ence for representation through an employee organization that
interacts with management in a non-adversarial manner. 606
The Freeman and , Rogers study documents a "representa-
tion/participation gap" in which worker desire for voice far exceeds
its current availability. 607 They find this gap to be "harmful to the na-
tion's economic progress and social well-being."608 Freeman and
Rogers, accordingly, suggest that the United States needs "a system
that admits new institutions as well as extension of current ones." 609 In
short, if labor law reform can fix only a small part of the problem,
some other, alternative voice mechanism needs to be established.
1. A Full or Partial Repeal of Section 8(a) (2)
Since NLRA section 8(a) (2) stands as an obstacle to the forma-
tion of many types of EIPs, 610 it is not surprising that numerous re-
form proposals call for an amendment of that provision. These pro-
posals come in many variations, but all share the common objective of
reducing the statute's current barrier to the creation of employer-
sponsored EIPs.
el FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 273, at 16.
6°2 REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437, appA.
L01 See generally FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 273.
r'm See id. at 151, ex.7.2.
605 Id. at 68.
re Id at 56, 141-43.
re Id. at 48-51, ex.3.5.
es Freeman & Rogers, supra note 162, at 14.
609 FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 273, at 155.
610
 See supra notes 407-422 and accompanying text.
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A few commentators suggest a total repeal of section 8(a) (2). 6"
This would have the effect of permitting employers to experiment
with an unlimited range of possible involvement programs. 612 But
such a complete deregulation would go too far. Employers then would
be free to establish company-dominated organizations whose purpose
is to suppress union organizing efforts rather than to afford any true
measure of independent representation.
More common are proposals for a partial repeal of section
8(a) (2). This is the route suggested by the Dunlop Commission. The
Commission's final report recommended that Congress clarify section
8(a) (2) so that nonunion EIP's are not deemed unlawful "simply be-
cause they involve discussion of terms and conditions of work or
compensation where such discussion is incidental to the broad pur-
pose of these programs."613 The Commission, however, would con-
tinue the prohibition on company-dominated unions, particularly
where an employer establishes a program "with the purpose of frus-
trating employee efforts to obtain independent representation." 614
A somewhat more pi o-employer variant is the TEAM Act that
passed Congress in 1996,615 but which President Clinton vetoed.616
This legislation would have amended section 8(a) (2) to make clear
that an employer's creation of an EIP is not an unfair labor practice,
even if it addresses terms and conditions of employment, so long as
the entity does not seek "to negotiate or enter into collective bargain-
ing agreements."617 This version appears . to permit the formation of
company unions so long as their proceedings are not reduced to a
written agreement. 618
611 See, e.g., Bruce E. Kaufman, The Employee Participation/Representation Gap: An Assess-
ment and Proposed Solution, 3 U. PA. J. Lite. & Eme. L. 491, 532, 543 (2001).
6111 See Estreicher, supra note 230, at 160 (arguing in favor of experimentation in the
design of nonunion Eli's).
613 REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORICER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, Supra note 437, at 8.
814 id.
613 Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, H.R. 743, 104th Congress
(1996).
616 See Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 1997), at e-1.
613 See 1-1.R. 743.
618 See Arthur J. Martin, Company Sponsored Employee Involvement: A Union Perspective, 40
ST. Louis U. L.J. 119, 136-37 (1996) (characterizing the TEAM Act and the Dunlop
Co 'ssion recommendation as "nothing more or less than attempts to legitimize the
company unions that flourished in the darkest days of early industrialization in order to
frustrate employees' efforts to organize"); see also Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Par-
ticipation is Required in a Declining Union Environment to Provide Employees with Meaningful
Industrial Democracy, 66 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 135, 142-43 (1997) (criticizing the TEAM Act
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Others have proposed a more pro-employee version of partial
repeal in which employer-sponsored EIPs would be tolerated only
upon compliance with various structural safeguards. As an example,
Professors Summers and Hyde both would permit EIPs only if ap-
proved by a secret-ballot election of the employees in question 619
Similarly, a group of six professors crafted an Employee Involvement
Bill as an alternative to the TEAM Act which would partially repeal
section 8(a) (2) subject to a number of conditions 620
The shared shortcoming of all of these proposals is that they
merely tolerate, rather than require, employee involvement. Thus, an
easing of section 8(a) (2)'s ban on employer-dominated EIPs will re-
sult in more employee involvement only if employers desire that re-
sult. 621 At present, there is much to suggest that most employers would
prefer to muffle rather than to amplify employee voice. 622 While the
sheer number of EIPs has risen in recent years, many of those pro-
grams are "largely talk"623 and designed to influence worker prefer-
ences rather than to listen to worker concerns. 624
for not containing safeguards to ensure that employers not use EIPs as a mechanism for
thwarting unionization).
612
 See generally Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Em-
ployment Law, 69 041.-KENT L. REV. 149 (1993); Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice and Em-
ployer Choice: A Structured Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI :Kerr L. Rev. 129 (1993).
620 See Charles J. Morris, Will There Be a New Direction for American Industrial Relations 1—A
Hard Look at the TEAM Bill, The Smiler Substitute Bill, and the Employee Involvement Bill, 47
LAB. L. J. 89,92 (1996). The six professors are Charles J. Morris, Thomas A. Kochan, Clyde
W. Summers, William N. Cooke, Charles B. Craver, and Harry C. Katz. See id. The EIB
would add two provisos to section 8(a) (2). The first would permit EIPs where no union
representation exists and the EP does not seek to represent employees with regard to
grievances, wages, and other working conditions. Id. at 100. The second set of conditions
would apply where the EIP is representational in nature. Here; five conditions must be met
that, on the whole, assure affected employees a democratic process with regard to how the
EIP runs and how the members are chosen. Id.
621 See WEILER, supra note 90, at 206-11 (discussing how EIPs generally exist at the dis-
cretion of the employer and that even if workers want workplace involvement, if the em-
ployer does not, then no EIP will exist because management alone has the power to de-
cide).
622 See Harper, supra note 468, at 115 (concluding that "the different responses of
management to average workers in union and nonunion environments ... do not reflect
an inability to hear the voices of these workers without the amplification of union repre-
sentation, but rather a lack of interest in listening").
623 Freeman Sc Rogers, supra note 162, at 35.
624 See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation:
From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 Coeum. L. Rev. 753,825-78 (1994); Harper, supra
note 468, at 113-14.
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2. Works Councils
A better option than EIPs is to mandate some form of works
council system similar to that which exists in Germany. 625 Works coun-
cils are "elected bodies of employees who meet regularly with man-
agement to discuss establishment level problems."626 Works councils
in Europe typically are independent institutions through which em-
ployees consult with management in a relatively non-adversarial man-
ner.627 In short, they are a close approximation of the type of em-
ployee involvement mechanism that workers who were questioned as
part of the Worker Representation and Participation Survey so highly
favored.628
Although most West European countries have adopted legislation
mandating works councils, 6" the German experience is the oldest and
most well-developed 630 Under the German Works Constitution Act, 651
an employer who employs a minimum of five employees must estab-
lish a works council upon the request of three or more employees. 632
The size of the council varies with the size of the employer, and the
employees elect representatives in a manner that reflects the composi-
tion of the workforce 633
The works council is empowered to consult with management on
a variety of plant or enterprise-related topics. The works council has
625 A number of English-language publications describe German works councils. See,
e.g., MANFRED WEISS, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GERMANY Ch. 5 (1995);
Rudolph Buschmann, Workers Participation and Collective Bargaining in Germany, 15 COMP.
LAB. U. 26 (1993); Alex Leuchten, Germany, in I INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOY-
MENT LAWS 4-35 to 4-45 (William L. Keller, ed. 1997); Clyde W. Summers, An American
Perspective of the German Model of Worker Participation, 28 COMP. LAB. U. 333 (1987).
626
 U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, supra note 75, at 93.
627 See generally Summers, supra note 625, at 343-45.
628 SA supra notes 604, 606 and accompanying text.
629 See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 162, at 45-46. In 1994, the European Union ap-
proved a directive requiring large multinational corporations that operate in two or more
EU states to establish a European Works Council or similar mechanism for employee con-
sultation. Council Directive 94/45, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64.
639 The first Works Council Law was enacted in Weimer Germany in 1920. The statute
was revoked during the Nazi era and reintroduced following World War II. The statute
subsequently was amended in both 1952 and 1972. See Janice R. Bellace, The Role of Law in
Supporting Cooperative Employee Representation Systems, 15 COMP. LAB. U. 441, 456 (1999);
Leuchten, supra note 625, at 4-35.
631 Betriebsverffassungsgesetz (BetrVG) (Works Constitution Act], v. 15.1.1972 (BGBI.
S. 13).
632 See Leuchten, supra note 625, at 4-36 to 4-37.
633 See id. 4-37. The statute requires that salaried and hourly workers be proportion-
ately represented in the works council. Id.
448 	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 43:351
the right to receive information from, and exchange views with, man-
agement concerning the employer's compliance with applicable laws
and on general business matters. 634 The employer also must consult
with the works council prior to the hiring, transfer, or termination of
employees.635 Finally, with respect to a number of "social" topics, such
as work scheduling, safety measures, and the restructuring of jobs, the
works council has a right to "co-determination." 636 If the parties can-
not come to agreement on one of these topics, the dispute is referred
to a dispute resolution panel for final and binding resolution. 637 The
works council is forbidden to strike or to use other types of economic
action in support of its position. 638
Works councils in Germany serve to supplement, rather than to
supplant, traditional unions. In Germany, unions tend to bargain on
economic matters on a national or regional basis within certain hicks-
tries.638 Works councils may seek to enforce or supplement the union
agreement at the local level, but the applicable union contract pre-
empts any contradictory works council arrangement. 64° Although the
unions play no official role in works council operation, a majority of
works council members also are union members, thereby ensuring a
considerable amount of coordination in efforts. 6"
Professor Paul Weiler has been the most vocal proponent of
adopting an American works council system 64 2 He has endorsed im-
porting most aspects of the German system with two major excep-
634 See id. 4-39 to 4-40.
635 See id. 4-40 to 4-41. An employer may discharge a worker even if the works council
disapproves of such action. Id. at 4-41. The employee, however, may challenge the termi-
nation by appealing to the labor court, and the employer can rely only on its explanation
previously given to the works council in attempting to establish sufficient cause for the
discharge. Id. at 9-15 to 4-19,4-41.
636 See id. 4-41 to 4-42; Buschmann, supra note 625, at 31; Freeman & Rogers, supra
note 162, at 49.
687 See Bellace, Cooperative Employee Representation, supra note 630, at 448; Leuchten, su-
pra note 625, at 4-42.
638 See Bellace, supra note 630, at 447-48; Leuchten, supra note 625, at 4-35.
638 See generally Leuchten, supra note 625, at 4-19 to 4-30; Summers, supra note 73, at
1412-14.
686 See Leuchten, supra note 625, at 9-35.
6" See Otto Jacobi et al., Germany: Codetermining the Future?, in brousnum. RELATIONS
IN THE NEW EUROPE 243-44 (Anthony Ferrier & Richard Hyman eds., 1992) (estimating
that 75% of German works councilors are members of unions affiliated with the central
labor federation); Summers, supra note 73, at 1416 (estimating that 80% of those employ-
ees elected to German works councils are nominated from union slates). Works councils
and unions in Germany frequently work closely together. See Weiss, supra note 625, at-I69,
174-75.
682 WEn-en, supra note 90, at 283-95.
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Lions. First, Professor Weiler recommends that disagreements involv-
ing matters subject to co-determination be resolved by affording the
affected employees the right to strike rather than by access to binding
arbitration. 643 Second, he suggests that in a unionized workplace, the
local union, upon majority vote, should serve as the works council
body.644
I disagree with Professor Weiler on both points. Providing works
councils with the right to strike would alter radically their consultative
nature. Rather than being a body that is directed to seek solutions
with management in a "spirit of mutual trust" as it is in Germany, 645
the option of concerted action would transform works councils into a
more adversarial body akin to American unions. Of course, Professor
Weiler is right in arguing that generally available binding interest ar-
bitration is inconsistent with American labor traditions.646 The only
real solution, it appears, is to require the consultative process, but
without imposing any formal impasse-breaking mechanism. 647
On Professor Weiler's second point, enabling the local union to
serve as the consultative body blurs the essential distinction between
the nature of these two entities. Unions are independent institutions
with the right to compel collective bargaining on terms and condi-
tions of employment and the right to back up bargaining positions
with concerted economic action .648 Works councils, on the other
hand, are parliamentary-type consultative bodies that address a
broader array of topics at the local level in a less confrontational
manner. 649 If unions serve both functions, it is likely that the consulta-
tive function will become submerged in the union's barga . • g
6" See id. at 290. •
6.4 See id. at 294-95. Professor Weiler suggest that a second council would be necessary
for nonunion employees at the work site, with the two councils coordinating their efforts
in consulting with management. See id.
646 See Buschmann, supra note 625, at 30 (citing to BetrVG § 2).
646 See WEILER, supra note 90 at 290 ("Under American labor policy, at least in the pri-
vate sector, we have decided for good reasons not to give unions a regime of binding inter-
est arbitration"); see also Summers, supra note 625, at 352 ("Recourse to arbitration to settle
an interest dispute, as under the Works Constitution Act, runs directly counter to the
deeply rooted American principle of free collective bargaining.").
647 This would not necessarily result in a lack of good faith consultation by manage-
ment. Employers would have an incentive to consult in good faith so as not to create a
disgruntled group of employees who then might find the option of union representation
more palatable.
648 See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
649 See general!) U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, Supra note 75, at 43. Works councils, unlike Ger-
man unions, function at the local level and maintain independence from the union. See
generally Summers, supra note 625, at 343-45.
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agenda.65° A better resolution is to keep the two entities separate, but,
as in Germany, permit unions to endorse candidates for works council
membership. 6m
With these suggestions, the adoption of an American works
council system effectively could close the "representa-
tion/participation gap" documented by Freeman and Rogers. 652 Em-
ployees at firms exceeding a certain minimum size would have the
automatic right to a participatory mechanism without being depend-
ent on the benevolence of their employer and without the necessity of
enduring the strife and adversarial hangover of a union election cam-
paign. The works council institution, itself, would provide a mecha-
nism for expressing employee concerns in a more cooperative envi-
ronment. And, when combined with the labor law reforms suggested
above,655 employees still would have the option of amplifying their
voice yet further by freely selecting more traditional union represen-
tation.
While works councils mirror the type of employee involvement
plan that most workers desire, gaining the support of either manage-
ment or unions for such a system will be difficult. 654 Both tend to op-
pose a works council system, albeit, for different reasons. 655
Some commentators perceive mandatory works councils as costly
and cumbersome. 656 They point out that such legislation would im-
pose costs on employers with respect to both the establishment and
the maintenance of such organizations. 657 Additional costs would re-
sult from a lack of employer flexibility in being able to adjust em-
ployment practices quickly in response to market conditions. 658
656 See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 162, at 62-63 (maintaining that works councils
should not engage in wage bargaining because they are an institution designed to increase
enterprise surplus rather than to fight over how firm profits should be divided).
651 See supra note 641 and accompanying text.
652 See supra note 607 and accompanying text.
653 See supra notes 524-596 and accompanying text. •
654 See Estreicher, supra note 230, at 159 (noting the lack of a political constituency for
the adoption of a works council system); Michael H. Gottesman, Whither Goest Labor Law:
Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L. J. 2767, 2807 (1991).
655 See Bellace, supra note 78, at 26 (noting that both management and unions tend to
oppose the adoption of a works council system).
456 See generally Carol D. Rasnic, Germany's Statutory Works Councils and Employee Codeter-
mination: A Model for the United States?, 14 Lot L. A. het & Cone. L. J. 275, 299-300
(1992) (criticizing works councils as impinging on management prerogatives).
655 See Kaufman, supra note 611, at 541-42. Under the German works council model,
employers are responsible for financing the operations of work councils. See Leuchten,
supra note 625, at 4-44 to 4-45.
655 See Addison, supra note 395, at 313; Kaufman, supra note 611, at 541-42.
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The evidence concerning the likely impact of works councils on
productivity, however, is far from clear. Research suggests that em-
ployee involvement generally increases productivity and the economic
performance of the organization 659 Interviews with managers of
European firms who consult with works councils "overwhelmingly ...
[report that work councils] have important positive effects which in
general make them a net benefit to firms."660 On the other hand, em-
pirical studies looking specifically at German works councils find that
they have little correlation with productivity, 66I except in smaller firms
where the correlation is for a reduced level of productivity. 662
While economic productivity should not be the sole gauge for
measuring the worth of a works council system, these financial con-
cerns can be mollified, at least in part, by two adjustments to the
German model. First, the potential drag on managerial speed and
flexibility could be reduced by the expedient of only requiring con-
sultation without also requiring lengthy impasse procedures such as
arbitration. 663 Further, legislation could exempt small employers, such
as those with fewer than fifty employees, from the works council man-
date.
Union supporters also find much to dislike in works councils and
other employee involvement plans. They perceive such programs as
creating sham organizations that inherently impede true collective
bargaining. 666 As former United Auto Workers President Douglas A.
65" See supra notes 404-405 and accompanying text.
660 Freeman & Rogers, supra note 162, at 51. Freeman & Rogers also state that "man-
agers widely report that councils facilitate communication with employees, increase em-
ployee commitment and force advanced planning in areas that require council consulta-
tion that improve management's own initiatives." Id.
661 Addison, supra note 395, at 322 (reporting that the empirical research shows "little
evidence of any positive impact of works councils on firm performance. Much of the evi-
dence actually points in the opposite direction"); Kaufman, supra note 611, at 541 (report-
ing that mixed econometric evidence exists that works councils in Germany promote pro-
ductivity).
662 See Kaufman, supra note 611, at 541.
663 See supra notes 646-647 and accompanying text.
664 This is the threshold adopted in the Dutch Works Constitution Act, see van Peijpe,
supra note 454, at 134, as well as in the United States' Family and Medical Leave Act, see 29
U.S.C. § 2601(4) (A) (i) (1994).
665 For a discussion of union views on works councils as a specific sub-type of EIP, see
Freeman & Rogers, supra note 162, at 50.
666 See, e.g., Laurence Gold, The Legal Status of "Employee Participation" Programs After the
Labor Board's Electromation and du Pont Decisions, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVER-
SITY'S 46TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR, JUNE 2, 1993 at 21-24 (Bruno Stein ed.,
1994); Michael Harper, The Continuing Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the Contemporary Work-
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Frasers stated in his dissent to the Dunlop Commission's majority po-
sition on this issue, the kind of participation and cooperation that the
American system really needs "is democratic participation and coop-
eration between equals."667 In other words, America needs independ-
ent unions, not employer-dominated participation schemes.
I think that union supporters are shortsighted in opposing legis-
lation establishing works councils. Unlike other employee involve-
ment mechanisms, employers cannot manipulate the creation of
mandatory works councils to deter a union organizing drive We Works
councils, moreover, involve collective action and likely will serve as
seed beds for independent unions.669 Workers who feel either em-
powered or thwarted by a works council experience, may turn to in-
dependent unions to further their new-found collective aspirations. 679
Even if this is incorrect, the argument that unions conceptually
are a more desirable model of employee representation no longer
provides a compelling basis for employee advocates to oppose works
councils. Union representation in the United States now stands at a
mere thirteen percent of the workforce and continues to drop 671
Stated conversely, the vast majority of American workers have no rep-
resentation rights at all. Under the circumstances, some voice is better
than no voice at all.
place, 96 Mims L. REV. 2322, 2375-76 (1998); Owen Herrnstadt, Section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA: The Debate, 48 LAB. L.J. 98, 104-05 (1997); Martin, supra note 618, at 136-37.
667 REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437, at 13.
668 Unlike most E1P plans which exist only at the discretion of management, only
workers can trigger the formation of a works council. See U.S. DEP'T of LABOR, supra note
75, at 43; WEILER, MOM note 90, at 292; Weiss, supra note 625, at 169.
669 See Estreicher, supra note 71, at 29 (stating that works councils, if adopted in the
United States, "are likely to be seed beds of traditional unionism, if they take hold at all");
George Strauss, Is the New Deal Collapsing? With What Might ft Be Replaced?, 34 INDUS. REL.
329, 340 (1995) (stating that institutions such as works councils "might serve as way sta-
tions toward independent unions").
676 Goldman, supra note 173, at 302 ("union leadership should recognize that
works councils may be the best means for providing the new American work force with
object lessons in the value of collective action as well as serve as a training ground to de-
velop the core of rank and file leadership needed for successful bargaining unit organiz-
ing."); see also Kaufman, supra note 398, at 788-89.
67 ' See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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D. Recommendation #4—Enhancing Employment Protection for the
Contingent Workforce
The final set of recommendations attempts to address the black
hole of legal deregulation672 that has accompanied the increase in
contingent work. Toward this objective, this Section recommends ex-
panding the coverage of employment protection statutes, easing un-
ion organizing rules for leased employees, and increasing the port-
ability of certain employee benefits.
L Expanding the Reach of Employment Protection Statutes
As discussed above,673 the most serious legal problem resulting
from the increase in nonstandard work arrangements is the lack of
coverage for many types of contingent workers under American em-
ployment protection statutes. This problem, in turn, flows primarily
from a restrictive interpretation of "employee" status which serves as
the touchstone for statutory coverage. The prevailing common law
definition fails to extend basic social protection to many workers who
provide labor under subordinate circunistances. 674
The Dunlop Commission's proposed solution is to adopt a uni-
tary "economic realities" test for defining employee status. 675 The
Commission's final report opined that the determination of whether
someone is an employee for purposes of employment protection stat-
utes "should not be based on the degree of immediate control the
employer exercises over the worker, but rather on the underlying
economic realities_ of the relationship." 676 Presumably, the Commis-
sion's recommendation, if adopted, would extend the economic reali-
ties test currently used under the FLSA to other federal labor, em-
672 See supra notes 425-460 and accompanying text.
675 See supra notes 430-458 and accompanying text.
674 See supra notes 451-460 and accompanying text.
675 See REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437, at 36.
The Report also recommended that the "'single employer' doctrine should be expanded
so that firms do not have incentives to use variations in the corporate form to avoid work-
place responsibilities." Id. at 41. I have argued elsewhere in favor of the need for such re-
form and proposed a reformulated test for determining employer status. See Stephen F.
Befort, Labor Law and the Double-Breasted Employer. A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter
Ego Doctrines and a Proposed Reformulation, 1987 Wm. L. FtEv. 67, 101 (1987).
076 See REPORT ON FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, supra note 437, at 38.
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ployment, and tax statutes. 677 Many commentators agree with this rec-
ommendation. 678
While the Commission's recommendation certainly would im-
prove on the current connnon law approach, it falls short of an ideal
solution. As with the common law standard, the economic realities
test also consists of a multi-factor formula in which the right to con-
trol the manner of work is a significant factors" As demonstrated by
Professor Marc Linder, the federal courts increasingly have inter-
preted the economic realities test in a manner that is more restrictive
than its ostensible purpose would suggest. 680 As a result, many workers
are deemed not to be covered employees even though they are eco-
nomically dependent upon a particular user entity."'
A comparative view once again offers the prospect for a prefer-
able solution. A number of countries have recognized a third category
of workers that falls in between that of employees and independent
contractors. These "dependent contractors"682 technically are not em-
ployees under the traditional legal tests, but nonetheless are recog-
nized as deserving of some employee-like legal protections by virtue
of working in positions of economic dependence. 683 Employment pro-
tection laws that are currently in place in Canada, 684 Sweden,685 Ger-
677 The economic realities test as currently used under the FLSA is discussed supra at
note 441 and accompanying text.
678 See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 79, at 884; Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concern-
ing the Contingent Work Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739,749-50 (1995); Stone, supra note
252, at 652. But see Hylton, supra note 115, at 849-50 (arguing for a cautious approach to
any increased legal regulation of contingent work).
678 See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
680 See Linder, supra note 132, at 207-09.
68 ' See id.; Maltby & Yatnada, supra note 439, at 260-62.
682 The term "dependent contractor" was coined by Canadian scholar Harry W. Ar-
thurs. See Harry W. Arthurs, The Dependent Contractor A Study of the Legal Problems of Counter-
vailing Power, 16 TORONTO L. J. 89 (1965).
685 See Langille & Davidov, supra note 117, at 24-25.
684 Most Canadian jurisdictions have adopted provisions that treat "dependent con-
tractors" as employees for purposes of collective bargaining. See id at 25. Ontario's Labour
Relations Act, for example, extends to a "dependent contractor" who is defined as:
a person, whether or not employed under a contract of employment ... who
performs work or services for another person for compensation or reward on
such terms and conditions that the dependent contractor is in a position of
economic dependence upon, and under an obligation to perform duties for,
that person more closely resembling the relationship of an employee than
that of an independent contractor.
Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. ch. 1, sched. A., § 80 (1995).
665 See Ronnie Eklund, A Look at Contract Labor in the Nordic Countries, 18 COMP. LAB.
LJ. 229,240-41 (1997) (reporting that "dependent contractors" are covered by Sweden's
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many,696 and the Netherlands,687 for example, treat dependent con-
tractors similar to employees for some purposes, but not for others.
Germany's approach is the one most worthy of emulation. There,
an intermediate group of "employee-like persons" 6" are technically
self-employed, yet nonetheless treated as employees for some pur-
poses because they are "economically dependent and are in similar
need of social protection." 689 Thus, employee-like persons are covered
by statutes relating to workplace health and safety, the prevention of
sexual harassment, and collective bargaining. 690 On the other hand,
these dependent contractors are not covered by Germany's Act on
Protection against Dismissals and the Act on Working Time."' This
dichotomy apparently reflects the notion that statutory coverage
should be broader where basic societal interests are at stake than
where the interests in question relate more narrowly to the status of
an individual worker.
The United States should follow this example and extend the
reach of employee protection statutes that serve core societal goals to
contractors who are economically dependent on a user firm. Antidis-
crimination statutes such as Tide VII clearly fall within this category.
The eradication of discrimination is a well-recognized societal goa1, 692
and it will not unduly distort labor market competition by extending
the antidiscrimination ban to this group of workers. 693 The same is
true for broadening OSHA's reach. On the other hand, individual
employment security protection from the revised META proposal
should not go so far as to restrict the termination of non-employee
contractors. With respect to the NLRB, a preferable solution is dis-
cussed in the following section.
collective harp'	 g statute (the Joint Regulation Act), but not by the Swedish Employ-
ment Protection Act).
696 See Wolfgang Daubler, Working People in Germany, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & PoL'v J. 77,
94-95 (1999) (reporting that 'employee-like persons" in Germany are covered by statutes
relating to workplace health and safety, the prevention of sexual harassment, and collective
bargaining, but not by statutes relating to employment security and working time).
687 See van Peijpe, supra note 454, at 141, 152 (reporting that economically dependent
workers are covered by Dutch labor law, and to a lesser extent, by the Dutch statute regu-
lating employment security).
688 "Arbeitnehmerahnliche Persottetn." See Daubler, supra note 686, at 77.
689 Id. at 88.
69° Id. at 94.
691 Id, at 95.
092 See supra note 512 and accompanying text.
698 See generally HENRY H. PERR1Tr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW & PRACTICE 1039
(1992); Maltby & Yamada, supra note 439, at 265.
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2. Enhancing the Option of Collective Bargaining for Leased
Employees
It is not uncommon in today's economy for a company to have
workers leased from a temporary services company working side-by-
side with the regular employees of the user company. Yet, while the
regular employees can decide for themselves whether to develop a
collective bargaining relationship with their employer, the leased
workers, at least until recently, 694 could join in that bargaining unit
only with the consent of both joint employers—the supplier lessor
company and the user lessee company. 695 The reason for this result is
that the NLRB has treated this situation as a variant of multi-employer
bargaining where it necessarily follows that a union cannot expand a
bargaining unit to encompass another employer's employees without
the consent of that other employer. 696 Such consent is hardly ever
granted, 697 with the result that the only union option for leased em-
ployees is to attempt to organize the dispersed workers of the leasing
company, a daunting task, indeed 698
The problem with the multi-employer analogy is that, in many
leased employee contexts, the user firm is not some outside entity, but
instead, an employer of both employee groups. The user entity, along
with a supplier entity, are considered to be joint employers of the
leased workers if the two entities share or co-determine matters gov-
erning the workers' terms and conditions of employment. 699 Because
of this fact, the NLRB in M.B. Sturgis, Inc. 703 recently declined to ac-
cept the "faulty logic" of prior decisions relying upon rules applicable
to multi-employer bargaining,90 and ruled that a unit composed of
employees who are jointly employed by a supplier employer and a
user employer, as well as employees who are solely employed by the
694 The Board overruled Lee Hospital, 300 N.L.R.B. 947 (1990), in 2000. See M.B.
Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (2000).
696 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
696 See Lee Hospital, 300 N.L.R.B. at 948 (applying the rules generally applicable to
multi.employer units to the leased employee situation).
697 See Rahebi, supra note 129, at 1124 (referring to an interview with former Board
Chairman William Gould during which he reportedly "remarked that he had not heard of
a case to date in which the [leased] employees had obtained the consent of both employ-
en").
698 See id. at 1113-15; see also M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 173, at 12
(reaffirming that the dispersed employees of a supplier firm may seek to bargain with the
supplier firm without needing to obtain the consent of the various user firms).
699 See Riverdale Nursing Home, 317 N.L.R.B. 881,882 (1995).
799 331 N.L.R.B. No. 173.
791 See id. at 13.
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user entity, is permissible so long as the two groups share a sufficient
community of interests?"
Although combining solely employed permanent employees with
jointly employed temporary employees may introduce some awk-
wardness in terms of tri-party !negotiations?" the Sturgis approach
comes with several advantages. First, eliminating the dual consent
prerequisite to a combined unit offers the only realistic prospect of
meaningful choice in union representation for leased employees.
Second, bargaining in a combined unit provides a vehicle for narrow-
ing the pay and benefit gap that currently separates temporary and
long-term workers?" Further, the Sturgis decision will not unduly
burden the user firm's flexibility since a combined unit only will be
appropriate where a joint employer relationship exists?" and the two
groups of workers share a community of interests?" Put another way,
leased employees will be included in the unit only where the user firm
both exercises control over the leased employee's working life and
assigns them to work tasks that are similar in nature to the user firm's
long-term workforce. In this particular context, the Sturgis decision
also serves the purpose of limiting an employer's capability of using
leased employees as a union avoidance tool?"
At this point, a legitimate question could be raised concerning
why a NLRB decision that already has been issued should be included
on a list of proposals for reform. The reason is that the Sturgis deci-
sion may well be short-lived. Either an appellate court or a NLRB
newly constituted by President Bush could reintroduce the former
dual consent requirement. In the face of a possible retreat, the long-
term elimination of the dual consent rule should remain on the re-
form agenda just in case.
3. Increasing the Portability of Benefits
Some have called for more direct governmental intervention to
reduce the pay and benefits gap. For a number of years beginning in
1987, U.S. Representative Patricia Schroeder introduced bills that
7°2 See id. at 12, 15.
703 See id. at 38-39 (Member Brame, dissenting).
704 See supm note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the lesser pay and benefits
generally received by contingent workers).
7°5 Set M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.RB. No. 173 7.
7°6 See id. at 15.
707 See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text (discussing that some employers
hire contingent workers in order to further a union avoidance strategy).
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would compel employers to provide proportional health and pension
benefits to certain part-time and temporary workers. 708 More recently,
in 1999, U.S. Representative Lane Evans introduced legislation calling
for employers to provide contingent workers with equal pay for eqtral
work and the same benefits as earned by regular employees after a
qualifying period of work attachment. 709
These proposals are quite intrusive and likely not very feasible.
Equal pay for equal work is a concept that, as we know from experi-
ence under the federal Equal Pay Act, applies to a very narrow range
of positions. 22° It probably would engender more litigation about what
work is "equal" than it would engender pay equity. As for benefits, it is
difficult to conceive how Congress, in fairness, could compel an em-
ployer to provide benefits to contingent workers when it does not do
so for employees generally. 711 Further, a mandate for more employer-
provided benefits could act as a serious drag on etnployment. 7 t 2
A more fruitful route would be to increase the portability of
benefits."' As discussed above, many contingent workers are ineligi-
ble for certain employee benefits because of the lack of a sufficient
work attachment with a particular employer. 714 Thus, even an em-
ployee who has engaged in substantially continuous employment, but
with a series of different employers, may not gain eligibility for a vari-
ety of benefits. As an example of legislation that could enhance port-
708 See, e.g., H.R. 2188, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also Schroeder, supra note 430,
at 736-37 (summarizing the proposed Part-Time and Temporary Workers Protection Act).
7°9 See H.R. 2298, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Forster, supra note 132, at 570 (summa-
rizing the proposed Equity for Temporary Worker Act of 1999).
Ti° See Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994); see also MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT LAW 298 (2d ed. 1999) (describing the Equal Pay Act's substantive proscrip-
tion as "brief and narrow").
711 ERISA, the principal federal statute governing employee benefits, regulates the
fiduciary management of benefits plans, but does not require that employers actually pro-
vide any particular benefits to employees. See generally Philip D. Nixon, Contingent Workers
and ERISA: Should the Law Protect Workers With No Reasonable Pension Expectations?, 25 OKLA.
Cm( U. L. REV. 667, 679 (2000).
712 Employeopaid benefits have increased three-fold since 1948 and now constitute
15.6% of compensation. MISHEL ET AL., ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THE STATE OF
WORKING AMERICA 2000-2001 at 116-17 (2001). Since the amount of benefits generally is
fixed for a full-time employee without regard to the number of hours worked, an employer
has a financial incentive to meet labor needs by increasing hours rather than by increasing
the number of employees. Id. Mandating proportionate benefits for contingent workers
likely would serve to strengthen that incentive.
7" The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, which protects
worker access to health insurance when changing jobs, is an example of a federal statute
that enhances the portability of benefits. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-82 (1994).
7" See supra note 430-433 and accompanying text.
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ability, Congress could amend ERISA to provide that employees who
work for more than one employer can accumulate periods of service
to meet the minimum vesting period for a defined contribution pen-
sion plan. 715 Similarly, state unemployment compensation laws could
be altered to permit more employees who work at part-time and tem-
porary positions to qualify for some proportion of unemployment
benefits. 7 l6 In both situations, the cost of providing these benefits
could be prorated among the various employing entities.
Contingent work arrangements are not likely to decrease in the
foreseeable future and trying to prevent their use is likely to be a fu-
tile endeavor. By increasing the portability of benefits, the law can ac-
commodate rather than obstruct the prevalence of these nonstandard
work arrangements.
CONCLUSION
Much has changed in the world of work over the past fifty years.
Evolving gender roles and increased immigration have changed the
demographics of who is at work. Advances in technology have
changed how we work. And, the global economy has altered what we
do at work and the market in which work is valued.
In the legal realm, the last fifty years have witnessed the decline
of collective regulation and the rise of governmental regulation. The
prevalence and impact of union-management relations has waned
while government oversight of the individual employment relation-
ship has waxed. Full-tilt civil litigation has displaced the bargaining
table and the relative informality of labor arbitration.
It is tempting to dismiss this trade-off in regulatory models as a
wash. One could look at this trade-off and conclude that although
employees now receive less security through union representation,
the new statutory and judicial limitations on the at-will rule provide
an equally effective counterweight to managerial interests. But this
view would not be accurate. The new governmental model of regula-
tion, at least for employees, is haphazard, difficult to access, and lack-
ing in voice. Further, as Professor Clyde Summers has shown in a re-
cent article, the courts have "grudgingly applied" many of the at-will
715 ERISA currently permits employers to establish a minimum five-year employment
period before an employee's pension benefit fully vests. See supra note 931 and accompany-
ing text.
716 Most state laws require an employee to work twenty weeks per year in order to qual-
ify for unemployment compensation benefits. See supra note 933 and accompanying text.
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limitations during the past decade."? Most importantly, however, the
changing dynamics of the global workplace have created a shift in
practical economic forces that dramatically skews the true balance in
the new legal order.
The new global market places a premium on capital flexibility.
Economic efficiency demands a decrease in workplace regulation.
Countries compete to deregulate in order to attract capital. Put sim-
ply, we are engaged in a dramatic race for the bottom in terms of em-
ployment regulation. Economic efficiency, however, is not the only
goal of a social system. Considerations of fair treatment must be
added to the mix as well.
This is not the first time in the World's history that technical in-
novation has outpaced the civilized rules of the master and servant
relationship. Technological change necessarily benefits first those who
have ownership rights to the new technology. In other eras, imbal-
ances in the respective legal rights of management and labor have
been adjusted in order to establish a new equilibrium. We need to do
so again.
Since global trade and technology largely are responsible for the
current lack of equilibrium, some type of global solution ultimately
will be necessary to re-balance the scales of workplace justice. What is
sorely needed is not a race to the bottom, but a new international
consensus on labor norms. As Europe has learned the hard way, it is
difficult to compete in a global economy with social policies that are
far more generous than the international norm. But it is increasingly
difficult to justify the fairness of American business having an advan-
tage in global economic competition by virtue of social policies that
fall below the international norm. A new consensus must be forged
that falls somewhere in between these two sides of the Atlantic Ocean.
This Article makes a number of recommendations that would
direct American labor and employment policy toward such a consen-
sus. They are art ambitious set of proposals, and I have no illusion that
they will be adopted readily in our present political climate. I only
hope that they will contribute to the ongoing debate that will be nec-
essary to correct the mess of our current labor and employment law
regime.
717 See Summers, supra note 177, at 73-77.
